



Säkerhetspolisen

Vår ref.
Therese Mattsson

Datum
1998-09-07

Ärende
SA 187-1394-98
Er ref.

MHM

250/009 11

P 2 Eni
A 9 T

9 Utrikesdepartementet
att: John-Christer Åhlander
103 39 STOCKHOLM

P2 EU 2 dnr 188/008

Tillgång till Säkerhetspolisens arkiv om Raoul Wallenberg

Utrikesdepartementet har till Säkerhetspolisen inkommit med en begäran om att få tillgång till handlingar i Säkerhetspolisens arkiv rörande Raoul Wallenberg.

Genomgång av aktuella handlingar skall enligt begäran ske av ambassadör Martin Hallqvist.

Säkerhetspolisen beviljar härmed Martin Hallqvist att få ta del av personakten gällande Raoul Wallenberg. Handlingarna skall genomgå i Säkerhetspolisens lokaler.

Martin Hallqvist ombeds ta kontakt med arkivarie Gunnar Carlsson för att överenskomma om lämplig tidpunkt för besök.


Bjørne Törner
Polisöverintendent


Therese Mattsson
Polisintendent

kopia till arkivarie Gunnar Carlsson

BAKER & MCKENZIE

ADVOKATBYRÅ

ERIKSBERGSGATAN 46
BOX 26169, 100 41 STOCKHOLM
TELEFON: 08-566 177 00
TELEFAX: 08-566 177 99
E-mail: stockholm@bakernet.com

253/662 10

P 2 En'

TELEFAX

DATUM: 1998-09-10
TILL: Henrik Ankarcrone
FAX NR: 08-611 82 16
TILL: Kabinettssekreterare Jan Eliasson
FAX NR: 08-723 11 76
TILL: Kamrarrättspresident Henry Montgomery
FAX NR: 08-662 05 87
FRÅN: Claes Cronstedt

TOTALT ANTAL SIDOR (INKL DENNA): 5

Detta telefax är endast avsett för ovan angivna adressat. Annan får inte kopiera, vidareförmedla eller tillgodogöra sig den information telefaxet innehåller. Om Ni erhållit telefaxet av misstag ombedes Ni meddela oss per telefon och återsända originalet per post. Vi ersätter därefter Era kostnader.

MEDDELANDE

Bröder,

Åberopande vårt möte i tisdags får jag översända en justerad pamflett.

Caroline Wallenberg ringde igår morse och var förtvivlad över att hon missat vårt sammanträde. Hon hade antecknat fel dag i sin kalender och bad mig framföra detta till Er.

Jag återkommer med Peder Bondes gästlista. Den skickas direkt till vårt Washington-kontor.

Hjärtliga hälsningar

Claes Cronstedt

CLAES CRONSTEDT
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
THE RAOUL WALLENBERG PRIZE FOUNDATION

STOCKHOLM
9 September, 1998

THE RAOUL WALLENBERG PRIZE FOUNDATION

Raoul Wallenberg came to Budapest in 1944 as First Secretary of the Swedish Legation and representative of the United States War Refugee Board. Budapest was occupied by the Nazis. When he got there, the 230,000 Jews living in Budapest faced a prospect of imminent deportation to their deaths in Auschwitz. The fate that had already befallen the 437,000 Hungarian Jews who had lived outside the Capital. Wallenberg's assignment was to save as many lives as possible.

The young Swedish diplomat devised a system that would eventually give some 100,000 people a tenuous new lease of life — the "Schutz-Pass" or "protective passport". The document looked official, and bore the Swedish royal coat of arms and the national colours. On his almost daily visits to the train station, he would distribute the "Schutz-Pass" to Jews who had been selected for transport to Auschwitz in sealed cattle cars. The Germans believed the documents gave the bearer diplomatic immunity and would excuse whoever had one from boarding the train.

In November 1944, the man in charge of the "Final Solution", Adolf Eichmann, ordered all remaining Hungarian Jewish women and children to march on foot to the Austrian border, 125 miles away, where they would board trains for Auschwitz. Wallenberg heard of the operation, and drove along the route to pass out food and water — and also to distribute more Swedish "Schutz-Passes".

Shortly afterwards, he learned that the Nazis had drawn up plans to destroy the Budapest Ghetto, together with its inhabitants. Wallenberg confronted the Nazi charged with carrying out the orders and told him he would hang as a war criminal if the plan was carried out. With the sound of Soviet artillery echoing in the distance, the warning was only too credible. The death warrants of another 75,000 people were rescinded.

On 17 January, 1945, Wallenberg set out for the Soviet Army Headquarters in Debrecen to try and round up some provisions for the Jews who remained. He never returned and his fate remains a mystery...

On 5 October 1981, President Reagan signed into law a bill making Raoul Wallenberg an honorary citizen of the United States, the second in history after Winston Churchill. Canada proclaimed Raoul Wallenberg an honorary citizen on Human Rights Day on 10 December 1985. On 17 January 1986, the Israeli ambassador to Sweden made the announcement in the Stockholm Cathedral that Wallenberg had been made Israel's first honorary citizen.

Genocide and mass murder have not been consigned to history. The basic freedom and human rights enshrined in the United Nations conventions are routinely disregarded, and prosecution and obsession are rife. The rules governing warfare no longer apply. More than 90 percent of war casualties today are civilians, compared to 10 percent in World War I and

50 percent in World War II. This reflects the nature of the internal conflicts now being fought along religious or ethnic divides, where women and children are in the front lines. The international law books are full of newly-enacted humanitarian covenants, all duly ratified, but the inhumanity of man-to-man goes on.

Under these conditions, the role of the selfless individual is more important than ever. Acts by courageous personalities can halt violence and mitigate suffering. It is here that the example of Raoul Wallenberg can show the youth of today what they can do to fight tyranny in the midst of madness and expose genocide and human rights abuses before they become systematic.

THE FOUNDATION

This foundation was established with the aim of seeking out and honouring people who have dedicated their lives to upholding those humanitarian principles that Raoul Wallenberg held dear. It is hoped that the attention given to a prize honouring someone who, at great personal danger, preserved the spirit of Raoul Wallenberg by saving fellow human beings will be an inspiration to the young around the world.

The Foundation is a charitable trust with the stated goal of keeping the name and deeds of Raoul Wallenberg alive for future generations through the annual award of The Raoul Wallenberg Prize. The founders of the Foundation are:

Professor Emeritus Carl-Gustaf Andrén,
Count Claes Cronstedt,
Professor Guy von Dardel (half-brother of Raoul Wallenberg),
Mr. Jan Eliasson, and
Mrs. Nina Lagergren (half-sister of Raoul Wallenberg).

The assets of the Foundation will come from gifts, legacies, and the interest these assets earn. The Board, headquartered in Stockholm, administers the Foundation's funds and oversees its activities. The founders have provisionally appointed the following members of the Board:

Mr. Henric Ankarcrona, Stockholm, Hinc Asset Management AB,

Count Peder Bonde, Washington, D.C., Investor International AB (Count Bonde is a second cousin of Raoul Wallenberg)

Count Claes Cronstedt, Stockholm, partner of Baker & McKenzie and Chairman of the Raoul Wallenberg Association in Sweden,

Mr. Jan Eliasson, Stockholm, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and in the Swedish government responsible for the search of Raoul Wallenberg; (Mr. Eliasson was the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs in the UN 1992-1994 and Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN 1988-1992),

Judge Henry Montgomery, Stockholm (former President of the Administrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm), and

Ms. Caroline Wallenberg, Stockholm, LL.M.

One seat has been reserved for a non-Swedish member.

THE PRIZE

The Raoul Wallenberg Prize shall amount to at least USD 100,000. The prize can be divided into two parts, one part to the laureate personally and one part to a project suggested by the laureate which focuses on conflict prevention or protection of human dignity and is approved by the Jury.

THE LAUREATE

The example of Raoul Wallenberg is the standard by which the jury is guided. The laureate must be a person who, without regard to personal gain and under great danger has displayed a singular courage in advancing a humanitarian goal. Ideally, the saving of lives under conditions of armed conflict or military occupation.

The name of the laureate will be announced on 17 January, the anniversary of the day on which Raoul Wallenberg was arrested. The award will be bestowed upon the laureate at a ceremony in Stockholm in May, presumably by a member of the Swedish royal family.

THE JURY

The Jury consists of 11 members to be appointed by the Board. They must have a proven interest in humanitarian affairs and be of a suitable station in life. Race, religion, sex, national origin, or professional standing are not determining factors in choosing Jury members.

THE FOUNDATION'S EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

The Executive Secretariat of the Foundation is the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (RWI), an academic institution established in 1984 at the University of Lund, Sweden. RWI is a charitable trust, supported by annual grants from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, whose purpose is to promote research, training, and academic education in the fields of human rights and humanitarian law.

RWI initiates, develops, and supports studies in public international law as well as human rights and humanitarian law. In cooperation with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), RWI runs an academic program for promoting human rights standards and democratic values in developing countries, particularly in Africa and Asia.

NOMINATION PROCEDURE

Any organization or individual may nominate a candidate for the prize. The candidate must be a person, not an organization. The deadline for nominations is 31 May. The letter of nomination should contain the following particulars:

- personal information on the nominee,
- a description of his or her activities and achievements,
- documentation of the activities,
- status of the nominator (individual, NGO, national institution, etc.), and whether there is any direct or indirect association between nominator and nominee, and
- references (addresses and telephone numbers) of individuals who may be contacted by the Jury for more information or corroboration.

Preliminary timetable:

- June-November: The nominations are reviewed.
- 1 December: A short list of the proposals is presented to the Jury.
- 1-15 January: The Jury selects the laureate.
- 17 January: Announcement of the laureate.
- January-May: Ceremony preparations.
- May: Prize ceremony in Stockholm.

The first laureate is scheduled to be named for the year 2000.

FOUNDING DONORS

The Raoul Wallenberg Prize Foundation welcomes financial contributions from those who support its goals. It has established the following criteria for prospective donors:

- All contributions, whether monetary or in kind, are given in the spirit of the aims of the Foundation.
- No benefit or gain will be sought, directly or indirectly, by the donor.
- The donor supports the total confidentiality and independence of the Board and the Jury.

The names of founding donors will be made known internationally, and they will be invited to the award ceremony in Stockholm.

To: Lage Olson EI/ESTK X

Attn: Martin Hallquist

From: Susanne Berger
1 703 237 0946

Date: September 9, 1998

Ex Hill:

Martin Hallquist, EC

Exp. 98-09-09

P 2 Cu'

K

u.a./K

Dear Lage,

Could you please transmit the enclosed message to Martin? I sent an e-mail but it was returned. I may have misspelled the name.

I have decided to write a report on the Swedish materials in the RW case and the Swedish dimension of the problem in general, as a basis of discussion for the next meeting of the Working Group. Thank you for your advice. I see now that without a report there is too much room for misinterpretations.

Best regards

Dear Mr. Hallquist,

Thank you for your active interest in the review of the Swedish Military Intelligence materials in the RW case. I hope you were not too discouraged by the sparsity of the particular collection you reviewed. This type of material is typical for a primary level request. It is only useful as a general foothold from which further requests for additional, indirectly related, yet highly relevant material are developed. Once that process is complete, one usually finds that such material actually leads to valuable information about the primary target of the investigation or in some cases even to additional primary source material that was hitherto unavailable.

I would be grateful, should you choose to continue your inquiries, to advise the respective archivists in other Swedish archives (Intelligence and others) with whom we have pending requests that for the moment the inquiries of the Swedish Foreign Ministry are conducted PROCEDURALLY independently from our own requests, although we all work together on the same project and exchange the information we find. This will serve to avoid any confusion on the part of the archivists as to whether or not your visit comes in answer to one of our requests. It will also avoid any misunderstanding in the subsequent question of how follow up to these requests should be conducted.

I hope we will have a chance to discuss these matters in some detail during our next meeting in Stockholm. I will draft an advance paper on the review of Swedish materials and the Swedish question in general. It will be available by the end of September.

Best wishes,

Susanne



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1998-09-11

Utrikesdepartementet

Ambassaden
OSLO

EI/ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08 - 405 3280

✗

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

I anslutning till vårt krypto den 9 dennes i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet vore vi tacksamma om ambassaden vid sin förfrågan hos vederbörande norska myndigheter även kunde inkludera den i faxet nämnde norskättade finansattachén Iver C. Olsen vid den amerikanska ambassaden i Stockholm. Utöver att vara kontakman för Raoul Wallenberg spelade han bl.a. en aktiv roll beträffande flyktinghjälpen till Norge under andra världskriget.

Cabinet

Postadress
103 39 STOCKHOLM

Telefon
08 - 405 10 00

E-post: ud@foreign.ministry.se
X.400: S=UD; O=Foreign; P=Ministry; A=SIL; C=SE

Besöksadress
103 39

Telefax
08 - 723 11 76

Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

Author: Ulf (UD) Lindell at (Pk)Ottawa-amb
Date: 1998-09-10 17.34
Priority: Normal
Receipt Requested
TO: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
CC: Fredrik (UD) Wetterqvist
Subject: Montreal-Kiev-Kazan

253/001

1998 09 11

P 2 Eu'

Lage,

Härmed resultatet av ett samtal med Mr Kantorsky i Montreal.

Hälsningar

Ulf

Delges:

Kabs

Amb Kiev

von Dandel

Carl Persson

Magnusson, Riga

Hellqvist, EC

Olson, EI-ESEK

Gullgren, EC 4

Amb Moskva

RW-Föreningen

exp. 98-09-11

K

G.A. / L

1998-09-10

Montrealbo minns samtal i Kiev om fångläger i Kazan

Följande från ett telefonsamtal med Mr Oskar Kantorsky, Montreal idag:

Kantorsky, som är av judisk börd, lämnade Ukraina 1973. Tjugotre år senare, 1976, var han för första gången på besök i Kiev, sin gamla hemstad. En dag när han var på restaurant med gamla vänner utbringande han en skål för dem som hade fallit offer för sovjetsystemets förtryck. En stund senare kom en man, som hade hört honom utbringa skålen, fram till bordet och ville tala med honom. Mannen föreslog att de skulle slå ihop bordet med hans sällskaps bord, vilket skedde.

Mannen, som såvitt Kantorsky minns hette Nikolajev, Nikolev eller Nikitin eller något annat som börjar på "Nik" var omkring 70 år. Han berättade flera historier från olika fångläger där han suttit under många år. Nikolajev (om han hette så) hade gripits när han var i 18-årsåldern i slutet av 40-talet eller början av 50-talet mot bakgrund av att hans far, som varit överste i Röda Armén tidigare hade deserterat till den amerikanska zonen i Berlin. Familjen uppgavs ha varit rik på tsartiden och i hemmet hade talats både franska och engelska. "Nikolajev" (sonen) kom att fängslas i flera olika läger under många år.

År 1952 eller -53 satt "Nikolajev" i ett "prison camp" utanför staden Kazan. Detta var indelat i två

delar, en för vanliga brottslingar och en för politiska fångar. En vintermorgon kom flera svarta bilar med civilklädda ryssar och lämnade en ny fånge, som fick egen cell i fängelset, vilket var mycket ovanligt. Den nye fången övervakades och fick egentligen inte ha kontakt med övriga. Vid ett par tillfällen talade "Nikolajev" ändå med honom. Fångens brytning antydde att han inte var ryss. De samtalade även på engelska innan vakterna avbröt dem. Vid ett tillfälle nämnde fången ordet "Stockholm." Vid ett annat tillfälle skänkte han "Nikolajev" sina skor, vilka var av bättre kvalitet än vanliga ryska skor. Vakterna omöjliggjorde senare vidare kontakt mellan de två fångarna. Den välbevakade fången hade hela tiden förefallit vara vid god hälsa.

En dag på sommaren samma år fördes fången bort av civilklädda peroner i två bilar.

På våra frågor om källan till uppgifterna sade Kantorsky att han hade frågat en person i "Nikolajevs" sällskap om vem denne var. Svaret hade varit att "Nikolajev" var en av de rikaste männen i västra Ukraina och att han hade mer än 3000 anställda. "Nikolajev" var som sagt i 70-årsåldern och föreföll ganska sliten. Han var välklädd utan att vara påfallande elegant.

Kantorsky föreföll anse att "Nikolajev" var trovärdig. Kantorsky hade tänkt på Raoul Wallenberg när han hörde historien 1996, men det var först nu, när han läste om RW i Montreal Gazette och såg att Kazan var omnämnt där, som han ville kontakta svenska myndigheter. Kantorsky sade sig vara mycket angelägen att bistå Wallenbergutredningen och var därför beredd att svara på eventuella ytterligare frågor.

Kantorskys telefonnummer på arbetet är + 1 (514) 364-6230 och hans hemnummer är + 1 (514) 483-6078.

Ulf Lindell

Author: Susan (UD) Mesinai at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1
Date: 1998-09-11 16.57
Priority: Low
TO: INTERNET:dmatus@mb.sympatico.ca at internet
Subject: Your Press Release

Overlaid by Susan Mesinai
98-09-15
✓

Dear David. Write you from Moscow where I have been working for close to nine months and expect to work for at least nine months more in the KGB and other archives (under conditions of confidentiality).

I have not read your report, will pick it up in Stockholm on my way home (leaving Sunday). However, from your press release I would like to point out one thing: you failed to mention the Canadian archives. When you began this process and I met with you in Washington, I gave you a detailed list of what was needed for the investigation from the Canadian files as well as from the British. Since then I have received nothing from you in this regard,, a poor exchange for the time spent apprising you of the accomplishments at that time so you could be up to speed and needs for your help in furthering our research in Canada as well as the countries mentioned above. (I should add at a time when I had been working with out funding for several years).

If you are serious about this thing, why don't you start in your own front yard? This work is very time consuming and meticulous, but there can be no doubt that there is valuable information in Canada. If you tried and found nothing, then I would appreciate your helping me gain access through the appropriate channels (at a time when I have both the funding and the freedom, as I am now working in the American, British, Hungarian and Russian archives while Susanne is working in the Swedish.)). In that manner, at least Canada will have done her homework. Otherwise it comes across as people in glass houses throwing stones.

As for it not just being a Swedish-Russian bilateral matter, the fact is that what is affectionately known as the ABC, America, Britain and Canada, i.e. the Western Allies are lagging far behind the Working Group in a very serious way when it comes to declassification. My own personal opinion, as one with hands on the files and spearheading declassification in a number of nations, is that this issue can be solved right here as is being done through a very careful and serious dialogue which is based on years of building trust.

Again, if you want to help dig through the rubble, please do so where you are and make a contribution of substance rather than skipping over the fact that a serious investigation is going on and has been for several years.

Sincerely, Susan Mesinai

INT
DI 254/005,1
1998-09-15

P 2 Eu'

P 2 Eu'

REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

TELEMEDELANDE (A) Sid. 1(1)
Mnr UD/980911-3

EI/ESEK
Lage Olson
Telefon 08 - 405 3280

1998-09-11
Generalkonsulatet
NEW YORK

Generalkonsulat NEW YORK Dnr 84

Rysk visering

Den amerikanska medborgaren Susan Mesinai, 123 Bank Street, New York, 10014 N.Y., är sedan några år knuten som expert till arbetsgruppen i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet. Mesinai, som torde vara väl känd för Gk genom tidigare besök där, befinner sig f.n. i Moskva men kommer inom någon vecka att återvända till New York via Stockholm och London.

I syfte att underlätta Mesinais resor till Ryssland under det närmaste året eller så länge hennes uppdrag varar, har departementet bett ambassaden i Moskva att hos ryska utrikesministeriet begära att Mesinai skall erhålla multipelvisering. Ministeriets andra europeiska avdelning (Tutjin) har utlovat sitt stöd.

I syfte att ytterligare underlätta Mesinais arbete anmodas Generalkonsulatet att skriva en note till ryska Gk i New York för att om möjligt undvika eventuella krav på viseringsavgifter i framtiden.

Cabinet

CC:
(Pk) Moskva-amb-rt

Author: Ulf (UD) Lindell at (Pk)Ottawa-amb
Date: 1998-09-10 17.34
Priority: Normal
Receipt Requested
TO: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
CC: Fredrik (UD) Wetterqvist
Subject: Montreal-Kiev-Kazan

Lage,
Härmed resultatet av ett samtal med Mr Kantorsky i Montreal.

Hälsningar
Ulf

Delges:

Koles Amb-Kiev
von Dandel
Carl Persson
Magnusson, Riga
Hellqvist, Ec
Olson, EI-ESEK
Gullgren, EC 4
Amb Moskva
RW - Föregär

exp-98-09-11

a. a.



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
OTTAWA

1998-09-11

DN 254/002
1998 -09- 15

Lage Olson

P 2 Eu'

UD-EI/ESEK

a.o. / L

Han delgivit
som e-mail
98-09-11)

L

Montréal-Kiev-Kazan

(1 bilaga)

Broder,

Härmed den PM i rubr ämne som översänts med e-post.

Vänliga hälsningar

Ulf L.

Ulf Lindell

1998-09-10

Montrealbo minns samtal i Kiev om fångläger i Kazan

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Kantorskys telefonnummer på arbetet är + 1 (514) 364-6230 och hans hemnummer är + 1 (514) 483-6078.



Ulf Lindell



1998-09-14

Handläggare: H Magnusson

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Re Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet; Susan Mesinais
interimsrapport

Till: EC (Hallqvist)
Kopia: EI (L Olson), amb Moskva

Jag har nu granskat slutversionen av utkast till interimsrapport från Susan Mesinais och finner att den är acceptabel med följande smärre justeringar;

- Is it not better to call it interim rather than preliminary?
- sid 6, atfer first two lines, add: "Of course, we are aware of at least one important distinction between Raoul Wallenberg and the others: only in the case of RW (and the Swiss diplomats) was the arrest itself highly controversial and in contravention of international law; there was also a strong pressure from his government for information (and release)."
- page 7: delete th first sentence of the second paragraph ("If...government")
- delete the first two sentences+three words of the third paragraph: "5. The Moscow...lines".
- last full paragraph on the same page, the second line from the end: instead of "is increasing proof", write: "there are some indications".
- page 9, third paragraph from the bottom, add at the end: ("...directorates, to the extent this has not been done").
- page 10, third paragraph, first line: instead of "is analogous", write "could be analogous".
- page 14: mid-paragraph (18)..I don't recall that Pitovranov attributed to Utechin the information that

Amb. Riga

K R Y P T O F A X

Sid 2 (2)

Wallenberg had a potential usefulness as an agent of influence, although he has talked about this without giving the source.

-page 20, third paragraph: add before the last sentence: "...information, although it has been understood this should refer to RW".

MAGNUSSON

1998-09-15

Aambs A. Wallberg

EC

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mär
P	2	Eu'

För: UD-EC (Hallqvist)

Kopia: UD-EI (Olson),

amb Riga

Re Raoul Wallenberg

1998-09-03

(1 bil.)

PZED

Bifogat översänds en uppdaterad version av Susan Mesinais utkast till fölgebrev avseende framställan till Hälsovårdsministeriet. Tacksam instruktion huruvida det understrukna avsnittet bör kvarstå/ändras/utelämnas.

HIRDMAN

September 8, 1998

Dr. Alexander S. Karpov, Director
Division for Neurological and Psychiatric Care
Ministry of Health of the Federation of Russia
Ulitsa Neglinnaya 25
Moscow, Federation of Russia

Dear Dr. Karpov:

I wish to thank you and Mr. Konovalchouk for taking the time to meet with Anders Wallberg and myself in an effort to define the parameters of our forthcoming research in conjunction with the Swedish-Russian Working Group into the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg. I found the meeting to be both interesting and heartening, and I especially thank you for your insight and suggestions which have already contributed to the acceleration of our investigation.

I am sure that both you and Mr. Konovalchouk can recognize the international value of making an active attempt to evaluate the view raised by Dr. Nanna Svartz' testimony of the Sixties and Eighties that Wallenberg was in a psychiatric facility in the Moscow region and 'not in good shape'. Therefore, your help in facilitating the enclosed requests from my colleague, Susanne Berger, to study of files of Dr. Alexander Leonidovich Myasnikov and the various doctors aware of this discussion on the Soviet side will be greatly appreciated. The contents of these files will remain confidential and be only subject for discussion within the Working Group.

For my part, I would like to say that -- as my method of research involves the study of analogous cases as well as numbered or indexed prisoners -- any information uncovered in the course of this investigation which identifies other 'disappeared' foreign prisoners who experienced an anonymous fate will be turned over to the Working Group so that your Ministry can initiate the appropriate action. In this manner, you can receive proper credit for this work as I am primarily a facilitator and catalyst in this mounting global effort to heal the wounds of the past.

Attached I am submitting to you a number of requests, or reference to others of secondary priority which will be forthcoming. The list is challenging, in order to bring this work to a resolution sooner rather than later. May I ask that if there is anyway to make this work easier for your side, you do not hesitate to inform us. We do have a limited budget for research fees which would be appropriate to pay a retired archivist to carry out the demanding task of finding these files.

As my return to Russia is scheduled for late October/early November, this gives us several months to lay the groundwork for our joint research. After that I expect to be in Moscow almost continuously, except for the New Year. Susanne Berger will be available to do her research

Once again, I wish to thank you for your valuable time and the seriousness with which you approached our research. My colleagues and I very much look forward to working with your offices over the next several months.

We are very pleased that the Ministry of Health has agreed to participate in the serious work of the Swedish-Russian Working Group into the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg as I know your contribution will be of great value to the conclusion of this work.

Sincerely yours,


Susan Ellen Mesinai

Overlaminated or Jusen Mesinai full CD
1998-09-14

INK

1998-09-15

GLOSSARY - 'A'

D-edges:

Magnuson, Pige

Hallgren, EC

Olsen, EI/ESER

exp. 98-09-15

ABAKUMOV. Deputy Commissar, Internal Affairs. Orders to transport Dering before 25.XII.42 (p.22); Schlitter, Page 162. Mironov to Abakumov reporting that Schlitter is in his prison, under the jurisdiction of the 4th Department, but his arrest has not been documented. Requesting instructions. 21 IX 43. Hamburger, Page 4/44. Approves decision about prevention. 5.VIII.43. Kitschmann, Page 14. From Burashnikov to Mironov, Kitschmann summoned for interrogation on 11 VI 45 per order of Abakumov; Akikusa, interrogated by Abakumov on 27 XI 45 from 3:15 to 3:35 AM, under jurisdiction GUKR-Smersch; See pages 22, 32, 37 with notes on back side, reference also number 4637--all in 1945, and reference page 96, May 1946. Braun, Oggins, 21 V. 47 Memorandum 2773A, letter to Stalin and Molotov regarding his execution and to provide falsified medical reports of his death by aggravated tuberculosis of the spine. . Wallenberg Notes on Bulganin arrest order for Abakumov to report when and with whom Wallenberg brought to Moscow ?; Vishinsky request to Molotov to get Abakumov to report on Wallenberg of May 21, 1947; Reference in Council of Ministers registry to Memorandum 4773A of July 17, 1947 regarding the fate of RW, reference in Vishinsky XXXXXX that Abakumov had arrested Wallenberg for collaboration with the Nazis against the Soviet Union and her Allies (). . Schandl, letter from Ionov of regarding his ongoing detention without interrogation, etc. Schorner, Page 146. Interrogation 13 II 49. REVIEW ALL FILES FOR MORE INSTANCES.

ABOMAEV, V. R. Vladimir, signs act in burial of Akikusa, 24 III 49., Page 217.

ABRAMOV, Captain. . Counter Intelligence, Military Unit 32750.' Goaze, Page 1, makes decision on his prevention on 28 I 49; Page 14, signs list of things given to Goaze on the 15 or 18th of X.48 and Pages 16-25, 30-31 interrogates Goaze 18 X 48 thru 29 III 49.

ABRAMOV 2. Deputy Head, Vladimir. Pataridze, Page 241. Request.

ADAMOV . Operational. Made decision on prevention for von Hinkledey, 1 VII 48, page 2.

ADAMOV. Interrogator/May be same as above. Richter, Pages 163, 166, 172, 176, 187, 203-207, 209, 213 and starting 23 XII 1947 through 9 XII 48, with 213 out of order as 17 I 48. Schorner, Pages 119 13 XI 47), 140 (22 X 48), 143 and 144. 13 XII and 15 XII 48. Bergemann, Page 16 (20 II 48) and Hatz, Supplement Number 1, seems to be interrogation 27th and 29th of 1947.

AFANESENKO or AFANASENKO . Akikusa, Pages 10-11. Approves decision to send him to a special prison as Head of Investigation Department, 4 XII 48. Nakamura, Page 299. Approves decision about sending him to special prison. As Head of Investigation Department 3: Sanitser, Page 129. Request for prolongation, 4 X 49. Tzigenhirt, Page 19. Letter of 8 VII 52 and Page 20, decision about sending him to special prison of 2 VII 52.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1998-09-15

Utrikesdepartementet

EI-ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08-405 3280

Ambassaden

MOSKVA

Att. Anders Wallberg

✓ Exp 1998-09-15/AFV

9 2 E^u

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

(1 bil.)

Under åberopande av telefonsamtal i dag den 15 september mellan Susan Mesinai, på besök i Stockholm, och Anders Wallberg på ambassaden bifogas rättelser till Mesinais delrapport till ryska vederbörande i RW-ärendet. Hans Magnusson har i dag på eftermiddagen godkänt Mesinais ändringar.

Cabinet

1998-09-15

EI-ESEK
Lage Olson
Telefon 08-405 3280

MEMORANDUM TO: Anders Wallberg
FROM: Susan Mesinai

Upon arriving in Stockholm, I have received the changes which Ambassador Magnusson wants included. Unfortunately, for reasons that are unclear to me, my copy of the Preliminary Report is not on the disc. Rather I have two copies of another document, even though I know I copied the Report --this being the purpose of obtaining the disc.

Therefore I am typing the changes and identifying them below. Cecilia will have to access the document for you from my directory. It is called REPORT2 and at present it has no underlinings and basically MUST correspond to the copy I left in your box with my signature. Whoever is so kind as to make these changes should please make sure that whoever types them does some spatial adjustments (as there are deletions) so that the last page which I have signed under 'Summary Remarks' can be used as my signature. Also, of course, you should alert Magnus to the changes in the Russian text.

I thank you very much for this added burden and hope that you can find someone who can handle this undue pressure. With all best wishes.....

First Change: Item 1 under the 1947-Moscow section should include a footnote which comes at the end of the phrase: '....comes too soon.' and which will now be the first footnote in the text. The footnote should read: 'One should of course bear in mind the distinction between Raoul Wallenberg and the Fascists, namely that he was a neutral diplomat whose arrest was in contravention to international law. This will be dealt with in another report.'

1998-09-15

Second Change: After the Item 4 in the 1947-Moscow Section, approximately Page 7 in the text, the first sentence in the portion which begins in Italics ('If correlations could be shown.....to the Swedish Government') should be DELETED in both the English and Russian texts. The italicized portion will now begin "*If the Russian side could offer examples of others whose presence in the Soviet.....from which to draw our conclusions.*"

Third Change: The indented Item 5 in the 1947-Moscow section, approximately Page 7 in the text, should now read as follows:

At the Moscow Conference of October 1943, Molotov reportedly stated to the American side that Stalin was 'violently opposed' to all forms of Eastern European federation, confederacy or any form of economic union. Along these lines, Stalin kept a sharp eye out for separate peace deals and/or any secret business negotiations between the Germans and the Western Allies that could effect Soviet success on the Eastern Front or their plans for establishing 'spheres of influence.' Such business negotiations included the ransoming of Jews or others in exchange for trucks or strategic materials, to be used by the Germans exclusively on the Eastern Front. This 'violent opposition' may account for Soviet determination to proceed with an illegal arrest and with possible reprisals against Raoul Wallenberg in 1947, in spite of the Swedish Government's repeated request for clarification as to his fate.

Fourth Change: At the end of the italicized section of Item 5 above, the sentence should now read: "*In most of the cases noted, there is some indication of a direct connection with Wallenberg.*"

Fifth Change: At the end of Item 9 in the 1947-Moscow section, approximately Page 9 in the text should read: "As the issue of Wallenberg being an 'American spy' has been cited as the probable cause of his extreme fate, whether death by execution or long term detention, more attention should be paid to the investigative efforts of the American Departments of the various directorates" ADD "to the extent that this has not been done."

Fifth Change: Item 10 in the 1947-Moscow section, approximately Page 10 in the text, Second paragraph or the beginning of the italicized

1998-09-15

section should now read: *"My research in the West would suggest that Field's case could be analogous to Wallenberg's not only in their mutual interest in rescuing people, but through possible overlapping contacts in Budapest during the War. There exist also indications that not only Field and Bethlen but Wallenberg may have had connections with Allen Dulles, through his associates, related to the future of Hungary."*

Sixth Change: The first paragraph of Item 18 of the 1947-Moscow section should now read as follows: (approximately Page 14)

While the fact and form of Wallenberg's death in 1947 is grounds for debate, there seems to be no question among the Russian authorities that Wallenberg refused to be recruited. This leaves the question of who was attempting to recruit him, for what purpose and when. Stolyarov, for example, in his evaluation of Abakumov's interest in Wallenberg has stated that Utekhin of Komitet Informatsia knew a lot about Wallenberg due to an active interest in his potential usefulness as an 'agent of influence.'

Seventh and Final Change: The first italicized paragraph in Item 4 in the 1952-54 Section should now read. (Approximately Page 20)

In this context, it is imperative to determine the identity of the 'especially important prisoner' to whom Grossheim-Krisko and Richter were each connected. Are these the same person? The investigative files studied by the Swedish side do not reveal this information --although it has been understood that this could refer to Raoul Wallenberg. Are there any alternative routes to determine the identities in question?

Author: Hans (UD) Magnusson at (Pk)Riga-amb

Date: 1998-09-16 10:19

Priority: Low

TO: Martin (UD) Hallqvist at (Pk)UD-3, Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3,
Anders (UD) Wallberg at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1, Susan (UD) Mesinai at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1,
INTERNET:makinen@eprendor.uchicago.edu/ at internet,
INTERNET:dmatas@mb.sympatico.ca/ at INTERNET
Subject: Re[2]: report

Dear Mr Matas,

Concerning the working group: It is true that there will be two reports from the working group, we have agreed on that with the Russians, The only thing that could change that is incontrovertible evidence about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

The drafts will be exchanged and commented upon before release.

Concerning your agreement with what you yourself have written, I can just repeat that some of it is simply not correct.

Yours sincerely

Hans Magnusson

Reply Separator

Subject: Re: report

Author: INTERNET:dmatas@mb.sympatico.ca/ at INTERNET

Date: 1998-09-16 08.27

Dear Mr. Magnusson:

Thank you for your prompt response to my report. It is perhaps needless to say that I continue to agree with what I have written.

Some of your comments are points of detail which I expect we could resolve. For instance, my notion of two working groups rather than one came from Mr. Kosatchev and the fact that when I met him he had already in hand a draft Russian report separate from the Swedish report. However, it may be pointless to try to resolve these details between ourselves. I expect that we both hope that discoveries will soon make my report out of date, even if it is a fair and accurate description of the current situation.

My impatience with having the report of the working group published as soon as possible is, at bottom, impatience with the delays in finding out the truth about Raoul Wallenberg. It was that impatience that led me to release my report now.

I am of course in agreement with your observation that it is regrettable that the non-Russian part of the working group has not had full and free access to the key Russian archives. I was particularly pleased to read your statement that repeated attempts are being made to open up archives in the USA, UK etc, and that an effort is underway to make all Swedish relevant archives available in one form or another.

The overall thrust of my report was that there be full and free access to all Russian and non-Russian material about Raoul Wallenberg. If you feel that there is any assistance I can give to the effort to obtain access or to any other aspect of your work, please let me know.

Re David Matas rapport
RW-ärendet

P 2 Ew¹

Delges;

Kabs

von Dardel

Carl Persson

Ch A-ARK

Backman, A-ARK

RW-Föreningen

Ans Ottawa

Berger, Washington D.C.

Mesinai, New York

exp. 98-09-17

a.a. /

Sincerely yours,

David Matas

Author: Susan (UD) Mesinai at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1
Date: 1998-09-11 16.57
Priority: Low
TO: INTERNET:dmatus@mb.sympatico.ca at internet
Subject: Your Press Release

Delivered to Susan Mesinai
98-09-15
✓

Dear David. Write you from Moscow where I have been working for close to nine months and expect to work for at least nine months more in the KGB and other archives (under conditions of confidentiality).

I have not read your report, will pick it up in Stockholm on my way home (leaving Sunday). However, from your press release I would like to point out one thing: you failed to mention the Canadian archives. When you began this process and I met with you in Washington, I gave you a detailed list of what was needed for the investigation from the Canadian files as well as from the British. Since then I have received nothing from you in this regard,, a poor exchange for the time spent apprising you of the accomplishments at that time so you could be up to speed and needs for your help in furthering our research in Canada as well as the countries mentioned above. (I should add at a time when I had been working with out funding for several years).

If you are serious about this thing, why don't you start in your own front yard? This work is very time consuming and meticulous, but there can be no doubt that there is valuable information in Canada. If you tried and found nothing, then I would appreciate your helping me gain access through the appropriate channels (at a time when I have both the funding and the freedom, as I am now working in the American, British, Hungarian and Russian archives while Susanne is working in the Swedish.). In that manner, at least Canada will have done her homework. Otherwise it comes across as people in glass houses throwing stones.

As for it not just being a Swedish-Russian bilateral matter, the fact is that what is affectionately known as the ABC, America, Britain and Canada, i.e. the Western Allies are lagging far behind the Working Group in a very serious way when it comes to declassification. My own personal opinion, as one with hands on the files and spearheading declassification in a number of nations, is that this issue can be solved right here as is being done through a very careful and serious dialogue which is based on years of building trust.

Again, if you want to help dig through the rubble, please do so where you are and make a contribution of substance rather than skipping over the fact that a serious investigation is going on and has been for several years.

Sincerely, Susan Mesinai

Author: Hans (UD) Magnusson at (Pk)Riga-amb

Date: 1998-09-14 19:30

Priority: Low

TO: internet:dmatas@mb.sympatico.ca at internet, Martin (UD) Hallqvist at (Pk)UD-3,
Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3, Anders (UD) Wallberg at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1,
Susan (UD) Mesinai at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1,
internet:makinen@eprendor.uchicago.edu at internet

Subject: report

Dear Mr. Matas,

I would like to give the following personal comments to the report I received a week ago.

First I want reiterate my respect for your personal commitment to the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. I think that all serious contributions towards the search for truth in this case are and will always be welcome.

Having said this, I must confess I am somewhat puzzled how to interpret the publication of your report at this time and in this form, although I recognize many of your points from earlier correspondence.

First of all, you have not at all taken into account the latest development of the investigation during the last ten months or so (and you have not even asked about it, as far as I know). Consequently, while you repeatedly stress the high legal standards that we must set for drawing any conclusions in this case, you unfortunately make rather sweeping statements yourself on flimsy grounds, especially about the work of the working group (please note: only one working group, not two).

First about the composition of this group: it is true it has been predominantly bilateral - Swedish-Russian. But we have several foreign experts attached to the group, one of them Mr Makinen from Chicago, who has been with us almost from the start of the work. There are presently two more experts from outside Russia helping us, and in Russia there have been a number (independent) over the years.

Right now, at this stage, the independent international experts are doing the main part of the job, which started early this year.

These are very thorough investigations mainly in Moscow and Vladimir, based on a request handed over to the Russians in connection with President Yeltsin's visit in Stockholm at the end of last year. On the whole we are satisfied with the Russian cooperation.

So for the time being, I see no need, e g, of a Presidential Commission, although I have nothing against that idea in principle. But I doubt it would have worked better than our present strategy, in particular if you take into consideration the latest political developments in Russia.

On the whole I think, although there is nothing wrong with your proposals for follow-up in principle, that you do not fully understand and take into account the complicated Russian realities, which have undergone a constant change the last 10 years, but rather base your ideas on what would have been perfectly workable in western countries.

I can assure you that we have at least tried to make the best out of the ever-changing situation, utilizing all possible contacts, some of which must be handled with discretion even today. But of course, there is always a feeling one could have done even more.

Still I do take offense at your accusation that "the working group fell

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Beyer

Mesinai

exp. 98-09-15

victim to inordinate delay caused by exaggerated deference..." I also must protest your conclusion that "other than conducting interviews, the group neither engage in research..." and that they "did not themselves conduct archival research nor arrange for it to be done by anyone else." Once more, a conclusion based on flimsy grounds.

Any delays are not the result of deference but mainly of objective problems on both sides (I do not deny Russian going slow during certain periods) and the reason that this kind of work, which concerns not only Russia, but several countries, simply takes time. The American MIA-working group still goes on, as well.

The non-Russian part working group has not had full and free access to the key Russian archives, which is regrettable, but was simply not possible to obtain. We have however had the possibility to examine a considerable amount of original files, registry journals and cards from the former KGB archive, the MVD and the Vladimir prison and the Foreign ministry archive. We have certainly arranged for a more thorough research to be done by others.

As to your impatience with having the report of the Working group published as soon as possible I get the feeling that the delay has mostly been interfering with your interest to get your own report out quickly. My view is, that the work that is and has to be undertaken, is far more important than the timing of publication of the report. But it is of course true, that we had hoped to be able to publish the report last year. The work remaining to be done will, however, not allow us to do that until some time next year. I can promise you, though, that regardless of the findings there will be some sort of follow-up of that report.

I feel uneasy about your more or less quoting some excerpts of the draft report of the working group, as it was discussed last year. First of all there was no decision of the working group as such to share the report with non-members (outside the Swedish government) already at that time. I am still ready to share it with knowledgeable persons at the right moment.

Then, I am slightly puzzled by your selection on some points. Take e.g. the example of the shooting theory you quote. I would be much more cautious using this; it is true it can be mentioned if one has the ambition to tell all versions given to the working group. But this one has rather weak legs to stand on its own. In general, you are right, that no definite conclusion can be drawn about RW:s destiny, and that the possibility that he was "hidden" somewhere in the GULAG or prison system can not be dismissed. It is, by the way, this possibility we are now concentrating upon, in a more roundabout way, since the more direct approaches have not given us enough evidence.

I also have some objections on various other points. I will only comment on one of them here. E.g. I don't think you give an accurate presentation of the Molotov/Vyshinsky letters to Abakumov in 1947. It was not just a request for information that could be given to the Swedes, but also, in rather insistent terms, a request to settle (or liquidate) the case. Of course, in theory, Abakumov might just have replied giving the elements for the Vyshinsky note in August, but then it would hardly have been very sensitive to file it with the other documents in the MFA file. After all, it was a personal letter to Molotov which has never been found, and about which not even Vyshinsky had heard five days after it had been received. So, obviously there should be more to this letter than you suggest. But we are not sure exactly what.

Finally, I can inform you that repeated attempts are being made to open up archives in the USA, UK etc, and that an effort is underway to make all Swedish relevant archives available in one form or another.

Yours sincerely

Hans Magnusson

Author: INTERNET:dmatas@mb.sympatico.ca/ at INTERNET

Date: 1998-09-16 08:27

Priority: Normal

TO: Hans (UD) Magnusson at (Pk)Riga-amb, Martin (UD) Hallqvist at (Pk)UD-3,
Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3, Anders (UD) Wallberg at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1,
Susan (UD) Mesina at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1,
INTERNET:makinen@eprendor.uchicago.edu/ at internet

Subject: Re: report

Dear Mr. Magnusson:

Thank you for your prompt response to my report. It is perhaps needless to say that I continue to agree with what I have written.

Some of your comments are points of detail which I expect we could resolve. For instance, my notion of two working groups rather than one came from Mr. Kosatchev and the fact that when I met him he had already in hand a draft Russian report separate from the Swedish report.

However, it may be pointless to try to resolve these details between ourselves. I expect that we both hope that discoveries will soon make my report out of date, even if it is a fair and accurate description of the current situation.

My impatience with having the report of the working group published as soon as possible is, at bottom, impatience with the delays in finding out the truth about Raoul Wallenberg. It was that impatience that led me to release my report now.

I am of course in agreement with your observation that it is regrettable that the non-Russian part of the working group has not had full and free access to the key Russian archives. I was particularly pleased to read your statement that repeated attempts are being made to open up archives in the USA, UK etc, and that an effort is underway to make all Swedish relevant archives available in one form or another.

The overall thrust of my report was that there be full and free access to all Russian and non-Russian material about Raoul Wallenberg. If you feel that there is any assistance I can give to the effort to obtain access or to any other aspect of your work, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

David Matas

A. A. / Ho

(Delgiver

fill in the

under e-mail

in name file)

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1998-09-16

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

EI/ESEK, Lage Olson

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Vårt

1998-06-08

Y c EU'

Delges:

Magnusson, Riga

Hallquist, EC

Olson, EI-ESEK

Ch A - ARK

Bäckman, A - ARK Lundvall

24-98-09-17

Lo



Author: INTERNET:dmatas@mb.sympatico.ca/ at INTERNET

Date: 1998-09-17 13:44

Priority: Normal

TO: Hans (UD) Magnusson at (Pk)Riga-amb, Martin (UD) Hallqvist at (Pk)UD-3,
Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3, Anders (UD) Wallberg at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1,
Susan (UD) Mesinai at (Pk)Moskva-amb-1,
INTERNET:makinen@eprendor.uchicago.edu/ at internet

Subject: Re: report

Dear Mr. Magnusson:

I do not mean, by continuing to agree with what I have written, to persist in manifest error. My point is only that often the same facts can lead to different interpretations both of which are reasonable.

Take for instance the issue of whether there is one working group or two. Once there are to be two reports signed by two different groups of people, it continues to strike me as reasonable to say that there are two working groups. I would not say to you that your description of the Russian Swedish ensemble as one working group with two reports is "simply not correct". It is rather a different way of describing what we both agree is expected to happen.

My attitude is the same in answer to all the points you originally made. I do not suggest that what you write is "simply not correct" but rather a reasonable way of describing underlying facts different from the way I describe those facts, which I continue to believe is also reasonable.

Sincerely yours,

David Matas

(Fortsatt meningsutbyte
mellan David Matas
och Hans Magnusson
om Matas rapport i
RW-ärendet.)

Ks

Delges

Kabs

von Dardel

Carl Persson

Ch A-ARK

Backman, A-ARK

RW-Förargen

Amb Ottawa

Berger, Washington D.C.

Mesinai, New York

sep. 98-09-17

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SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

Sid 1 (3)

1998-09-18

Handläggare: H Magnusson

Dnr: T j ä n s t e

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P.	2	Enl.

Re Raoul Wallenberg

För: amb MOSKVA
Kopia: EC (Hallqvist), EI (L Olson)

Se bifogade kommentarer till förslag följebrev.

MAGNUSSON

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

1998-09-17

tjänste

Aambo A. Wallberg

Avd.	Grupp	Mål

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: Rekryfax amb Riga (Magnusson)

W

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Nedan utkast till följbrev till Mesinais
delrapport med handbrev Magnusson-Olson som
underlag för synpunkter.

Utrikesministeriet
Andra europeiska
avdelningen
Vjatjeslav Tutjnin

Bäste herr Tutjnin,

med hänvisning till samtal i maj i år i Moskva
mellan ambassadören och ordföranden i den svenska
delen av arbetsgruppen för ett uppklarande av Raoul
Wallenbergs öde Hans Magnusson och den ryske
medordföranden Konstantin Kosatjev och arkivchefen
vid FSB Vladimir Vinogradov har vi härmed äran att
i enlighet vad som därvid överenskomms överlämna en
interrimsrapport avseende det arbete som den
oberoende experten Susan Mesinaï utfört i MVD:s och
FSB:s fångarkiv.

Texten är Susan Mesinais. Vi har granskat den och gjort kommentarer men ej funnit det möjligt att alltför hårt redigera den. Vi har förståelse för om den ryska sidan, liksom vi, konstaterar att en del frågeställningar, även om de inte slutgiltigt besvarats, redan diskuterats under arbetets gång och kanske därför bäst lämpar sig att tas upp under en avslutande diskussion. Mesinais text är icke desto mindre av intresse, eftersom den återspeglar en strävan efter ett helhetsgrepp på problematiken. *F*

*Fett förbrutt
arbete efter
dessa linjer
är därför
angeläget*

De konkreta önskemålen [~~Bör specificeras? ex: som~~
framförs i Mesinais rapport] står vi bakom.
Särskilt angeläget är att fortsätta arbetet med
angivna dossierer. *Starkt möjligt härmed godkända
från nyss till slutliga dater - från beaktande -*
Å Hans Magnussons vägnar *skulle uppläggas,*

NEJ
~~Anm. Vid överlämnandet framförs muntligt 2/ i
handbrevet (?) (överstruket i den sista versionen
anm).~~

HIRDMAN

Embassy of Sweden
Riga



~~HFV~~
T E L E F A X Page 1 ()

P 2 E w¹

September 21, 1998

a. a. / H

TO: Ms Susanne Berger

ATTN:

FAX No: +1 703 237 0946

FROM: Hans Magnusson

RE: Your fax dated 20 september 1998.

1

Dear Ms. Berger,

Thank you for your proposal for access to captured German records etc. On the whole I think this request is reasonable, but I would like to make a few comments.

1. Even if there might theoretically exist references to Raoul Wallenberg as early as 1940 I strongly doubt it - it would be to give exaggerated attention to him. This also means that the expectation that there would have been any opinion about RW formed already then and developing continuously over time would seem unwarranted. But that does not exclude "occasional references" to him - which is then the expression you might use in phrasing your request.

2. Would it be possible to make the request about JOINT 1940-45 even more restrictive/or narrowly defined? Will you/Susan be able to cope with all that material?

3. Concerning interrogation protocols with personnel of the Swedish legation in Budapest we have several time made that request to the Russians (except for

Address
A Pumpura iela 8
LV-1010 RIGA

Telephone
+371 782 80 32
+371 733 87 70

Telefax
+371 782 80 31

Telex
(64) 161114 svnsk lv

some of the associated staff and "others") - with the answer that no protocols have been found. So in formulating your request you would have to take this into account - either by saying this is a repeated request to the Russian side to look into this matter or by deleting the names of the legation staff.

4. I am puzzled by the point concerning correspondence between the Swedish legation in Budapest and Moscow 1944-45. You must mean any correspondence that went via the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm?

5. We have already asked for the reports of the Rybkins, but without success, as these are in the Foreign intelligence archive. Of course, we were assured that they did not contain anything of interest about RW(which is not a satisfactory answer). You could try again however, but my expectations are not high. Perhaps we could try to see Rybkina's son again.

Yours sincerely

Hans Magnusson



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1998-09-22

Utrikesdepartementet

Ambassaden
TEL AVIV

EI-ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08-405 3280

Ep 980722 / 87

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendetSkr. 18A 1998-08-11 2
(4 bil. u.s.o.)

PRIMO

Under återopande av ovanciterade skrivelse anmodas ambassaden att förbereda en intervju med Isaak Miller i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet för att dels försöka bekräfta att han är samma person som intervjuats flera gånger tidigare om sina sammanträffanden med RW, dels utröna huruvida ytterligare information om RW kan erhållas. I syfte att underlätta en genomgång av ärendet översänds med nästa lägenhet kopior av de tidigare fyra intervjuer som tidigare gjorts med Isaak Miller och som finns i UD:s RW-arkiv. Sannolikheten för att det rör sig om en och samma person verkar efter en jämförelse med den av ambassaden insända uppteckningen gjord av Dr. Jean Kloos Fishman vara mycket stor.

SECUNDO

I sammanhanget är det också av intresse att få veta av Miller om han kan känna till andra personer i Israel som har vetskap om RW:s öde.

Cabinet

Author: INTERNET:asoderqu@pen.k12.va.us/ at INTERNET
Date: 1998-09-23 20:32
Priority: Normal
TO: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
Subject: S.Berger/Finances

Dear Mr. Olson,

I would like to ask you to consider payment for my work on several Swedish Working Group projects.

This include: a) Research and Preparation for the request to the Russian Ministry of Health, concerning papers of the Academy of Medical Science.

b) Extensive discussions with Susan Mesina concerning the review of prisoner files; supply of answers to questions, advice of general direction of research and supply of specific data obtained from research in Swedish Archives. I have been compensated for the expenses of the telephone calls, but not for the time involved

c) Preparation and research into the question of captured German records in Russian archives; discussions and coordination of request with Susan.

sum of \$500.00 (I understand 25% will be taxed) for this work seems adequate.

Susanne Berger

OK, Berger papperas inkomme
med faktura -

a r a r

Susanne Berger
4793 Williamsburg Blvd
Arlington, VA 22207
1 703 237 0946 Tel/Fax

Daniel Backman
UD/Archive
Stockholm

Attn: Backman

ext: 405 5502

Rev. 14.10.98
med. l. and Backman
u. o. g

ARR

274/001	
1998-10-01	
P	2
Eu ¹	
(A	16 ua)

Re: postering Raoul Wallenberg

October 1, 1998

Dear Mr. Backman,

Thank you very much for your telephone call today to advise me of some of the problems in locating the material I had inquired about in an earlier letter.

During our conversation you mentioned that FOREIGN material can be legally destroyed after twenty years, in accordance with existing bureaucratic guidelines. Did I understand you correctly in this point?

I would be grateful, if you explained to me a bit more in detail what this means exactly. Does this mean, for example, that material which reached the Foreign Ministry from the Swedish Legation, Budapest (i.e. 'foreign' material) via the Swedish Legation, Berlin would have been subject to the destruction policy? Or would only the material of the Swedish Legation, Berlin (which contained in its archives material from the Budapest Legation) fall under this policy? I remember you drawing a distinction between Ministry archives and Legation archives but I am not entirely clear on this point. ??

I also would like to know more about the procedures which govern/governed the destruction of documentation in UD. Would there be a record of what material was destroyed and when? If so, and if we cannot locate the materials I requested, can it be checked if a formal record for the destruction of this material exists? Is there a policy that applies consistently to destruction of all types of documents?

As we agreed, I will send a separate request to Riksarkivet to see if the archivists there have any suggestions where this material might be found.

In any case, would it be possible for you to provide me with copies of the Kabinetsspasses for the following individuals, including the application materials and letters of support, etc.:

Yngve Ekmark
? Hallerstrom
Anton Grundbock
Lennart Frederik Laurentius Larsson
Lennart Thomas Johan Larsson
? Ludo (this name may not be correct, but I want to try anyway)

Many thanks again for your help,

Susanne Berger



Röda korset

*Croix-Rouge Suédoise
Swedish Red Cross
Cruz Roja Sueca*

Datum/Date
98-09-29

Vår ref/Our ref

Er ref/Your ref
Lage Olsson

□ EI/ESEK
UD

272/013
01

1998-10-01

P 2 En¹

Hej !

Ursäkta att mitt svar har dröjt. Tyvärr kan jag inte hitta något om någon med det namnet i vårt material här . Vårt gamla arkivmaterial finns dock på

Riksarkivet i Arninge.

Vår kontaktperson där heter Lena Ånimmer

Adress:

Riksarkivet

Fyrverkarbacken 13-17

102 29 Stockholm

Tel: 737 63 12 (Lena Ånimmer)

Lycka till!

Vänlig hälsning

Sonja Sjöstrand

Informationsavdelningen

CS

Ny följande till
Lena Ånimmer RK
1998-10-01

a.a.

CENTRALSTYRELSEN • COMITÉ CENTRAL • CENTRAL COMMITTEE • COMITE CENTRAL

Postadress
Postal address
Box 27316

S-102 54 STOCKHOLM

Gatuadress
Address

Östhammarsgatan 70

Telefon
Telephone

Nat 08-66 55 600
Int +46 8 66 55 600

Telegram
Telegram address

swecros

Telex

19613
swecros s

Telefax:

Nat 08-783 66 92
Int +46 8 783 66 92

Giro:

Gåvor
900 800-4



REGERINGSKANSLIET

286/004 PZ Eu⁺
ESE

Stockholm, 13 October 1998

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

EI-ESEK

Lage Olson

Telephone +46 8 405 3280

Dr. Vera Parnes
President of the Raoul Wallenberg
International Movement for Humanity
4845 Bourret Avenue, Suite 34,
Montreal
Québec
Canada H3W 1L2

Fax No. 009 1 514 343 0137

Invitation to Annual Conference


Dear Dr. Parnes,

Many thanks for your kind fax message of 12 October, 1998 with an invitation to attend the annual meeting of the Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity in Montreal on 6 December, 1998.

I do very much regret that I will not be able to go to Canada in December or early January. I have also talked to Ambassador Anger who said that he, regrettably, would not be able to go either. He has, however, asked me to find out if our ambassador in Canada, Mr. Jan Ståhl, could represent him at the ceremony and receive the prize on his behalf. I have subsequently been in touch with Ambassador Ståhl who assured me that he would be greatly honoured to represent Ambassador Anger on that occasion. Mr. Ståhl has, however, to confirm if 6 December is a suitable date.

With best wishes

Yours sincerely,


Lage Olson

PS The Embassy of Sweden in Ottawa has the following telephone and fax numbers respectively: (613) 241 8553 and (613) 241 2277.

Postal Address
SE-103 39 STOCKHOLM
SWEDEN

Visiting address
Gustav Adolfs torg 1

Telephone
+46 8 405 10 00

Fax
+46 8 723 11 76

E-mail: ud@foreign.ministry.se
X.400: S=UD; O=Foreign; P=Ministry; A=SIL; C=SE

Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

Exp. 98-10-13

Authpr: Martin (UD) Hallqvist at (Pk)UD-3

Date: 1998-10-13 18:02

Priority: Low

TO: Berndt (UD) Fredriksson at (Pk)UD-5, Lage (UD) Olson

Subject: riksarkivarien

hej berndt,
självfallet är vi intresserade - jag sänder materialet vidare till
lage, eftersom jag slutar här i morgon, för att efterträda jan Ölander
på rps!
min efterträdare här är ännu inte utsedd

martin

a.a. / dv

(P 2 Eu¹)

Ex till:

Hans Magnusson

exp. 98-10-15

/ dv

hays

Se e-mail

13/10

Prat

Karl M,

Riksarkivarien har frågat mig om bifogade handling innehåller något av intresse för Utrikesdepartementet. Jag svarade att han borde sända kopia till mig f v b Dig. Du avgör.

Berndt

Berndt Fredriksson

den 29. September 1998

Herrn Generalleutnant Dr. Sergei
Kondraschew
Bolchaja Filevskaja 57, Apt 73
Moskva 121433
Russland


Fax: 095-247 05 29

Sehr geehrter Herr Kondraschew!

Unser Kollege, Herr Professor Jürgen Rohwer, hat mich im Zusammenhang mit dem Militärgeschichtlichen Kongress in Lissabon von Ihren Forschungen über Raoul Wallenberg informiert. Besonders interessant finde ich das Schreiben von Mai 1945 in russischer Übersetzung, wo Walter Schellenberg Raoul Wallenberg und andere Schweden erwähnt hat. Ich weiss noch nicht ob das Schreiben bei uns bekannt ist, möchte aber gern in Verbindung mit meinen Kollegen in Schweden das Originalschreiben nachforschen. Für diesen Zweck wäre ich Ihnen äusserst dankbar für nähere Angaben über das Schreiben, wie z.B. Datum und Adressat.

Ich hoffe Ihnen damit behilflich zu sein und würde sehr schätzen mit Ihnen in Zukunft in Verbindung zu bleiben.

Mit freundlichen Grüssen



Erik Norberg
Reichsarchivar

Zur Kenntnisnahme:

Herrn Professor Dr. Jürgen Rohwer
Am Sonnenhang 49
D-71384 Weinstadt
Bundesrepublik Deutschland



Riksarkivet
Box 12541
102 29 Stockholm
Besöksadress
Fyrverkarbacken 13-17
Tel 08 - 737 63 94
Fax 08 - 737 64 74
E-mail erik.norberg@riksarkivet.ra.se

RIKSARKIVARIEN

30 sept 98

Engelens arkiv
Bengt Fränkason

Proble!

Tor Du att det var
intresse? Konstanten var det
dåligt som samman! E6B-
generat.

Stämning - /Gj.

Herrn Prof.Dr.Juergen Rohwer
Am Sonnenhang 49, D-71384
Weinstadt
Tel.(49)-07151-68259

Sehr geehrter Professor Rohwer,

Ich danke fuer Ihren Brief vom 7 Juli, den Ich vor ein Paar Tagen erhalten habe. Ich habe auch mit Herrn General N.N.Andreev gesprochen. Wie Ich verstanden habe, er ist bereit Seine moegliche Teilnahme an der naechsten Tagung positiv zu erwaegen. Als er noch im Dienst ist, benoetigt er eine formelle schriftliche Einladung um die Zustimmung des Dienstes zu erhalten.

Ich glaube auch eine Information ueber moegliche Themen der anderen Referenten Ihm behilflich sein werden.

Seine Anschrift ist sehr aehnlich zu meiner. Wir wohnen in demselben Haus. Der Unterschied besteht nur in dem Nummer der Wohnung. Sein Appartement hat # 29.

Ich werde sehr dankbar wenn Sie Dr.Erik Norberg ein Paar Worte ueber meine geschichtliche Taetigkeit sagen koennten. Ich habe jetzt aus dem Archiv sehr interessantes Dokument - ein Schreiben von Walter Schellenberg, den in Mai 1945 in Schweden geschrieben war. Raul Wallenberg und andere Schwedische Vertreter sind in dem Dokument erwaehnt. Leider habe Ich nur eine Uebersetzung dieses Dokumentes in Russischen. Der Schwedische Reichsarchiv muss dieser Dokument in Deutschen Originalfassung haben. Vielleicht koennte Ich mit Herrn Erik Norberg darueber einen Meinungaustausch haben.

Mit herzlichen Gruessen
Ihr



Sergei A.Kondraschew

4 August 1998.
Bayern, Schliersee, Hotel Arabella vom 3 bis 17 August.

The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity

4845 Bourret Avenue, Suite 34, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3W 1L2
Tel (514) 343-0137 • Fax (514) 738-6340

Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Lage Olson
Counsellor
Fax: 468 723 1176

Dear Mr. Olson:

It was with pleasure that we met. Ebba Gronroos, our representative in Sweden, told me much about your deep interest in Raoul Wallenberg's fate and your eagerness to share the data of new investigations. I am very thankful to you for the material that you sent to me to Stockholm and Montreal.

We are preparing our annual meeting and hired a hall for Sunday, December 6, 1998. This date is good for us (other possible dates are January 3, 10 or 17). We are in the process of working out our program.

This annual conference is special because we are going to mark Per Anger's 85-th birthday and present him with the **RAOUL WALLENBERG AWARD**. We would be honoured if you, the Counsellor of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and member of the Russian-Swedish Commission searching for the truth about Raoul Wallenberg, would make a speech on *The Swedish Mission in Budapest during WWII*, or the *Swedish diplomacy during WWII*, or on something else what you want to tell us. Of course, we want to know the latest data about Raoul Wallenberg as a Swedish diplomat and about Per Anger's books devoted to R.W. that show up his own role.

Please answer me as soon as possible. My fax and telephone: (514) 343 0137. I hope that you will be with us. For publishing a program I need to know the title of your speech and its duration (better 15-20min.) Be so kind as to send me your photo and some short curriculum vitae. If December 6 is not good for you, please tell me what date would be suitable for you. Your participation is extremely important for us.

Usually we have about 200 guests at our conferences, among them are P.M., diplomats and correspondents.

With all the best wishes
Sincerely yours,

Dr. Vera Parnes
President

Fax till
let. 98-10-13

exp.

285/002

ESE

P

2

Eu¹



REGERINGSKANSLIET

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

A-ARK

Sven Johansson

Telephone +46 8 405 5017

ARKIVEXEMPLAR

287/002

Stockholm, 14 October 1998

orig 4 16 Ua

P 2 Eu'

ytterligare 20
på originalut

Ms Susanne Berger

4793 Williamsburg Blvd

ARLINGTON, Va 22207

Dear Madam,

Ref: Your letters of October 1, September 22 and 24.

The records not only can but some types of documents shall after appraisal be disposed of for destruction with set terms between one and twenty years depending on their juridical and administrative value. All such measures unavoidably mean a "mutilation" of the records but they have become an urgent necessity considering expenses for premises and transportation and are now commonly practised by most authorities in Sweden and other countries. In the Ministry archives the method has only been applied to account materials posterior to 1953 and limited to a few files and other collections containing documents on routine matters (orders for writing-materials etc) and others of little importance for the future. Instead the Ministry has chosen in increasing extension to dispose of specified files and other material in the archives of the legations (and consulates), i.a. because they to considerable parts contain the same information as the Ministry's archives, they are so to say only mirrors, and because the representations abroad must report everything of importance to the Ministry. The disposal policy was not initiated until the 60:ies, when the want of space grew imminent, and has been pursued in cooperation with the National Archives and with their approval.

The files which are screened for destruction and the procedures involved will be clear from the enclosed circulars. From the sign and the age of a file you can always learn, if it is eliminated or will be so. Besides, in the catalogues over the legation-archives the eliminated files are marked with a stroke, sometimes also G. There are no such markings in the catalogue over the Berlin Legation's records which consequently means that they

Ifylles av postexp

Avsänt med

☐ sv kurir

☐ utl kurir

☒ luftpost

☐ vanlig post

Avs datum

98/10/10

Sign

KL

Stockholm, 14 October 1998

have never been subject to any elimination measures. During the war the legation, for reasons easily understood, may have destroyed a few especially dangerous or delicate documents but there are no notes, also for reasons easily understood, about that. Or some letters may have never been filed as they were addressed directly to officials who kept them to themselves. A number of documents, mostly on commercial matters posterior to 1940, was destroyed by fire during a bombing raid November 1943, but most of them were replaced by copies from the Ministry.

The Berlin Legation, of course, never "contained in its archives material from the Budapest Legation" and "material from the Swedish Legation Budapest" has never "reached the Foreign Ministry via the Swedish Legation Berlin". As mentioned above, no disposal measures were taken prior to about 1960 and consequently all the records from Berlin are preserved entirely as they were sent to Sweden.

In your letter of September 22 you, referring to the Berlin Legation's incoming diaries, inquired about a string of documents, none of which could be found on any of the Legation's files or in its diaries. A subsequent examination made clear, that you referred to the Ministry's incoming diaries (stored at the RA) for correspondence with the Budapest Legation, not to the Berlin Legation's diaries (stored here). Anyhow, the following of the documents you asked for in your letter are on Ministry files stored at the Ministry and can be sent by us to you as copies.

- A 6 P, hemlig (The complete text is "Eder 8 anländ" - skr 8:
cipher-keys)
- R 36 S, R 20 Eu (Copy enclosed as example)
- HP 80 A/Ungern (D:o, page 1 of 9)
- R 31 R/3123 (Kanslisten Mezey blev sv. medborgre)
- P 21 I/Budapest (The complete text: "Carlsson inträtt i tjänst")
- P 1 Berg (D:o "Berg inträtt i tjänst")

Stockholm, 14 October 1998

- P 1 Anger (D:o: "Anger återinträtt")
- P 21 U/Budapest (utlägg, 5105 pengö, för Argentina, sjömannen Sandgren, A. Gati) (vouchers only)
- A 6 P (267 ej 266) ("Chiffermaterialet mottaget")

All the other documents are stored at the Riksarkivet and you have to ask for them there. As an additional service to you (and the RA) I am pleased to present the complete and correct sign of the files that are registered in our card-index.

Hallerström:	P 90 F/LXVI/18
Y. Ekmark:	P 90 F/144/47
Grevinnan Andrassy:	P 96 S XII/22
Petö:	P 96 S XXIII/19
Peter Balint:	P 96 S XIV/5

In addition, you can read "Finansattaché Olsen HP 21 EU/allm" in vol. 2 of the published RW-documents, the "Blue books", too, if you want.

You have also to ask at the Riksarkiv for copies of documents concerning the following (your letter October 1) "individuals":

Y. Ekmark (see above)

Hallerström (d:o)

Anton Grundböck P 90 F/L/62

Lennart Larsson P 89 P XCVI/45

Concerning your letter of September 24, on the contrary, your references to the Berlin Legation's diaries are quite correct but as the letters have been entered without signs ("dossier numbers") the probable conclusion seems to be that they have never been filed (cp above

Stockholm, 14 October 1998

"addressed directly"). You must then try to look into the Ministry's corresponding diaries for "handbrev" to and from Berlin (stored at the RA). Are these "handbrev" not entered there, they may have yet been inserted in HP 64 Ct, H 44 Ct or H 94 Ct (or Er) without notes in the diary. The Ministry has no personal papers from Sohlman.

R 49 ("Rättshjälp i brottmål i utlandet") on the Norman-gang is not transferred to the RA and is now probably accessible.

Yours sincerely,



Daniel Backman
Desk Officer

HANDELSMINISTERIEN

INK. 1998 -10- 15

1998-10-21;UD/AME;H. Ahlström/AA
FAX TILL AMB. LANDELIUS, Amb. Buenos Aires

Ex. f. kdm/Hans!

Em 98/02/144-17.10/111
El Embajador de la Republica Argentina P 2 Eu¹

ESEK

Stockholm, 14th October 1998

Dear Minister Pagrotsky:


As I announced to you, I have the pleasure to enclose herewith an advance copy, received by fax, of the invitation to you and your wife, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Mr. Guido Di Tella, to the unveiling of the monument in homage to Raoul Wallenberg that will take place on Tuesday 17th November 1998 at 10 am, at the General Urquiza square, a highly prominent place in downtown Buenos Aires. The original will follow shortly.

We wonder whether you may accept to address the audience on that occasion. Speeches will also be given by the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Governor of the City of Buenos Aires, Dr. Fernando De la Rúa and the President of the Raoul Wallenberg International Committee, Sir Sigmund Sternberg.

The programme includes, on Monday 16th November, a meeting of the Commission for Enquiry into Nazi Activities in Argentina, which will be presided by our Foreign Minister and a luncheon on 17th November, also hosted by him. After, the foreign participants will have a meeting with the President of the Argentine Republic, Dr. Carlos Saúl Menem, at the Government House.

It will be an honour for Cathrine and for myself if you and your wife would join us for a dinner before your departure to Buenos Aires, which may also include other participants to the visit to Argentina,

Sincerely yours,


JUAN CARLOS VIGNAUD
Ambassador

To His Excellency Minister Leif Pagrotsky
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Stockholm

Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto


Buenos Aires, October 1998

Dr. Leif

As you already know the Argentine Government with colaboration of the Buenos Aires City Government, the Embassy of Sweden and the President of the Raoull Wallenberg's International Committee, Sir Sigmund Sternberg, has decided to inaugurate a monument on Wallenberg's memory. The ceremony will take place next November 17th at 10.00am at General Urquiza Square in the city of Buenos Aires.

Therefore, I am delighted to invite you and your wife to take part of this important event which our government considers of a vital relevance.

Indeed, we would be honored to meet you here for this occasion as we think that the presence of important members of the Swedish Government will give a special sense to the recognition of this remarkable man.



Mr. Leif Pagrotsky
Minister of Commerce

Author: INTERNET:asoderqu@pen.k12.va.us/ at INTERNET
Date: 1998-10-19 09:47
Priority: Normal
TO: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
Subject: message from S.Berger

Dear Mr. Olson,

here some general developments in the question of the Amercian RW papers. I will meet with Susan on Monday to discuss how the various efforts should be coordinated.

I have spoken to the man who earlier this year resigned from the President's Advisory Commission on Declassification (in protest against what he sees as foot dragging and intentional delays on the part of the agencies in question). He has given some specific advice on how to phrase any folow-up requests. In addition to the discussions I have had with representatives of L.S.'s office, the following approach emerges:

1. Formulate a new official (Swedish government request) with references to all earlier requests (dates and answers received) make specific reference in the new request to the 1992 and 1995 Special Presidential Directive on Declassification; emphasize that earlier partial declassification and/or withholding of additional materials in the RW case file constitutes a direct violation of these directives.
2. Address this request directly to the Agency's Operational Department, European Division AND to the Operational Directorate. Then send a copy to the FOIA/Archives division
3. Include specific,detailed questions such as:
 - a) Documents from the State Department's Special War Problems Office and its liaison bureaus in repective US agencies for the applicable years; papers of the director of SWPO (who is known to have been personally familiar with RW's case) for specific years; communications and collections of papers of Iver C.Olsen, OSS Stockholm, OSS London, Bari and Caserta. Also, some broader categories such as labor camps and prisons in the USSR, etc. (These are just examples)
4. Requests for "Specialty Collections" like the OPC (State Department) and the NSC, etc. for specific years. The agency in question regularly briefed these units and answered queries.
5. Request the collections of papers of individual section chiefs in the agency in question, over several decades, from Bruce Hopper/Calvin Hoover (Scandinavia in the 1940's) to Harry Rositzke (OSS London, in 1960's and 70's responsible for USSR clandestine operations). This would cover quite a few individuals but if one concentrated on the early years, 1945-55 it could prove very useful.
6. This request is a bit tricky and you will have to discuss it "amongst yourself". All individuals I have spoken to agree that the bulk of the remaining material is not released because it would reveal "sensitive liaison agreements" (aside from sources and methods).If the request could specifically address this issue, it would be most helpful. There are various options how to go about this. The question becomes complicated where more than two parties are involved, such as U.S., Sweden and Great Britain, for example. For the two-party documentation the easiest would be to request specificaly any communications between official Swedish "liaison channels" and Amercian agencies, whatever they may have been, in the RW question, Swedish participation in Jewish

292/006
1998 -10- 20

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W.A. / H

rescue in general and in particular (for Hungary), etc.

I will discuss with Susan the coordination of efforts with Senator Levin's office. The current consensus of those I have consulted appears to be that the issue will be best served by separate, yet coordinated requests (from Levin AND the Swedish government)

I have forwarded to you by mail an additional bill for \$ 195.00 for telephone expenses for September/October (all discussions with Moscow). Thank yo for reimbursing my last receipts so promptly.

Could you send me a copy of this message by fax, since I have problems printing on this maschine. Thanks a lot,

Mr & Mrs
Nicklas Wacz

Banérgatan 13

115 22 Stockholm, Sweden

Tel. 08-661 01 25

Fax. 46-8-661 01 25

To:

From:

Subject:

Date:

Number of Pages:

Till Ambassaden Lage Olsson
Kate Wacz
20.10.98,

Till Avd. EU-ESK²

Re. Berlin, 14/10/98

Raoul Wallenberg Preis

293/017

Bäste Lage,

Bifogat nrklipp från
Berlin, samt några
om Amb. Per Anger

85 års Dag 7. Dec. 1998,

Med vänliga hälsningar

Kate

Japans „Schindler“ rettete 6 000 Juden

Raoul-Wallenberg-Preis postum an ehemaligen Diplomaten verliehen

VON MARLIES EMMERICH

Der diesjährige Preis der Raoul-Wallenberg-Loge der jüdischen Organisation „B'nai B'rith“ ist am Mittwoch postum an den japanischen Diplomaten Chiune Sugihara verliehen worden. Die zum dritten Mal vergebene Auszeichnung nahm der Sohn des Diplomaten für seinen 1986 verstorbenen Vater im Rathaus Schöneberg entgegen. Sie würdigt das Engagement Sugiharas, der während seiner Dienstzeit in Litauen zwischen 1930 und 1940 mehr als 6 000 Visa für polnische Juden ausgestellt und damit diesen Menschen die Flucht nach Kōbe ermöglicht hat. „Ich weiß, wenn mein Vater mich heute sehen könnte, würde er eine Mischung aus großer Freude und Stolz empfinden“, so Hiroki Sugihara.

Der Sohn erzählt, wie schwierig es für den Diplomaten war, die Juden zu retten: „Japan konnte das Ausstellen der Visa für jüdische Flüchtlinge nicht erlauben, da Japan gerade beschlossen hatte, ein dreiseitiges Abkommen mit Deutschland und Italien zu unterzeichnen.“ Sein Vater habe dennoch drei Anfragen gestellt und um Erlaubnis gebeten, die Dokumente ausstellen zu dürfen. Dies sei ihm jedoch jedesmal versagt worden. Sugihara ließ sich nicht hindern. Der damals fünfjährige Sohn Hiroki



„Er soll Mut machen.“

Der Sohn zu Sugiharas Einsatz

erinnert sich noch heute: „Mein Vater machte das Unmögliche mit der Ermutigung meiner Mutter möglich.“ Als Ergebnis des Einsatzes verlor der Diplomat seine Anstellung im Auswärtigen Amt. „Wegen der Vorkommnisse im litauischen Kauna“, heißt es. Die Familie lebte später unter schweren Entbehrungen – unter anderem nach dem Krieg 18 Monate lang in einem russischen Camp. Auch nach der Rückkehr in Japan blieb es bei Demütigungen. Es dauerte bis 1968, bis die Überlebenden Sugihara über die israelische Botschaft in Tokio ausfindig machten. 1985 wurde er in der Jerusalemer Gedenkstätte Yad Vashem als „Gerechter unter den Völ-

HILFSORGANISATION

B'nai B'rith

B'nai B'rith war 1843 die erste in den USA gegründete internationale Hilfsorganisation. Seine 500 000 Mitglieder verteilen sich auf 1 500 Logen und Gruppen in 50 Ländern der Welt.

Grundlage aller Aktivitäten ist der Wunsch, das jüdische Gemeinleben weltweit zu stärken und anzu-

regen. Das World Center hat seinen Sitz in Jerusalem.

Die Raoul-Wallenberg-Loge besteht in Berlin seit 18 Jahren. Seit drei Jahren vergibt die gleichnamige Loge, die B'nai B'rith angeschlossen ist, den undotierten Preis für den Einsatz bei der Verwirklichung von Menschenrechten.

kern“ geehrt – wie auch Oskar Schindler, dem Steven Spielberg mit seinem Film „Schindlers Liste“ ein Denkmal gesetzt hat. „Diese Geschichte soll Menschen zeigen, daß es sich auszahlt, Mut zu haben und zu seinen Prinzipien zu stehen“, wünscht sich Sohn Hiroki.

„Wir wollen zeigen, wie dankbar wir für Leute wie Sugihara sind“, so der Präsident der Wallenberg-Loge, Jeffrey Drimmer. 1997 waren Hans Koschnick und Jakob Finci wegen ihres Einsatzes um den Frieden auf dem Balkan ausgezeichnet worden. Zuvor ging der Preis an den Gefährten Raoul Wallenbergs, das frühere Mitglied der schwedischen Botschaft in Berlin, Per Anger.

Berlin

Berliner Zeitung · Nummer 240 · Donnerstag, 15. Oktober 1998

Berlin

Berliner Zeitung · Nummer 240 · Donnerstag, 15. Oktober 1998

25

...nicht geben werde.

Raoul-Wallenberg- Preis für Sugihara

6000 Juden das Leben gerettet

BERLIN (R.B.). In Würdigung der humanitären Verdienste des japanischen Konsuls Chiune Sugihara wurde seinem Sohn Hiroki der Preis der Raoul Wallenberg Loge Berlin im Rathaus Schöneberg in einer Feierstunde übergeben. Sugihara hatte, wie berichtet, gegen den Willen seiner Regierung 6000 polnischen Juden 1940 in Litauen Transitvisa ausgestellt und war dafür von seinem Land bestraft worden. Der jetzige Generalkonsul in Berlin, Teruyoshi Inagawa, würdigte Sugihara als einen verdienten Vorgänger und ein großes Vorbild. „Der Mensch ist immer frei, sich zu entscheiden“, hatte Michel Friedman, Präsidiumsmitglied des Zentralrats der Juden in Deutschland, in seiner Laudatio gesagt. Sugihara sei der Beweis, daß man immer etwas habe tun können. Und an die Adresse Martin Walsers sagte er, es könne niemals zuviel Erinnerungsarbeit geben. Jeder 16jährige erinnere sich jetzt ein erstes Mal. Friedman appellierte an die 300 Gäste im Saal, sich zu überlegen, was man heute in Sicherheit und Freiheit alles tun könnte, wenn man nur wollte.

Nr. 16 487 / DONNERSTAG, 15. OKTOBER 1998

SEITE 12 / DER TAGESSPIEGEL

BERLIN

BERLIN

Ein Visum zum Leben

Eine Berliner Ausstellung erinnert an Zivilcourage in der NS-Zeit

Auch Hiram Bingham, einem unaußfalligen Mann mit Brille und Hut, seines Zeichens amerikanischer Vize-Konsul in Marseille, hat die amerikanische Regierung seinen Engagement nicht gedankt. Seinen echten und gefälschten Papieren hatten unter anderem Marc Chagall, Max Ernst und André Breton ihr Leben zu verdanken, er verkehrte mit der französischen Résistance und fotografierete in den Konzentrationslagern in Südfrankreich. 1940 wurde er abberufen, weil er der amerikanischen Politik im Wege stand. Mit einem kühnen Bluff hatte auch Clotio Ferlascia, zeitweise Geschäftsführer Spaniens in Budapest, rund 3000 Juden das Leben gerettet. Der einstufige Parteigänger Mussolinis wechselte nach der Bombardierung von Guernica das Lager und wurde 1944 spanischer Staatsbürger. Der faschistische ungarischen Regierung drohte er, für jeden Juden, dem etwas geschehe, werde in Spanien ein Ungar erschossen. Der Bluff wirkte.

Zu den Geehrten gehört auch der deutsche Schiffahrtsattaché Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, der im September 1943 wesentlich dazu beitrug, fast allen dänischen Juden zur Flucht zu verhelfen. Die Ausstellung endet mit dem Namensgeber des Preises, Raoul Wallenberg, der in Budapest gegen Ende des Krieges rund 30 000 Juden retten konnte. Das letzte Foto von ihm ist ein Paßbild aus dem Jahr 1944. Götharschaw hatte den Paß 1990 Wallenbergs Familie zurückgegeben. Das Schicksal des Juden-Retters ist weiterhin ungewiß.

ROLF BROCKSCHMIDT
Rathaus Schöneberg, bis 25. Oktober, danach im Rathaus Lichtenberg

„Ich wäre eher mit Gott gegen die Menschen als mit den Menschen gegen Gott“, sagte Aristide de Sousa Mendes, der portugiesische Generalkonsul in Bordeaux kurz vor dem Einmarsch der deutschen Truppen. Portugal hatte es zwar untersagt, Visa an jüdische Flüchtlinge auszugeben, aber auf Bitte des belgischen Rabbiners Chaim Kruger stellte Sousa Mendes innerhalb von drei Tagen Tausende Visas aus. Selbst als er Bordeaux verlassen mußte, befahl er dem ihm untergeordneten Konsul in Bayonne, weitere Visa auszugeben. Für seinen Mut und seine Menschlichkeit wurde der portugiesische Diplomat schwer bestraft, er wurde fristlos entlassen und mit einem Arbeitsverbot belegt – verarmt starb er 1954. Erst 1995 wurde er rehabilitiert. Ein Ehrenmann mit gutem Geschichtsaussdruck blickt einen auf dem Foto an, das in der Ausstellung „Visas für Life, Chinese Sugihara und die aufrichtigen Diplomaten“ im Rathaus Schöneberg zu sehen ist.

Der Anlaß der erstmals in Deutschland gezeigten Ausstellung der „Holocaust Traveling Exhibits“ war die posthume Verleihung des Preises der Raoul Wallenberg-Löge an Chinese Sugihara, den „Schindler Japans“, der ein ähnliches Schicksal wie de Sousa Mendes erlitten hat. Die Ausstellung würdigt mit Fotos und Begleitlexiken das Wirken von zehn Diplomaten, die vor und während des Zweiten Weltkrieges unter denkbar schweren Bedingungen Mut und Zivilcourage gegen die Politik ihrer Regierungen gestellt hatten. Sie retten rund 150 000 Juden das Leben, indem sie ihnen Visa, Schutzbriefe oder Schutzpässe ausstellen, oft gegen die Uhr und sozusagen im Akkord.

Der „Gerechte von Bordeaux“ rettete mehr als 10 000

Von Siegfried Helm

BM London - Schweden hat seinen Raoul Wallenberg, der als Diplomat in Ungarn 1944 und 1945 unzähligen Juden das Leben rettete. Oskar Schneller war als Retter von Juden in der Höhle des Löwen aktiv. Jetzt kommt ein Portugiese zu posthumen Ehren, der als Diplomat in Unehren aus dem Staatsdienst vertrieben wurde, weil er als Generalkonsul in Bordeaux 1940 rund 10 000 Juden verbotswidrig ein Ausreisevisum ausstellte.

Der Diplomat Aristides de Sousa Mendes do Amaral e Abreu riskierte sein Leben und zerstörte seine Karriere, als er die strikte Anweisung des

diktorischen Regimes von Antonio Salazar mißachtete, Juden, Staatenlosen und Personen mit zweifelhafter Staatsangehörigkeit kein Ausreisevisum zu genehmigen.

Ein Journalist stieß auf den vergessenen Diplomaten

Der französische Journalist Jose-Alain Fralon, Mitarbeiter der angesehenen Zeitung „Le Monde“, stieß auf den fast ganz vergessenen Diplomaten bei seinen Recherchen bei dem Prozeß gegen den französischen Nazi-Kollaborateur Maurice Papon.

Fralon hat jetzt die erste Biographie über diese Lichtgestalt in dunklen Zeiten geschrieben. Der vielsagende Titel erinnert an den Titel des Theaterstücks „Die Gerechten“ von Albert Camus: „Le Juste de Bordeaux“. (Der Gerechte von Bordeaux).

Als de Sousa Mendes 1940 in Bordeaux den Strom unzähliger Menschen erlebte, die vor dem Zugriff des NS-Regimes flohen und hofften, vor der Ankunft der Weltmacht über Portugal nach Amerika zu entkommen, wurde er in einen Gewissenskonflikt verwickelt.

Sei Biograph zitiert diesen Anspruch des Diplomaten, mit dem er seine Befehlsverweigerung als Staatsbeamter begründete: „Wenn so viele Juden im Namen eines Katholiken, nämlich Hitler, zu leiden haben, dann kann es nicht verwundern, wenn ein anderer Katholik um so vieler Juden willen zu leiden hat.“

Der Biograph te sich die den Anku Bordeaux Sousa A schließlich Visumant: Straße. I Habsburg aus und f gomery. Als es gal zur nahm er Großfamil sein ungl. Flüchtling ze, wie n gerechnet wegen s mäßigen V denunziert

mehr als 10 000 Juden das Leben

Katholik um len zu leiden x des Diplo- r dem Autor: z uns, er habe zft, entweder oder Gottes, er zu tun ha-

Jose-Alain Fralon forschte in portugiesischen und französische Archiven und führte lan- ge Gespräche mit Kindern des völlig verarmt gestorbenen Ex-Diplomaten.

Er zitiert einen Historiker mit dieser Einschätzung: Die Hilfs- aktion des Generalkonsuls von Bordeaux war „die größte Rel- tungssaktion eines einzelnen Menschen während des Holo- caust“.

Ihm zu Ehren wurde 1961 ein Baum gepflanzt

In Israel weiß man von dem Heldenmut dieses Mannes. Im Gedächtnisgarten in Jerusalem wurde ihm zu Ehren 1961 ein Baum gepflanzt.

Bei der Ankunft in Lissabon wurde er aus dem diplomati- schen Dienst ausgestoßen. Man erteilte ihm Berufsverbot als Anwalt und entzog ihm damit seinen Lebensunterhalt. Er war gesellschaftlich erledigt und verarmte. Er fand schließlich Zuflucht in einem Armenhaus des Franziskaner-Ordens in Lissabon.

Er besaß keinen eigenen An- zug, als er starb, und wurde 1954 in einer Mönchskutte be- graben. Seine Kinder kämpften nach dem Ende des Salazar-Re- gimes um seine Rehabilitierung, was ihnen aber erst 1988 ge- lang. Aber die glorreiche Ver- gangenheit dieses ehrenhaften Befehlverweigers kommt erst jetzt voll ans Licht.

SEITE 6 - DONNERSTAG, 15. OKTOBER 1998

Beilmer
MorgenPost

Preisverleihung

Chiune Sugihara, japanischer Konsul in Kaunas, Litauen, 1939-1940


Sugihara stellte japanische Visas für mehr als 6.000 polnische Juden aus. Er tat dies entgegen seinen Vorgesetzten. Die Visas erlaubten den Juden eine Flucht nach Kobe, Japan. Von dort gelangten viele nach USA, Kanada, Südamerika, Australien und Palästina. Über 1000 Menschen fanden Schutz in Shanghai, China. Es ist anerkannt, daß Chiune Sugihara als einer von sehr wenigen eine so große Anzahl von Juden vor dem Holocaust gerettet hat. 1947 wurde er aufgefordert, seinen diplomatischen Dienst zu quittieren. Im Jahr 1985, ein Jahr vor seinem Tod, verlieh ihm Yad Vashem in Israel die „Righteous Among the Nations“-Medaille für seine lebensrettenden Maßnahmen.

Fotoausstellung

„Visas for Life: Chiune Sugihara and the Righteous Diplomats“

Die Fotoausstellung ist dokumentiert die bemerkenswerte Geschichte von Chiune Sugihara und sechs anderen Diplomaten, die während des Zweiten Weltkrieges entgegen den Anweisungen ihrer Regierungen für jüdische und andere Flüchtlinge Visas ausstellten. Dies ermöglichte den Flüchtlingen eine Ausreise aus Europa, um so dem Holocaust zu entkommen. Es konnten so über 100.000 Leben gerettet werden. Die Diplomaten waren: Chiune Sugihara (Japan), Aristides de Sousa de Mendes (Portugal), Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz (Deutschland), Dr. Feng Shan Ho (China), Karl Lutz (Schweiz), Raoul Wallenberg (Schweden) und Jan Zwartendijk (Holland). Das Ausstellen der Visas ist die größte Judenrettung während des Holocausts. Heute gibt es mehr als eine 250 000 Nachkommen dieser geretteten jüdischen Überlebenden. Das war eine der wichtigsten humanitären und heroischen Taten während des Zweiten Weltkrieges.

POSTEN 9801



Raoul Wallenberg Loge e.V.
Fasanenstraße 79 * 10623 Berlin

MRS. KATE WACZ
BANÉRGATAN 13
11522 Stockholm,
Sweden

Anschließend wird in der Halle im Erdgeschoß des Rathauses Schöneberg
die Fotoausstellung
„Visas for Life: Chiune Sugihara and the Righteous Diplomats“,
die zum ersten Mal in Deutschland ist,
offiziell eröffnet.

Danach findet ein Cocktailempfang statt.

U. A. w. g. bis 2. Oktober 1998 mit beiliegender Karte
oder Tel. 8 85 94 50, Fax 8 83 21 79.

Programm

Musik

Jukako Morikawa (Klavier)
Franz Schubert: „Impromptus“, Es-Dur, Opus 90 Nr. 2

Begrüßung

Jeffrey Drimmer
Präsident der Raoul Wallenberg Loge

Grußwort

S. E. Botschafter Teruyoshi Inagawa
Generalkonsul Japans in Berlin

Laudatio für Chiune Sugihara

Dr. Michel Friedman
Präsidiumsmitglied des Zentralrats der Juden in Deutschland

Musik

Naoko Ogihara (Violine)
J. S. Bach: Solo-Sonate für Violine Nr. 3, 3. und 4. Satz

Ansprache

Andreas von Mettenheim
Gesandter des Auswärtigen Amtes

Preisverleihung

Preisträger:
Chiune Sugihara,
der während des 2. Weltkrieges
6000 jüdischen Menschen das Leben gerettet hat

Verleihung durch:

Dr. András Kain
Mitglied des Vorstandes der Loge

Rede

Hiroki Sugihara
Sohn von Chiune und Yukiko Sugihara

Musik

Jukako Morikawa und Naoko Ogihara
M. Ravel: Sonate für Violine und Klavier, 2. und 3. Satz

Dank

Bajla Krzeszower
Mitglied des Vorstandes der Loge

1999-11-02/UMK/ad
Handl: Magnus Hellgren/UMK
Besv m fax tit
u/J Eliasson

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
WASHINGTON

Sid 1 (2)

1999-10-22

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Till: Kab.sekr

Kopia: Ss Nuder, Ss Danielsson, Dep råd. Wingren,
SB

Avd	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Ea1

Re Wallenberg minnesstund i Stockholm m.m.

Idag hade jag besök av två medlemmar från American Jewish Committee, (AJC) Dr Ralph Grunewald och Mr Jason Isaacson, vilka reste två frågor till vilka jag vill dra Din uppmärksamhet:

1. AJC skulle vilja under Stockholms Forum 26 till 28 januari, årsdagen av frigörelsen av Auswitsch inspirera till en minnesstund (Commemoration) om Raoul Wallenberg att äga rum i Stockholm den 27 januari. Man ville göra detta till en "World Class Event" med fullt media-pådrag. Grunewald hade just återvänt från Stockholm (och minnesstunden i anledning Jan Nisells död) och tagit upp frågan med den judiska gemenskapen i Stockholm. Man hoppades att minnesstunden skulle äga rum i Riksdagshuset i närvaro av talmannen Birgitta Dahl och statsminister Göran Persson. Man hade indikationer att Drottningen var intresserad deltaga. Som fall-back lokal hade man Stockholms synagoga. Man hoppades att Göran Persson skulle vilja tala vid tillfället. Kati Marton var redan vidtalad som en av talarna och Richmond Hoolbroke kunde också möjligen komma. I övrigt väntades Tom Lantos från Representanthuset med hustru vilja delta. Per Anger

Exp.

Datum	Kl	Sign

var vidtalad. Man hoppades att Nane Annan skulle tala och räknade med generalsekreterarens medverkan, förutsatt att han var i Stockholm vid tillfället. Avgörande var nu stöd av statsministern och talman Dahl. Jag lovade vidarebefordra detta till Stockholm.

Utifrån vårt perspektiv här kan vi bara uttrycka stöd för initiativet vilket dock bör ske som en tribut från det officiella Sverige till Wallenberg, även om AJC väl borde nämnas som medarrangör av något slag?

2. AJC har framskridna planer på att låta SIFO genomföra en mätning (i början december) av svenska åttityder till Förintelsen bl.a. för att genom jämförelse med tidigare mätningar söka utröna hur kunskap och förhållningssätt i frågan förändrats genom Levande Historia-projektet. Jag utgår från att vi från officiellt håll inte har några synpunkter eller invändningar ifråga om detta.

EKEUS

Ambassadrådet Lage Olson
Utrikesdepartementet
EI/ESEK
103 39 Stockholm

Delges:

Hans Magnusson, Riga
(uten kildeskriftnar etc.)

exp. 98-10-26

294/029
1998-10-22

P 2 EU'

Bäste Lage Olson,

jag tänkte vänta på ytterligare uppgifter, men då detta bifogade brev från Vera Parnes anlände ansåg jag att det skulle vara bäst att kommentera en del av detta material som har hamnat på mitt bord redan nu.

1) När jag läste Special report- "the angel was a spy" och Iver Olsens kommentar "that he left in a hell of a hurry with no instructions and no funds", varför då inte kommentera mer om denna rapport av Olsen, men det hade väl kunnat ge en mindre negativ bild om händelserna i Stockholm före Raoul Wallenbergs resa till Budapest.

Och om han hade väntat några veckor för "instruktioner" hade alla hans insatser varit förgäves och många tusen flera mist sina liv.

Jag bifogar redogörelser av Rudolph Philip och Jacques Derogy vad som hände i Stockholm före resan till Ungern. Jag tror att man får en annan bild både angående planeringen och finansieringen av verksamhet i Ungern. Man borde vara medveten att under pågående krig kan allting hända och således "planeringen" är helt beroende på omständigheterna för varje dag och varje stund.

2) Angående filmen av Jean-charles Deniau om Raoul Wallenberg, så mest intressanta är kommentarerna av Nikita Petrov och Sergei Berija, likaså intervju med Sergei Kondratsev. Han var tolk vid förhören, och det kom inte fram något om spioneri. Om detta hade varit fallet, hade han inte blivit så förvånad då han fick höra att man hade dödat denne fånge.

Men för att förstå denna film helt, speciellt bilden av Raoul där han blir äldre och äldre, kan ske endast om man har sett inspelningen från ett fångläger, Perm 35, och hört några muntliga vittnesmål.

Några år sedan en f.d. fånge besökte mig. Han hade varit där fyra år, men benådades när Gorbatsjov kom till makten. Han hade dömts för 5 år. Min gäst hade delat cell bl.a. Nathan Sharansky- fastän Sharansky hade fått lämna lägret före honom. Min gäst var full av beundran för Sharanskys otroliga minne; de hade spelat schack med varandra utan bräde och bjäser, och Sharansky kom ihåg alla drag, även när papper och penna saknades. De båda var mycket bibelkunniga- min gäst kristen, Sharansky praktiserande jude. - Jag läste en gång ett tal av Sharansky, då han berättade om sin kristna cellkamrat, och hur mycket denna vänskap betydde för dem under dessa fruktansvärda år.

Min personliga uppfattning är att Raoul Wallenberg fängslades inte varken för spioneri eller någon sorts affärsverksamhet, utan ryssarnas stöld för hans bil, pengar och andra värdesaker. Det är alltför många som berättar för dessa stölder; Lars G:son Berg, Jacques Derogy, Bernt Schiller och annonsen i The Jerusalem Post.

Det är möjligt att man ville ha honom som uppgiftslämnare, men när han nekade, var det omöjligt att släppa honom. Det skulle ha blivit en internationell skandal. Stölder och fängslande av en diplomat från ett neutralt land.

Jag tror också, att han fick lämna arbetslägret 1989, men inte lämna landet liksom många andra utländska fångar.

Med vänlig hälsning

Hans Magnusson

My very dear Ebba,

Many thanks for your letters, and your greetings.

This time I was occupied with our forest in Jerusalem. We paid already 20% of the whole sum. The Jewish National Fond presented our organization with a special certificate at its annual conference.

Now we are busy with the RW grove in Montreal. We have already received a permission from the mayor of Montreal, but many formalities are to be done. We continue our lobbying for the RW Recognition Day in Canada.

By the way, we got a positive answer from the Swiss government to our suggestion to instal the RW monument in Geneva. I think, I have already told you. But the ambassador of Switzerland telephoned me again on Monday.

We had several important meetings of our organization during this time. On the first of October I made a report of our work for 1998.

Many things were done but we must do much more.

By the way, Sonja Sonnenfeld sent me a list with all the signs of Raoul Wallenberg's recognition, which she registered: 36 pages typed in one interval.

We are negotiating with Quebec government about new signs of RW recognition in Quebec. A representative of the government visited us, and there was a long conversation. Now I must send some additional papers to the Minister of the citizenship.

The article with the description of the events connected with a peace process in Israel, which you sent me, is one of the best that I read. Many thanks for it.

I was twice fasting heavily: no drop to drink, no food to eat during 25 hours.

After Sukkot and Simchat Torah, I will begin computerizing our Bulletin, but I also must answer more than 25 letters. There is no time to sleep. I try to calm myself: one more jump up, then my life will be easier.

How are you, my dear Ebba?

Please give my regards and my gratitude to Lage Olson. He sent me some very important material. My best regards to Torsten. How is he? He intended to send me the description of our meeting in the restaurant, but he did not. It is necessary that he send it to me by fax. I am waiting for it. Where are the photos which were made that very day? I am eager to publish them.

Once again, I thank you very much for your letters and your support of our activities.

With love,

Yours,



Raoul Wallenbergs möten med olika personer enligt hans dagboksnoteringar mellan 12 juli- 29.12.1944 . Förklaringarna givna av Per Anger.

- 12.7. Grevinnan Elisabeth Nako
- 13.7. Grevinnan Wechlei, Miklos Krauss
- 17.7. Samuel Stern/Jewish Council i Budapest
Journalist Geller
- 19.7. Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann
- 20.7. Löjtnant Laszlo Ferency vid ungerska polisen
- 21.7. Pető
- 7.8. Möte med ryska krigsfångar med hjälpinsatser
- 12.8. Zilay Sebess Jero, pressattaché vid ungerska ambassaden
- 20.8. Gunnaro Verolino (nu kardinal i Rom)
- 21.8. Born, chef för Internationella Röda Korsets sjukhus
- 24.8. Nandor Batisfalvy
- 13.9. Amiral Miklos
- 21.9. En tysk säkerhetspolis
- 23.9. Margareta Bauer och Birgit Burlin
- 25-
- 26.9. Molnar och Nathan Weiss/Jewish Council
- 27.9. Forgacy, judisk affärsman
- 7.10. Kasser, ungersk jude
- 15.10. Amiral Horthy
- 26.10. Friherinnan Kémeny
- 30.10. Utrikesministern Kémeny
- 4.11. " "
- 7.11. Raoul fick en guddotter
- 8.11. Lunch med mr. Darányi
på kvällen representant för Vatikanen , Angelo Rota
- 12.11. Tohtori Pal Hegedus
- 14.11. Hegedus och Reczö Müller
- 15.11. Nandor Batizfalvy
- 18.11. En man på Versorgungsministeriet och "Engelman"
- 28.11. Krauss

- 4.12. tre möten, en av dessa med Adolf Eichman (dinner)
- 17.12. "Harmincad Utca", en av hans sista adress i Budapest -
många andra adresser angivna
- 20.12. "Asta" - representant till Röda Korsets barnhem i Budapest.
- 22.12. Dinner med Per Anger
- 29.12. Lócsey, polischef i Budapest

Sista noteringen i Budapest

Närmare redogörelser för dessa möten har publicerats i Expressen

Utskrivning av skydds-passen- om man räknar 6000 x 10 minuter blir det 1000 timmar.

Omfattande rapporter till svenska myndigheter och till Iver C. Olsen, 9 mer kända.

Brev till sin mor- 5 kända.

Brev till hans flickvän Caroline Grinda-Christensen - antalet okända.

Några dagar vid hans besök i Stockholm med möte av Markus Wallenberg och madame Kollontay.

Kontakter med de över 350 anställda och på sjukhuset.

Räddningsaktioner - många beskrivna av dem som har sett och av dem vilka har på sista ögonblicket räddades.

Om man förvaltar så stora belopp pengar, enbart anställda över 350 stycken, kostnader av hyror och sjukhus, lämnade han förstas rapporter. Detta måste alla göra som handskas med andras pengar.

Om man sedan lämnade vidare dessa rapporter ^{till} med olika institutioner, vilka var intresserade av situationen i Ungern, kan man väl inte betrakta dessa rapporter som spioneri?

Och anvisning till fotografiet angående frammarsch ^{av} de ryska trupperna- vad skall man säga. - Om man inte hade haft alla dessa fotografier som bevakade alla strider, hur mycket skulle vi veta nu vad som hände. Dagligen visas dessa autentiska bilder på TV. Skulle man betrakta alla dessa fantastiska fotografier som spioner?

Jag har skrivit denna lista i syfte att man verkligen försöker förstå hur lite tid Raoul Wallenberg hade för något annat än att rädda människor.

Om allt detta som har hänt, inte skulle vara så allvarligt, man skulle kunna skratta för alla dessa spekulationer. Och även om han skulle spionerat, USA och Ryssland stred på samma sida mot Nazi-Tyskland.

Vera Parnes har varit mycket upprörd över dessa "spionskriverier", och om dessa skulle vara sanna, hon skulle veta. Hon har 405 st dokument angående Raoul Wallenberg från olika arkiven i Ryssland (jag har själv sett dessa, men tyvärr kan jag inte läsa ryska), så hon skulle inte vara så ledsen, utan skulle acceptera, att även den där delen skulle bli upplöst.

*Läs Nikita Pétrovs,
Sergei Berezins och
Sergei Kondratšins
kommentarer*

INTERVJUER

1. Nina Lagergren

Under femtioårs tid har vi varit växelvis förhoppningsfulla, växelvis förtvivlade och upplevt oavbrutna besvikelser. Situationen har ej heller förändrats. Sovjetunionen har ännu inte förmått att styrka Raoul är död. Han kan fortfarande vara vid liv, mer vet vi inte.

2. Guy von Dardel

Det har framkommit 20 olika versioner av Raouls död. Knappast någon av dessa berättar den slutliga sanningen.

3. Elisabeth Kemény

Wallenberg bad mig att hjälpa till att få kontakter i den nya regeringen, för utan dessa kontakter skulle det vara omöjligt att arbeta vidare. Han trodde att jag skulle kunna göra detta då min make var minister i den nya regeringen. Wallenberg talade lugnt och sade: "Jag behöver din hjälp". Regeringen har ett möte nu på kvällen och man tänker bland annat upphäva tillstånd att ha specialpass. Operationen för att rädda judar stannar. Eichmann börjar på morgonen klockan 4 razzior i våra byggnader, både i de svenska liksom dessa som skyddas av Vatikanen och schweizare, byggnader där människor hade lovats diplomatisk immunitet. Om du inte kan hjälpa mig vet jag inte vad skulle jag kunna göra.

4. Ewa Wimmer (tolk)

Hans uppförande var fantastiskt, när han träffade dessa mördare och diskuterade med dessa. Han höjde aldrig rösten, men lyckades alltid att göra intryck inför dessa som planerade massmorden. Inrikesministern- pilkorsare- lyfte sin hand till Szalasi (Hitler) hälsning, när Wallenberg kom in. Wallenberg sade att han kunde ta ner sin hand.

Jag frågade honom under en bilresa om han aldrig var rädd? Han svarade att han var ofta rädd - en människa har ju bara ett liv. Men just därför att vi är människor måste vi övervinna vår rädsla. Jag har kommit ihåg dessa ord under hela mitt liv. - Han betraktade sig inte såsom en speciell vän av judarna, han såg judarna som människor som var i fara. Måttet på vår mänsklighet är på vilket sätt en människa är kapabel att vara till nytta för sina medmänniskor.

5. Gábor Forgács

Vi var i dödsfara 24 timmar om dygnet. Vi var tvingade att skydda oss med allehanda uppslag samt med våra goda personliga kontakter. Vi måste komma ihåg att vi hade ansvar för ett område där det bodde 12.000 personer, flyktingar med s.k. skyddspass- Vi skötte deras angelägenheter, vi hade bland annat ett epidemisjukhus. Det var ingen brist på arbetsuppgifter. Wallenberg var i farten 24 timmar om dygnet. Klockan 6 på morgonen i Tatra Utza, därefter på järnvägsstationen för att rädda människor från massdeportationer. På eftermiddagarna besökte han kontoret under ett par timmar. Ni kan ta titt på hans notesbok. Han antecknade noggrant alla sina dagliga åligganden. Programmet var tämligen intensivt.

6. Nila Lagergren

Raoul berättade att han mådde bra, men att arbetsbördan var nästan omänsklig. Detta var under de sista dagarna då han arbetade nästan dygnet runt.

7. Guy von Dardel

Efter det första meddelandet om att ryssarna hade tagit Raoul under sitt protektion var vi lugna och trodde att han skulle återvända hem snart. Om de andra medlemmarna i den diplomatiska kåren i Budapest hörde vi ingenting under många månader. När dessa återvände från Moskva var Raoul inte med.

8. Gérard Aalders

Ryssarna misstänkte troligen att Wallenberg spionerade för amerikanerna. Och det var givetvis en ypperlig anledning att anhålla honom. Åtminstone klarlägger varför man behöll honom i Sovjet.

9. Nikita Petrov

Jag har inte hittat någon tillförlitlig förklaring varför Wallenberg anhölls. Diskussionerna med medlemmar i kommissionen inte heller har kunnat belysa fallet vidare. Personligen tror jag att ryssarna var mycket intresserade av Wallenberg. Jag kan tänka mig att man åtminstone i början tänkte utnyttja hans kontakter med kända nationalsocialister både i Ungern och Sverige, och kanske även i U.S.A. Troligen ville man även dra nytta av de pengar Wallenberg hade hand om. Men i detta får vi heller ingen klarhet.

10. Sergei Berija

Molotov besökte oss inte ofta, däremot Nikita Chrusjtjev och Malenkov. Det var en söndag när han kom. Vi skulle ta en promenad, ty vädret var milt och behagligt. Molotov yttrade sig ungefär: "Stalin har givit order att den i Budapest sysselsatta personen Wallenberg skulle omedelbart arresteras". Man hade fått upplysningar om att Wallenberg hade utfört uppdrag på order av amerikanerna och även haft kontakt med högstående tyskar. Dessutom hade han räddat tiotusentals judar. Strax efteråt tillade Molotov att det var fråga om judar som man hade nytta av, speciellt i finanskretsar. Arresteringsordern hade getts till Abakumov, chef för den militära spionorganisationen. Likväl preciserade inte Molotov orsaken till arresteringen.

11. Guy von Dardel

Min första reaktion var - svar som detta är inte trovärdigt. Jag sade för mig själv: "Nu har ryssarna lyckats". I den mån detta svar var deras uppfinning, då hade man åstadkommit en ytterst listig historia.

12. Elisabeth Kémeny

Med Kollontay, familjens vän, kunde Raoul tala öppenhjärtligt. Han berättade för henne om förteckningen angående de ungerska judarna. Han berättade att han efter kriget skulle vädja till ryssarna för att dessa skulle hjälpa judarna att få tillbaka sina tillgångar; husen, pengarna och smyckena. Då Kollontay var Sovjets ambassadör i Sverige, rapporterade hon naturligtvis till Stalin, men det är klart att Stalin inte var villig att hjälpa Wallenberg, en man som kände folket i Ungern och förhållandena där under kriget. En sådan man måste bort från Ungern, speciellt då Ungern snart skulle bli en kommunistisk stat. Detta betydde dödsdom för Wallenberg.

13. Sergei Kondratsev (förhör)

Samtalet pågick alldeles normalt. Det gjorde starkt intryck på mig att personen var så lugn. I allmänhet är den arresterade nervös när man förhörs. Man undviker frågor och är ovillig att svara. Men denna personen var lugn. Jag fick intryck att han inte visste i hur stor fara han svävade. Man presenterade inte den förhörda, men då jag kände officeraren som var förhørsledare och mötte honom 2-3 år senare, frågade jag vad som hade hänt med denne arresterade. Officeraren svarade: Han avrättades". Arkebusering. "Av vilken besynnerlig anledning" frågade jag. Han svarade: "Fråga inte mig någonting". Han berättade endast att mannen i fråga hette Raoul Wallenberg. Senare kunde jag läsa i tidningar om fallet.

Var hans namn Wallenberg? Ja-

Officeraren sade endast: "Fråga inte - jag kan inte svara på frågan".

14. Vladimir Vinogradov.

Likvideringsordern överlämnades i juli månad 1947. Senare har ett meddelande från Vyshinski kommit fram, innehållande information som styrker likvideringsordern. Dessutom vet vi att Abakumov översände information om fallet till Molotov den 17.7. Detta meddelande har registrerats hos både K.G.B. och utrikesdepartementet. Man har dock inte kunnat hitta detta dokument men man vet ändå att dokumentet finns.

15. Nikita Petrov

Materialet angående Wallenberg tillhör kategorin där handlingar aldrig får förstöras. Denna klassens handlingar har klassificerats "för evigt förvaring". För att dessa skulle kunna förstöras måste man ha tillstånd från "högre ort". Jag är säker på att mapparna angående Wallenberg finns kvar. Åtminstone brev och ytterligare rapporter hittas säkert någonstans. I arkivet i Kremlin finns en del hemliga mappar, vilka har insamlats dit ifrån andra arkiv, och där kan man hitta en del. Man har hittills framtagit ett flertal hemliga, statliga rapporter, bland annat upplysningar om massavrättning av polska officerare på Katyn 1940. Arkivet i Kremlin bevarar även alla handlingar angående planering av lönnmorden, och det är möjligt att material angående Wallenberg har insamlats i en mapp i Kremlin. Jag tror att Vinogradov har alla möjligheter att söka och finna nya dokument. Jag vill inte påstå att han redan har hittat och hemlighållit dessa, för detta skulle betyda att han vilseleder kommissionen med ofullständiga uppgifter.

16. Guy von Dardel

Vi visste inte om vi skulle betrakta honom som levande eller död. När inget officiellt dokument om hans död har kommit fram, betraktar vi honom som "fortfarande vid liv". Men Riksdagen i Sverige stiftade en speciel lag för detta fall. Raoul betraktas som död, om inga nya vittnesmål bekräftar att han lever, från och med år 2000, då han skulle fylla 88 år.

17. Sergei Berija

Stalin gav sitt samtycke för överläggningar och bad min far och Molotov att lova till finnarna Sovjetunionens opartiskhet och Finlands suveränitet. Då var en medlem av familjen Wallenberg med, jag kommer inte riktigt ihåg hans förnamn, men jag tror det var Marcus. I vilket fall som helst var han en industriledare, och han lovade att fullt stödja överläggningarna till slutet, om han fick en försäkran från högre ort att man inte skulle profitera situationen.

Södertälje den 16.5.1994
Ebba Grönroos Köpmangatan 1

Fru Nina Lagergren
Dahlbergsvägen 22

182 62 Djursholm

Tack för att vi, trots allt, fick träffa Er.

Först vill jag kortfattat berätta om min roll i allt detta.- Jag har varit länge intresserad av Er brors öde; tagit del i protestmarscher till ryska ambassaden, varit årligen i Storkyrkan den 17:e januari, och tillhörde några år Raoul Wallenbergföreningen på 80-talet.

Jag hade dock aldrig det minsta tanke på att mer aktivt ta an fallet, i.o.m. jag visste att det fanns personer som bevakar hans intressen.

Då hände det under år 1991 att jag fick två brev från Raoul Wallenberg Society i Moskva, vilka jag bifogar som kopior.

Efter det andra brevet anlände, försökte jag telefonledes nå föreningens sekreterare här i Sverige- men inget svar. Så jag kontaktade Theodor Katz för att med hans hjälp kunna svara till Vera Parnes fråga. Jag lyckades dock aldrig få veta varför?

Först tänkte jag att Ni betraktade denna förening i Moskva betydelselös, men sedan fick jag läsa i "The Jerusalem Post" en insändare av Eli Landau, borgmästare i Herzlia i Israel. Bilaga medföljer.

Efter ett par veckor senare fick jag ett besök. Då jag visade till henne dessa brev med några kommentarer svarade hon; "vet du vad- jag har en vän, som fick ett besök från utlandet, vilken hade några upplysningar om Raoul Wallenberg men vid kontakt med Er blev han inte speciellt väl mottagen". Det var väl Raoul Wallenbergföreningen han kontaktade- inte Er personligen. Denna besökare var Janis Rozhkalns.

I samband med mitt arbete för Ida Nudel fick jag bl.a. från U.S.A:s ambassadör Michael Novak en kopia av hans tal i Bern 1986 (Meeting of Experts on Human contacts), samt 7 sidor lång lista över fångar, på vilkas befrielse man i första hand arbetade för. Så här skriver man om Janis Rozhkalns: "Latvia baptist, who applied to emigrate in January 1983 together with 19 other Latvians. Arrested in April 1983, Rozhkalns was sentenced in December to five years strict regimen camp plus three years internal exile". Se fotokopior.

Så han har verkligen erfarenheter från ryska fängelser, fångarnas tillvaro, och en stark medkänsla för dessa som fortfarande sitter inne utan att ha varit skyldiga för något brott. Denna medkänsla inkluderar Raoul Wallenberg, och i samband med sina många internationella kontakter och med ryska fångar/fängelser har han tillgång till viss information.

Jag fick ta del i en del uppgifter vid möte med hans vän här i Sverige. Jag fick då avge ett löfte, att inte lämna dessa till några myndigheter, så jag har försökt att nå privatpersoner med möjligheter att agera. Detta är svårt. då KGB fortfarande är mycket aktiv (se artikeln i "The Jerusalem Post").

Jag har vid ett par tillfällen besökt dåvarande Sovjet, och är medveten om att man tar en stor risk (för utgiftslämnaren) om man med tolkens hjälp försöker få speciell information.

Därför blev jag glad när min väninna Edith Grunau (se fotokopia) blev stationerad i Raoul Wallenberg Center i Budapest. Hon var närmare Tyskland, och då hon kan bl.a. både ryska och tyska, kunde hon kommunicera med Janis Rozhkalns.

P.g.a. Edith Grunaus sjukdom blev det inget möte då, när hon var tvungen att söka läkarvård i Finland.

Efter hennes tillfriskande tog man kontakt med Janis Rozhkalns igen, och både Edith Grunau och jag själv, är ytterst tacksamma för hans besök och för alla dessa upplysningar han har kunnat medla till oss.

Visserligen var inte mötet hos Eder särskild lyckad- men lärorikt.

Vad beträffar uppgifter avlämnade av Alexander Solsjenitsyn, hänvisar jag "Gulag arkipelagen- evig rörelse", den andra delen i serien. Några sidor ur boken medföljer som bilaga. Läs även en annons i "The Jerusalem Post". Enligt annonsen döpte Abakumov Er bror till Erik Arvid Andersen.

Det var inte lätt för Abakumov att skilja mellan svenska och danska språket.

För övrigt använder man här i Sverige namnet Andersson- men bl.a. i Finland Andersen.

Vi förstår Janis Rozhkalns önskan att få stöd från Raoul Wallenbergs anhöriga, men en man, som har fått stå ut så mycket, har dock inte så svårt att acceptera ett nej.

Gud är dock allsmäktig, och ingenting kan förhindra honom att öppna "kopparporten" om det är Hans vilja.

Två, vilka jag har arbetat för, har nått friheten; Ida Nudel (med Armand Hammers hjälp), och en judisk flicka från Teheran. Hans släktingar kontaktade mig, och jag i min tur vände mig till överrabbinen. Han ordnade så, att representanter till judiska församlingen förde saken vidare, och hon har nu varit här några år. Dessutom lyckades man ett par år sedan få tillstånd för föräldrarna i Teheran att besöka sina döttrar och barnbarnen här under några veckor.

Ida Nudels namn stod på listan aldrig. Men hon är fri!

Så varför inte Raoul Wallenberg ?

Med högaktning

Ebbe Grunau

den 3 november 1991 6

RAOUL WALLENBERG

Dokument kastar nytt ljus över fallet

Från TT

MOSKVA, STOCKHOLM. Intervjuer med före detta fångvaktare finns med bland de nya dokument som den svenska Wallenberggruppen fick i förra veckan från den sovjetiska säkerhetstjänsten KGB.

Dokumentet innehåller enligt Hans Magnusson, ministerråd vid svenska ambassaden i Moskva, inga avgörande upplysningar om Raoul Wallenbergs öde, men kastar ändå nytt ljus över fallet.

— Det står klart att de sovjetiska myndigheterna verkligen anstränger sig för att bringa klarhet i fallet, säger Hans Magnusson.

Magnusson träffade KGB i onsdags i förra veckan tillsammans med Guy von Dardel, Raoul Wallenbergs halvbror, och Martin Hallqvist, kansli-råd på UD.

Pensionärer

De ingår i den svensk-sovjetiska arbetsgrupp som försöker klarlägga den svenske diplomatens öde. På den sovjetiska sidan finns förutom folk från KGB även utrikesministeriet representerat.

Hallqvist berättar att det nya materialet bland annat innehåller nya intervjuer med nu pensionerade fångvaktare som arbetat på fängelser där Raoul Wallenberg hållits fången.

"Bra stämning"

De nya dokumenten har hittats i KGB:s arkiv.

— Vi har fått ett tiotal nya dokument från KGB. Det råder en bra stämning mellan oss och dem och jag tycker att de verkar vilja komma framåt, säger Hallqvist till TT.

Hallqvist utlovar en mer utförlig redogörelse för dokumentens innehåll någon av de närmaste dagarna.

Se artikel 5.12.97

INRIKES/Jeltsin

Wallenbergs syskon
får en kontaktman

Raoul Wallenbergs syskon Guy von Dardel och Nina Lagergren mötte på torsdagen den ryske justitieministern och blev positivt överraskade, berättade de för DN efteråt. Justitieministern Sergei Stepasjin hade visserligen inte några nyheter för dem. Men han har lovat dem en särskild kontaktman på justitieministeriet. Någon sådan har de aldrig haft tidigare.

Ministern var ytterst förstående - särskilt beträffande de juridiska svårigheterna när det gäller att komma åt arkivmaterial. Här har det blivit svårare, berättar Guy von Dardel.

Guy von Dardel, som ingår i den svensk-ryska Wallenbergkommittén, var i Moskva för en månad sedan och träffade då de gamla fängvaktarna från Lubjanka-fängelset. Dessa ska, enligt tidigare vittnesmål, ha vaktat Wallenberg men vill nu förneka att de talade med honom. Vakternas identitet har tidigare förnekats officiellt.

Syskonen fick nu veta av den ryske justitieministern att president Jeltsin är angelägen om att Wallenbergs öde ska undersökas ordentligt. Det lät hoppfullt, tyckte Guy von Dardel, som också sammanträffat med utrikesminister Primakov. Men denne hade bara sagt att någon ny information inte fanns.

Justitieminister Stepasjin sade däremot till journalister att han inte såg det som en omöjlighet att göra en ny undersökning för att hitta förlorat arkivmaterial. Det som måste finnas innan fallet kan avskrivas var enligt Stepasjin två dokument: domen som hade avkunnats av en domstol med tre domare, samt dödsattesten.

Enligt en brevlapp som tillskrivits en fängelseläkare skulle Wallenberg ha dött i juli 1947 av en hjärtattack.

Disa Håstad

* Kanaka Sun

Lagergren

* har inte

berättat sin

* sin bror vad

som hände

en långvärd

man hade

kontaktat i

Moskva tidigare

Vahningssonen

Såväl Förenta staterna som Storbritannien skulle engagera sig att ta emot dem efter kriget. Sverige skulle under tiden få medel för att hysa och föda dem. Med förhandlingarna drar på tiden. Svårigheter dyker upp, ena stunden från tysk sida, i nästa allierad. Till sist spricker det hela. Alla sådana officiella framställningar i humanitära syften förefaller från begynnelsen dömda till liknande misslyckanden.

I början av 1944 kommer det till ett sista möte mellan Jacob Wallenberg och Goerdeler. Konspirationen har nu fått fart med stöd av en aktivist Klaus von Stauffenberg. Med ett attentat mot Hitler vill han ge signalen till en allmän resning, men han är en chef utan någon trupp. Efter det misslyckade attentatsförsöket mot Hitler den 20 juli häktas förre borgmästaren i Leipzig tillsammans med övriga sammansvurna. Himmler ger SS-översten Walter Schellenberg, chefen för *Sicherheitsdienst*, i uppdrag att via svenska legationen i Berlin ta kontakt med Wallenberg. Förevändningen skulle vara befrielsen av svenska medborgare i tyska läger. Men bankdirektören vägrar att bege sig till Berlin för det mötet. Han ville inte hjälpa Hitlers hantlangare, som bara skulle söka utnyttja Goerdelers förbindelser för att själva undkomma sitt ansvar.

Under tiden har hans kusin Raoul accepterat ett erbjudande att bege sig på en, den sista chansens mission till Budapest. Han har dragit lärdom av förhållandena i Danmark, där motståndsrörelsen har lyckats att få över 7.000 judar till Sverige.

*Raoul och Goerdeler, fallet
2 Raoul Wallenberg, en av hjälper
Rätte mannen av Sörbomdotter
And Kupferman och
Sveriges journalister
Ariane Wiesner
i Buda Pest.*

Rätte mannen

Som frivillig instruktör i hemvärdet har sergeant Raoul Wallenberg blivit inkallad för en tjänstgöringsperiod. Han har lämnat Stockholm för att deltaga i regementets fälttjänstövningar. Det är i början av juni. Kvällarna blir allt längre. Polcirkeln är nära.

Förmiddagen den 13 juni får hans överste ett telefonsamtal från Stockholm. Kan sergeant Wallenberg få 24 timmars permission, så att han omedelbart får möjlighet att ta kontakt med sin arbetsgivare, Mecopa-chefen Kálmán Lauer? Det gäller en statsangelägenhet.

Permissionen beviljas. Raoul är bjuden på middag ute på Grand Hôtel i Saltsjöbaden, den lilla idyllen med bad och båthamnar vid en vik av Östersjön, dit hela Stockholm beger sig för att njuta av det vackra sommarvädrat. Från matsalens fönster kan man se båtmasterna som sakta svänger för havsvindarna. Det bjuds på brännvin till smörgåsbordet med dess olika sillsorter. Vid borden kommenterar man kriget, som härjar i praktiskt taget hela det övriga Europa.

En vecka har redan gått sedan den västallierade armadan landsteg längs de normandiska kusterna i angrepp mot den s.k. Västvallen. På östfronten har ryssarna återtagit Sevastopol i söder och inlett en ny offensiv mot finnarna på Karelska näset. Enligt de flesta middagsgästernas uppfattning råder det inte längre någon tvekan om hur kriget skall sluta. Endast här och

var hörs någon yttra sin tro på att Tredje riket skall ha möjlighet att till sist ändå ta hem segern.

Kálmán Lauer har stämt möte med Raoul precis klockan 19.

Det är en liten rundhyllt herre med kortklippt hår och buskiga ögonbryn, över en kraftig, något tillplattad näsa. Han är orolig för vad som händer hans familj och hans hustru Marikas föräldrar. Hon har fått veta att de alla är direkt hotade av deportationsbestämmelser, som ungerska regeringen just utfärdat. En annan ungersk jude deklarerar oron. Henrik de Wahl har kommit till Stockholm den 19 mars för att gifta sig med sin svenska fästnös. Han tillhör en internationellt känd finans- och industrifamilj. Det är genom förmedling av skeppsredare Sven Salén, som han känt sedan länge, som han nu kommit i kontakt med Lauer för att eventuellt få höra något om hur det går för de familjemedlemmar, som är kvar i Ungern.

I kväll, här i Saltsjöbaden, är det han som är värd för de två representanterna för Metropa, Kálmán Lauer och Raoul Wallenberg. Som fjärde man slutar den nye amerikanske attachén Ivar C. Olsen sig till dem vid bordet. Denne leende och vänlige diplomat är med sina mjuka, rosiga kinder europarepresentant för the War Refugee Boards verkställande utskott. Organisationen, har helt nyligen skapats på president Roosevelts initiativ. Olsen är speciellt utskickad för att försöka rädda de judar som nu hotas av förintelse.

Den "slutliga lösning" som de nazistiska herrarna beslutat i januari 1942 har pågått oavlatligt sedan denna ödesdigra tidpunkt. Det skulle dock dröja ända till våren 1944 innan de allierade gör något mera än att prata om den. En kampanj startad i Schweiz har larmat den judiska befolkningen i Amerika, som i sin tur tryckt på presidenten. Samtidigt har denne fått ett mycket hårt formulerat brev från sin finansminister Henry Morgenthau. Resultatet blev att the War Refugee Board tillsammans med the Office of Strategic Services fick i uppdrag att vidtaga alla tänkbara dispositioner för att hjälpa den enda kvarlevande judiska befolkningen i det ockuperade Europa, den i Ungern.

Landet var det sista att bli invaderat av tyskarna, den 19 mars 1944. (OSS hade efter den japanska attacken mot Pearl Harbor i december 1941 fått officiellt uppdrag att samordna den amerikanska hemligtjänsten).

För denna hjälpverksamhet behövs ett neutralt lands stånd. Att president Roosevelts val kommit att falla på Sverige är helt naturligt. Dels har detta skandinaviska kungarrike gamla humanitära traditioner. Dels är det genom legationen i Budapest skyddsmakt åt sju länder som inte längre hade representation i Budapest efter landets inträde i kriget på axelmakternas sida.

För att klara de uppgifter, som dessa skyddsuppdrag för med sig, hade legationen inrättat en speciell B-avdelning, som förestås av attachén Lars Berg.

Generalsekreteraren i the War Refugee Board, James Pehle, hade därför tagit kontakt med amerikanske ministern i Stockholm Herschel Johnson. Man hade enast om att en av de amerikanska flyktingrådets tjänstemän, Ivar Olsen, skulle få knytas till legationen, kamouflerad som finansiell rådgivare där. Hans första uppgift nu är att finna en lämplig svensk diplomat som han tilltror möjligheten att organisera en räddningsoperation, kosta sedan vad det vill.

Det amerikanska initiativet sammanfaller med tre andra framställningar som gjorts till utrikesminister Christian Günther till förmån för judarna i Ungern. Den första hade kommit från överrabbinen i Stockholm, Marcus Ehrenpreis. Efter att ha fått informationer från Judiska rådet i Jerusalem om händelseförloppet hade han först förgäves vänt sig till de protestantiska kyrkomäns råd i Stockholm med begäran om en vädjan till kristna i Ungern. Den 18 april hade han sedan tagit kontakt med den svenske delegaten för World Jewish Congress, den interna judiska hjälporganisationen, Norbert Masur. Denne var direktör för bolaget Baltiska skinnkompaniet.

"Vi måste finna en rakryggad, icke judisk person med gott anseende, som går med på att bege sig till Ungern", hade han skrivit.

"Denne måste ha Utrikesdepartementets fulla förtroende, resa på diplomatpass och åtnjuta fullt stöd av våra legationer i Budapest och Bukarest. Till sitt förfogande skall han exempelvis kunna få 500.000 kronor. Hans uppgift skall vara att hjälpa de ungerska judarna att ta sig till Turkiet via Rumänien. Uppgiften bör underlättas genom inköp av visum och utdelandet av inrese tillstånd till Palestina. Vi bör kunna räkna på amerikanska fonder och på utrikesdepartementets stöd för utdelandet av provisoriska svenska pass om detta skulle visa sig nödvändigt, exempelvis för resan genom Bulgarien. Under den senaste tre månaderna har knappt tusentalet judar lyckats ta sin tillflykt till Turkiet. Det viktigaste är dock att finna rättte mannen för uppgiften."

Genom förmedling av överrabbinen i Zürich hade judarna i Schweiz samtidigt förhört sig med professor Ehrenpreis om han hade möjlighet att sända en förtrogen medarbetare till Ungern för att inhämta exakta uppgifter om trosfrändarnas öde.

Slutligen hade svenske ministern i Budapest, Ivan Danielsson, själv begärt att en av hans medhjälpare, den 69-åriga lektorn Waldemar Langlet, skulle utnämnas till officiell delegat för Svenska Röda korset. Lektor Langlet, som fungerat som kulturattaché på legationen och hans hustru Nina hade tidigare under stora personliga uppoffringar sökt hjälpa judar i nödläge. Ministerns begäran uppfyllades omedelbart. Han fick tillsammans med Langlets en vittgående fullmakt för att åtminstone i första hand söka skydda de förföljda, som hade familjeband eller yrkesmässiga relationer till Sverige. Dessa skulle kunna beviljas provisoriska pass utställda för den tid som kunde behövas för deras "hemsändning". Legationens B-avdelning översvämmas snart med ansökningar. För detta hade Danielsson redan själv begärt att få förstärkning från Stockholm med någon lämplig person.

Som en följd av alla dessa framstötter har utrikesministern beslutat sig för att sända en *chargé de mission extraordinaire* till Budapest.

Den stora byggnaden vid Strandvägen 7 i Stockholm rymmer

inte bara firman Meropa, där Kálmán Lauer och Raoul Wallenberg har sina kontor. Där har också skeppsredare Sven Salén sina lokaler, liksom Förenta staternas legation. Det är innanför det husets fasad som trädarna börjar knytas för den utveckling som skall komma att avgöra Raoul Wallenbergs öde och säkra en framtid för kanske tiotusentals ungerska judar.

Efter återkomsten från sin senaste affärsresa till Budapest, i november 1943, hade den unge utlandschefen i Meropa haft en roande anekdot att berätta för sin chef och medhjälpare Lauer: under en överläggning han haft med en ungersk överste hade en judisk affärsman råkat komma in i rummet. När denne såg översten sitta där bad han ödmjukt om ursäkt och beredde sig att hastigt försvinna igen. Men Raoul hade rest sig och satt fram en stol till och bött besökaren sätta sig. Han hade lett in samtalet på kulturella aspekter av tillvaron, där den bildade judiske affärsmannen var väl hemmastadd, medan översten inte fattat ett dugg. Det var en situation i Raoul Wallenbergs smak.

Men sedan dess har judarnas ställning i landet försämrats katastrofalt. Genom förtroenden han dagligen får av Kálmán och Marika Lauer följer Raoul oavlatligt den dramatiska försämringen. Han vill göra någonting för sina vänners familj. På vilket sätt skall han kunna ingripa? Det är inte faran för dess egen skull eller äventyret som lockar honom. Men han är en äkta Wallenberg och tar det som en utmaning att hjälpa till där oskyldiga medmänniskor är i fara. Eftersom hans affärer redan två gånger fört honom till Budapest och han har redan lärt sig en liten smula ungerska, som förbättrats under kontakterna med familjen Lauer, vill han på något vis ge utlopp för sin goda vilja.

"Jag måste försöka ta mig dit igen, för att se om jag kan uträtta någonting för era föräldrar", säger han en dag. Men handelsförbindelserna med Ungern är inte längre vad de hade varit. För Raoul återstår egentligen bara två möjligheter: söka ett tyskt transitvisum för att hälsa på system Nina som nu bor i Berlin tillsammans med sin make som tjänstgör på

legationen där. Eller skaffa sig ett diplomatpass!

I början av maj får Lauer ett telefonsamtal från rabbinen Ehrenpreis:

"Ni som står nära dem det verkligen gäller, känner ni någon som skulle kunna bege sig till Ungern för att ta reda på hudent läget är och — om det nu går — hjälpa våra trosfränder?"

— Jag har en person här bredvid mig som inte begär bättre. Han heter Raoul Wallenberg och har mitt fulla förtroende. Man stämmer möte hos överrabbinen i Stockholm.

Med sin allvarliga uppsyn, sin stränga blick och sin uppåtvridna mustasch över ett yvigt skägg ser denne ut som en Moses, som tankfullt med hakan stödd på sitt vänstra pekfinger betraktar lagens tavlor. Synen skulle ha kunnat förskräcka vilken annan person som helst. Raoul Wallenberg har dock ett annat problem. Var och hur skall han kunna få ihop tillräckligt med pengar för ett företag som detta? Skall han kunna nå några resultat i Ungern, om han nu alls lyckas ta sig dit, måste han säkert köpa sig de maktavandades medverkan och säkra gisslans utresor genom frikostiga donationer.

Den gamle rabbinen är litet förbluffad. Det är inte en så ung person han tänkt sig för detta delikata uppdrag. Han skulle föredra en mer erfaren person med större pondus, som kunde väga litet tyngre under stundande förhandlingar.

En månad senare får man i Stockholm beskedet att läget för judarna i Ungern försämrats ytterligare. När han lämnar sitt kontor råkar skeppsredare Sven Salén i trappan på den nye amerikanske legationsmannen Ivar Olsen. Den blonde, norrländske vikingen Salén är vice ordförande i Svensk-Amerikanska sällskapet och personligen god vän till ministern Herschel Johnson.

När de två männen hälsar på varandra i trappan råkar Kälman Lauer komma förbi. Olsen blir mycket intresserad när han får höra att denne är både jude och ungrare. Han överöser honom bokstavligen med frågor kring vad som verkligen händer i Ungern. Samtalet i trappan drar ut på tiden.

"Känner ni någon här i landet som ni lyser förtroende för

och som skulle kunna ge sig iväg dit på uppdrag av *War Refugee Board* och på dess bekostnad för att rädda de judar som det alltfjänt går att rädda?" Olsen riktar frågan till Salén och Lauer samtidigt.

De två behöver inte många sekunder för att komma på samma idé. Båda vet hur Raoul Wallenberg bemödat sig för att få visum och kunna resa. Men allt har varit förgäves. Inte bara det att tjänstemän och diplomater, som han vänt sig till, visat föga intresse att hjälpa honom. Andra inflytelserika krafter, som Wallenberg inte lyckats identifiera, tycks till och med motarbeta förslaget.

"Jag vet ingen som så får grepp om en persons egenskaper och svagheter och så vet att i en handvändning få gehör för sina egna synpunkter", säger Lauer. "När det gäller psykologisk blick har jag funnit min överman. Jag vet ingen bättre."

Dagen efter mötet i trappan mellan Olsen, Salén och Lauer, får Wallenberg av sin överste 24 timmars permission för att äta middag i Sallsjöbaden. På vägen dit tittar han in i sin bostad och erfar att hans ansökan om transitvisum genom Tyskland blivit avslagen. Han berättar hur besviken han känner sig. Om man skulle söka hjälp av en av Lauers tyska bekanta? Denne skulle kunna ställa sig som garant inför myndigheterna i *das Reich* att resan till Budapest verkligen tjänade kommersiellt nyttobringande syften. Man diskuterar detta under middagen men överger snart tanken.

När de fyra middagsätlarna skiljs åt klockan fem på morgnen har man i alla fall en aktionsplan:

1. Raoul är rätt mannen för uppdraget, under förutsättning att han kan få åtnjuta diplomatisk immunitet. Han måste därför bli medlem av diplomatiska kåren och sändas till Ungern som attaché med ansvar för humanitära frågor.

2. Han måste samtidigt ha fullt stöd av amerikanska *State Department* och ha tillgång till hemliga fonder som OSS då ställer till förfogande åt *War Refugee Board*.

För att genomföra uppdraget räknar man med två à tre månader.

Redan samma dag informerar Lauer Salén om resultatet av överläggningarna. Olsen rapporterar till sin minister. Herschel Johnson ringer genast upp Salén och ber denne att sammanföra honom med "den unge mannen som tydligen inget högre önskar än att få sticka in huvudet i varens gap för att hjälpa folk som han inte känner".

Några dagar senare får sergeant Raoul Wallenberg ännu en gång permission i 24 timmar. Den här gången är det för att äta middag med ambassadören själv och med Sven Salén. De faller båda helt för Raouls charm, men i ännu högre grad för hans entusiasm. Mot slutet av måltiden är det knappt intermittent förmår hålla sig lugn. Här erbjuder man honom möjligheten att rädda sina vänners familjer och kanske många andra också. Men han behöver inte ta risken som privat affärsman utan som diplomat i statens tjänst, precis som farfar en gång. Detta till och med på uppdrag av själve presidenten i Förenta staterna, hans hjärtas land. Han tror att han drömer mer ...

Klockan 4 på morgonen drar skeppsredaren sig tillbaka. Han lämnar Raoul, med ett sista glas på bordet, ensam med den storvuxne kraftkarlen med smala läppar och med mjukt vågigt hår som nu är Förenta staternas officielle representant i Sverige. Ministern är djupt imponerad av sin unge bordsgrannes idealism, parad med känsla för det praktiska och över hans hejiga optimism — egenskaper som man brukar tillskriva lovande unga amerikaner.

Dagen därpå får Herschel Johnson officiell bekräftelse på utnämningen av president Roosevelts kabinett i Vita huset. Nu går allting i rasande fart. Tjugofyra timmar senare beger han sig till utrikesdepartementet vid Gustaf Adolfs torg.

"Jag har i uppgift att tacka svenska regeringen för dess ansträngningar till förmån för de ungerska judarna. Apropå det så har jag fått höra att ni har för avsikt att sända en speciell representant till Budapest och att ni beslutat ge Raoul Wallenberg uppdraget. Jag vill bara säga att ni enligt vår uppfattning inte hade kunnat finna någon lämpligare person. Avsik-

ten med mitt besök nu är bara att framföra våra gratulationer..."

Personalchefen till vilka dessa ord riktar sig försöker dölja sin överraskning. Han har aldrig hört namnet Wallenberg nämnas i något samband med de ungerska judarnas problem, som i gengäld i flera månader diskuterats inom departementet. Han håller dock masken med ett vänligt leende: "Ja, vi håller just på att ordna till formaliteterna."

Med detta bevisar han att han är en god diplomat, något som ministern givetvis aldrig betvivlat.

Sergeant Wallenberg får order att lämna ifrån sig sin hemvärnsuniform och inställa sig i utrikesdepartementet. Han återvänder till Stockholm fylld av förväntningar.

Först och främst har han inte någon aning om diplomatisk byråkrati. Överläggningarna inom departementet fortsätter i flera dagar. Raoul är framför allt angelägen om att hans tilltänkta titulering och befattning vid legationen inte får hindra honom i förverkligandet av sina avsikter. Han kräver rörelsefrihet, oberoende och ett utrymme för sina planer som inte stämmer med de sedvänjor och bruk, som annars är tillämpliga inom den diplomatiska karriären. Framför allt vill han undvika allt som kan vålla slitningar mellan honom och minister Ivan Danickson. Denne har från Budapest redan gått med på att få en förstärkning för lösandet av helt speciella uppdrag. För att man skall slippa att i efterhand eventuellt söka skiljedom i Stockholm, sätter Wallenberg upp en promemoria om sina stundande uppgifter:

- a. Fullständigt fria händer för räddningsaktioner, bl.a. med hjälp av frikostiga skänker under bordet.
- b. Möjlighet att återvända till Sverige när helst detta kan bli nödvändigt för en direktrapport, utan att behöva avvakta departementets tillstånd.
- c. För den händelse de amerikanska fonderna inte skulle rätta till, möjlighet att komplettera dem genom en appell via pressen till svensk allmänhet.
- d. Rätten att träda i kontakt med förtroendemän som står den

ungerska regeringen nära, liksom med de tyska ockupationsmyndigheterna för vilka amerikanska och brittiska organisationer gjort upp en förteckning, utan att först behöva tillstånd för detta.

e. Rätt att utnyttja rekommendationer, utfärdade av förre ungerske ministern i Stockholm Vilmos Böhm, nu flyktig i Sverige, och av Storbritanniens minister, för att träffa ungerske premiärministern, general Szójay och försöka påverka hans antisemitiska politik.

f. Rätt att disponera över speciell kurir för rapportering, g. I mån av behov vara bemyndigad att ge hustrum åt behövande i legationens lokaler och att utfärda alla sorters dokument, som kan underlätta räddningsarbetet.

h. Rätt att söka en audiens hos Ungerns riksföreståndare, amiral Horthy, för att utverka ett personligt ingripande från dennes sida.

Han yrkar också på att utrikesdepartementet ställer fonder för den direkta hjälpen till hans förfogande och låter honom få minst 2.000 kronor i månaden för sina löpande utgifter.

Det hela slutar med att han får sina anspråk igenom helt och hållet.

Efter en extrakonselj, som sammankallats enkom för detta ärende, meddelar statsminister Per-Albin Hansson att Raoul Wallenberg blivit utnämnd till sekreterare vid den kungliga svenska legationen i Budapest. Kung Gustaf V signerar själv utnämningen, som också förses med kungens sigill.

Raoul läser nu in sig i sin bostad i två dygn för att koncentrera sig på de rapporter, som löpt in till departementet om händelsernas utveckling i Ungern.

"Nu måste jag iväg", säger han slutligen till Kálmán Laurer. "Varje dag som jag är kvar i Stockholm åsamkar dina landsmän nya förluster."

Han har också ett sammanträffande med den avsatte ungerske ministern i Stockholm, Vilmos Böhm. Det är en liten vilhårig, mustaschprydd herre, som i största hemlighet anförtror

honon en lista på f.d. fackliga ledare med anvisningar på hur man skall få kontakt med dem. Han ger också officiella eller hemliga adresser till katolska, antinazistiska aristokrater och antydning om vilka som är de mest moderata och resonliga medlemmarna i den regering som påtvingats Horthy av hans tyska bundsförvanter. Bland dom är några, som genom att dölja sina verkliga åsikter, lyckats nå höga poster inom utrikesförvaltningen.

Efteråt konstaterar Raoul att ingen tidigare givit honom en så klar bild av den verkliga situationen: "Nu tycker jag mig faktiskt ha en tydlig överblick över de problem som jag kan komma att möta." Till sist skaffar han sig också en lista över alla svenskar som finns kvar i Budapest, i den mån han nu skulle kunna förlita sig på dem.

Den 30 juni 1944 avgår Wallenberg från sin befattning som utrikeschef i Meropa. Samma dag översänder Kung Gustaf ett budskap som minister Danielsson får i uppgift att överräcka till regenten Horthy, när han skall träffa samman med denne på följande dag, den 1 juli:

"Efter att ha erhållit kännedom om de utomordentligt hårda metoder, som Eder regering tillgripit gentemot den judiska befolkningen i Ungern, tillåter jag mig att vända mig personligen till Eders Höghet för att i mänsklighetens namn be Eder att vidtaga åtgärder för att rädda dem, som ännu återstår att rädda av detta olyckliga folk. Denna vädjan har föranletts av mina gamla känslor för Ungerns goda namn och rykte i nationernas samfund."

Initiativet till detta hade tagits av överrabbin Ehrenpreis, när han personligen uppvaktat utrikesminister Günther för att till denne överräcka två mycket brådskande telegram.

Svaret på kung Gustafs hälsning till Ungerns regent Nicolas Horthy kom snabbt och hade följande lydelse:

"Jag har mottagit den telegrafiska vädjan som Eders Majestät tillställt mig. Med känslor av den största förståelse ber jag Eders Majestät vara övertygad om att jag gör allt, som under nuvarande förhållanden står i min makt för att humanitetens

och rättsins principer må respekteras. Jag uppskattar i hög grad de känslor av vänskap för mitt land vilka besjälade Eders Majestät och jag ber Eders Majestät att bibehålla desamma gentemot det ungerska folket i dessa tider av tunga prövningar."

När han tar del av detta utbyte av budskap söker Raoul Wallenberg förgäves dölja sin besvikelse. I sitt arbetsrum i departementet överöses han nu med telefonsamtal och böner om sammanträffande. Varje ungrare i Stockholm vill träffa honom för att anförtro honom brev, pengar och paket, avsedda för anhöriga och vänner i Ungern. Han accepterar allt och tar med sig allting man anförtrott honom. Men han måste också ha ett sista sammanträffande med Henrik de Wahl angående hjälpfondernas finansiering. *War Refugee Board* ställer visserligen stora medel till hans förfogande. Men inflationen härjar i Ungern. Det ligger i de förmögna ungerska judarnas intresse att ställa pengar till hans förfogande på platsen, där de annars snabbt skulle komma att konfiskeras eller förlora sitt värde. Den judiska hjälporganisationen är också angelägen om att spara så mycket som möjligt av de fonder, som är avsedda att ge de europeiska flyktingarna hjälp sedan de väl räddats. Genom de intressen som familjen de Wahl alltjämt företräder i Ungern och utomlands, lyckas man upprätta ett system med kommunicerande kärl.

Raoul dyker alltjämt upp på Meropas kontor några gånger. En dag är han iförd en ny anorak, nästa har han ryggsäck med sig, en tredje demonstrerar han sin revolver.

"Vapenhandlaren som jag gick till visade mig två vapen att välja på", berättar han. En hypermodern med alla finesser, en gammal modell för riktiga pistolskyttar – som jag naturligtvis valde."

Den var 80 kronor billigare och det gällde att spara på pengarna. Raoul var mycket noga med pengar. Han underlät inte ens att bokföra den mjölk och de bröd som han lät leverera till en sjuk granne, när han själv inte var hemma och kunde klara av det själv. Dessutom var det väl knappast med vapenhjälp som han skulle lösa sitt uppdrag.

Tidigare hade Raoul aldrig med ett ord nämnt det inflytande som hans familj hade på det svenska samhället. Men nu när han har en viktig uppgift att identifiera sig med tvekar han inte att anknyta till familjetraditionerna:

"När en Wallenberg ger sig utomlands på statligt uppdrag så tvingas han enbart av sitt namn att göra så gott han kan och söka utföra sitt uppdrag in i minsta detalj", som han anförtro några vänner före avfärden.

Hans sista besök gäller överrabbinen Ehrenpreis, som tar emot honom på badhotellet ute i Saltsjöbaden, i sällskap med Judiska världskongressens Norbert Masur och Kálmán Lauer.

Den gamle vise mannen erkände att han ändrat mening: "Nu är jag helt säker på att ni är rätt man att lyckas med detta svåra uppdrag!"

Han ger Raoul ett rekommendationsbrev till dr. Samuel Stern, som tyskarna hänfullt utnämnt till ordförande i judiska rådet i Budapest. Rabbinen reser sig sedan och sträcker ut sin hand mot Raouls redan något tunnhåriga panna: "Eftersom ni har accepterat att bli vår diasporas budbärare och åtagit er uppgiften att söka rädda judiska liv, ber jag er mottaga min välsignelse. Enligt vår Talmuds lärdom har resenärer som ställt sig i mänsklighetens tjänst, rätt till Guds speciella beskydd."

Den 5 juli tar Raoul avsked av sina närmaste vänner vid en stor middag. Han pratar oavbrutet och tystnar bara för att lyssna på en uppspehning av en varning som brittiske utrikesminister Anthony Eden via BBC riktat till de ungerska myndigheterna. Horthys regering beskylls för att samarbeta med de tyska i likviderandet av den judiska befolkningen. Premiärministerns närmaste medhjälpare hänvisar till svenske kungens budskap med ett tillägg, att hans eget lands regering vill göra allt för att komma offren till hjälp. Wallenberg kommenterade: "Jag börjar tro att jag vet hur det skall gå till. Det enda sättet att rädda så många mänskliga liv som möjligt ur mördarnas klor är att ge sig rätt in, utan att spara på krafterna och med fast beslutsamhet försöka nå så många som möjligt."

Tidligt nästa morgon kommer Kálmán Lauer och hämtar

honon i bil för att skjutsa ut honom till Bromma flygplats. Raoul har valt att flyga till Berlin för att där krama om sin syster Nina och dennes make, innan han själv fortsätter med tåg till Budapest.

När han ser honom får Lauer dock en svår chock. Raoul har grova pjäxor på fötterna och är iförd edenhatt till sin vindtygsrock och ryggsäck, med en gammal regnrock över vänster arm.

I högra handen håller han en proppfull tornister.

En något ovanligt uttryck för en diplomat! Han har med sig brev och adresser och namnlistor, som man givit honom och som han noggrant skrivit om i kod. Det hade varit omöjligt att lära sig allt detta utantill.

På vägen ut till flygfältet förklarar han sig besluten att handla efter de linjer han dragit upp i sin promemoria, som utrikesdepartementet hade accepterat. Om det visade sig att detta inte gick skulle han sända Kálmán ett kodat meddelande. Denne skulle sedan be Sven Salén yrka på att han blev hemkallad till departementet.

De når ut till Bromma. Wallenberg halar upp sitt berömda diplomatpass, med vars hjälp han nu skall söka ge historien en ny inriktning. Enligt signalementet där är han 170 cm lång, har brunt hår, bruna ögon och är 31 år gammal.

I utgången till flygfältet vänder han sig till Lauer: "Jag reser min väg som humanitär delegat utan att egentligen veta mycket om vad som väntar mig i ditt land, där borta. Men jag är fast besluten att lyckas, enligt wallenbergska traditioner."

Deras blickar möts en sista gång. Raoul vandrar ut mot flygfältet och klättrar uppför trappan till kabinen.

Auschwitz bödel i Budapest

Läget som transporterar Raoul Wallenberg mot Budapest rullar ut från Berlin. Dödskonvojernas store strateg, Adolf Eichmann, har vid det laget redan organiserat avfärd till dödsfabrikerna i Auschwitz för 437.000 av de 787.000 ungrare, som enligt 1941 års folkräkning klassificerats som judar. Alla deporterade på mindre än tio veckor. Ett rekord! Denne metodiske ackordsarbetare i folk mord med sitt ointressanta frökenansikte är nu 38 år gammal. Han är stolt över att få bära SS svarta uniform med en överstelöjtnants gradbeteckningar utan att någonsin behövt gå ut i krig. Mycken tid hade gått förlorad när han trädde till, men han fördubblade tempot och var snart ikapp tidtabellen för de planerade avrättningarna.

I två år har gått sedan den hemliga konferensen vid Wannsee där de nazistiska ledarna beslöt sig för att befria Europa från de elva miljoner judar, som deras organisationer lyckats räkna ihop. Eichmann är chef för byrå IV B 4 i *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*, (RSHA) som har det direkta överinseendet över "den slutliga lösningen". Han hade stampat av otålighet inför den vita fläcken på väggkartan som föreställde Ungern. Det var det enda landet i centrala Europa där inga resultat från *Ein-satzkommandos* blodiga arbete registrerats. Tack vare sina terrioriella vinster, som landet kunde tacka Tyskland för, hade det nästan fördubblat sin judiska befolkning mellan oktober 1938, då Tjeckoslovakien styckats, till maj 1941 då det jugo-

Rachel/psd: Jh, psd: a Raoul Wallenberg

nen. När man sedan kom tillbaka betalade han ofta 20 musiker dagspenning ur sin egen ficka. Det betydde en halv veckolön för honom, men hans exempel sporrade många andra, som utan honom knappt skulle ha offrat sin fritid för det frivilliga försvarsarbetet.

I december 1943 gifte sig hans syster Nina. Några dagar efter bröllopet reste hon till Berlin med sin man, som tjänstgjorde vid svenska legationen. Det ansåg Raoul oklokt: Man borde inte frivilligt utsätta sig för bombriskerna.

Men när han i maj 1944 fick höra av dr Lauer, att dennes fru Marika hade sina föräldrar och syskon på den ungerska landsbygden, där de hotades med deportering, och att hon fruktade för deras liv, förklarade Raoul spontant, att han skulle resa dit och försöka rädda dem.

Allt sedan dess umgicks han med tanken att på något sätt komma till Ungern för att söka rädda så många som möjligt av det bruna barbariets offer.

Mellaneuropeiska Handels AB:s affärer med Ungern hade blivit fullständigt avbrutna. För den skull sökte Raoul några gänger, men utan framgång, att skaffa sig kabinettspass från Utrikesdepartementet för att kunna resa dit ned. Ty med ett vanligt pass fordrades genomresevisum från tyskarna, och sådant beviljades i princip inte.

Den 19 mars hade Henrik de Wahl kommit till Stockholm. Som tidigare berättats, var han förlovad med en svenska. Den omständigheten, att de Wahl rest till Sverige för att gifta sig, hade räddat honom från att dela det öde som vederfors de övriga medlemmarna av koncernfamiljerna Weiss-Kornfeld-Chorin. I Sverige hade de Wahl obegränsad kredit hos skeppsredare Salén, då hans familjs koncern med dr Lauers hjälp under de senaste åren kun-
nat placera stora värden i svenska företag. Vid denna tid
var han mest intresserad av att koncernen efter krigets

slut skulle kunna återgå i familjens ägo.

I det stora huset Strandvägen 7 A fanns inte bara Salén-rederiernas och Mellaneuropeiska Handels AB:s kontor utan också amerikanska legationen. - Sven Salén var som granne och som vicepresident i Stockholms Svensk-amerikanska sällskap god vän med USA:s minister, Herschel Johnson. Vid legationen fanns också Mr Iver Olsen, som president Roosevelt sändt till Stockholm som attaché för finansiella och humanitära frågor i Europa.

Den 13 juni 1944 när Raoul läg inkallad till beredskaps-tjänst och var förlagd vid Drottningholm, kom han, som tidigare berättats, hastigt in till Stockholm, klädde sig civil och for ut till Saltsjöbaden. Vid en förberedande middag träffade han där de Wahl och Mr Olsen. Man diskuterade, hur Wallenberg skulle kunna besöka Ungern för att på Mr Olsens uppdrag utröna, om och vad Executive Office of the President, War Refugee Board kunde göra för att hjälpa de svältande i Ungern, framför allt judarna.

Samma dags morgon hade Raoul från tyska legationen fått veta, att han sannolikt inte skulle kunna få visum för resa genom Tyskland, då gränserna i princip var spärrade.

Vid middagen berättade Raoul härom för Mr Olsen och meddelade, att hans meddirektör doktor Koloman Lauer, ungersk medborgare, hade en nära personlig vän i Hamburg. Kanske skulle det gå att få visum, om man kunde som skäl uppge någon affärstransaktion, som Tyskland kunde ha fördel av. Han förklarade också, att han inte ville företaga sig något i denna riktning utan att Mr Olsen ingående hade prövat förslaget och funnit det acceptabelt. Kanske skulle det vara möjligt att intressera dr Lauers vän och andra tyska firmor för att på transito-basis sälja ungerska varor till Sverige. Ett sådant arrangemang borde intressera Tyskland, förklarade Mr Olsen. Han försäkrade också, att han såg på denna sak på samma

sätt som Raoul och att han kunde garantera, att varken Raoul eller Mellaneuropeiska Handels AB skulle komma på "svarta listan" för de ifrågasatta transaktionerna med en tysk firma.

Resultatet av överläggningarna blev, att dr Lauer telefonerade till sin vän i Hamburg och överenskom med denne om, att han skulle resa till Budapest för att träffa Raoul där. Han skulle också från handelskammaren i Hamburg skaffa ett intyg om, att det låg i Tysklands intresse att de avsedda transitoaffärerna kom till stånd.

Detta intyg skulle Raoul sedan uppvisa för herr Behrens på tyska legationen för att stödja sin ansökan om visering.

Sergeant Wallenberg återvände till sitt kompani. Under tiden beordrade State Department i Washington tre gånger legationen i Stockholm att intervinera hos svenska utrikesdepartementet för Ungerns judar.

Den 27 juni vände sig Jewish Agency Rescue Committee till professor Ehrenpreis och bad honom söka utverka att kung Gustaf skulle intervinera för de ungerska judarna. Professor Ehrenpreis sökte kontakt med Utrikesdepartementet och bad om dess medverkan för en sådan intervention. Departementet ställde sig förstående för saken, och ett par dagar senare sändes det berömda telegrammet till Ungerns regent Horthy.

Den amerikanska aktionen gick vidare, och en dag frågade minister Johnson herr Salén, om han kände till någon man, som var absolut tillförlitlig och modig nog för att åtaga sig ett humanitärt uppdrag i Ungern. Salén bad om 48 timmars betänketid och frågade Raoul, om han skulle vara villig att ta hand om uppgiften. Raoul glädde sig som ett barn, som ser ett nytt äventyr börja. Så skulle han då antligen få tillfälle att rädda dr Lauers anhöriga och kanske många andra offer för nazismen, men inte förkladd till affärsman utan i egenskap av svensk

diplomat och inofficiellt med ett viktigt uppdrag från presidenten i Amerika, det land, som näst fosterlandet stod hans hjärta närmast. Hans reslust och äventyrslystnad skulle också få nya utlopp.

Vi har redan berättat om dir. Saléns middag. Resultatet blev fullständig enighet, och klockan halv fem på morgonen för ministern och den nu godkände humanitäre representanten från Djurgården till ministerns våning. Mr Herschel Johnson var överraskad att hos en svensk pojke ha funnit så mycket av en äkta amerikanare, framför allt föreningen av amerikansk idealism med den naiva uppskattningen av framgången i alla dess former.

Roosevelts byrå förklarade sig genast införstådd med Herschel Johnsons val, och svenska regeringen medgav omedelbart, att Raoul maskerades som diplomat. Fyrtio-åtta timmar efter det att ordern från Washington ingått sade USA:s stockholmsminister till personalchefen i svenska utrikesdepartementet: "Jag gratulerar Eder till färdigt beslut att sända Mr Wallenberg som diplomatisk förstärkning till legationen i Budapest!" Sällan har en diplomat varit så förbluffad som personalchefen, som ännu inte hunnit få något meddelande från regeringen i denna sak.

När han nu fick sin egen regerings och amerikanska presidentens uppdrag var Raoul utan vidare beredd att ge sig in på det stora äventyret. Han var visserligen ingen hjälte men en renhårig karl, som ännu inte funnit sitt mål i livet. Ty hur mycket han än tyckte om utlandstjänsten inom Mellaneuropeiska Handels AB och de resor den förde med sig, så var ändå allt detta intressant för honom bara så länge det hade nyhetens behag. Ännu hade han inte funnit den rätta uppgiften åt sig. Om inte Sverige varje gång – ofta bara med en tumsbredd – klarat sig ur hotande krigsrisker, så skulle säkert Raoul under den tid

ett militärt motstånd varat ha blivit en tapper soldat. Sitt rikliga arbetsområde hade han dock säkert funnit framför allt som en av hjärnorna i en motståndsrörelse under tysk okkupation. Till Raouls beslut att påtaga sig regeringens och den amerikanske presidentens uppdrag och att genomföra det som ett efterlängtat äventyr, i det han spände alla fysiska och psykiska krafter, bidrog kanske också det dåliga samvete, som nu i litteraturen lär göra den svenska ungdomen till pessimister. Raoul kände kanske, att hans land och folk utan egna synbara förtjänster kommit att bilda en fredens ö i Europas kaos, och ville genom att frivilligt ta hand om ett farligt uppdrag för främmande offer för barbariet betala denna inbillade skuld.

Detta hindrade honom emellertid inte från att diskutera sin lön med byråkraterna i Utrikesdepartementet på samma sätt som en arbetare, vilken känner sin prestations värde, diskuterar med en snål arbetsgivare. Ty sina personliga utgifter ville han obetingat kunna betala med inkomsterna som legationsskreterare. För den humanitära aktionen fick han obegränsade medel till förfogande genom President, War Refugee Board. Härvid inkopplades herr de Wahl och hans familjekoncern, då ju Raoul behövde pengövaluta och det med den ständigt fortgående ungerska inflationen skulle varit darskap att ta med miljonbelopp i pengö från Sverige. Det är också självklart, att de ungerska miljonärerna hade intresse av att deras förmögenheter, som hotades av konfiskation, på något sätt – om också avsevärt under gållande kurs – räddades över till Amerika, liksom den amerikanska judiska organisationen gärna såg, att de dollars, som samlats in för att rädda de europeiska judarna, användes så ekonomiskt som möjligt, dvs att växlingen kunde ske till en förmånlig kurs.

På regeringens förslag sände Sveriges konung den 30 juni 1944 ett telegram till Ungerns riksföreståndare

Horthy. Samma dag sändes arbetare, ingenjörer och direktörer från fabriker i stadsdelen Új-Pest till förtjningslägren. Deportationerna nådde sin höjdpunkt. Nu insåg också juderådet, att dess taktik inte bara varit egoistisk utan också oklok. När de nu inte längre trodde att de kunde rädda sig genom eftergivenhet och lydnad, vände de sig till representanterna för Sverige och Schweiz samt till påvliga nuntien Angelo Rotta och informerade dessa om deportationerna och grymheterna. Den 5 juli höll engelske utrikesministern Eden ett tal. Från tillförlitliga källor hade han erfärit, att tyskarna och de ungerska myndigheterna sände judarna till förtjningsläger, där de mördades. I slutet av sitt anförande försäkrade Eden, att Storbritanniens regering gjorde och skulle göra allt som stod i dess makt för att lindra de ungerska judarnas svårigheter. Han erinrade också om konung Gustafs telegram och om påvens intervention i denna sak.

I början av juli meddelade den ungerska pressbyrå, att konung Gustafs intervention haft framgång. Den ungerska regeringen hade givit Röda Korset tillstånd att transportera judiska barn under tio år till Palestina. Pressen påstod också, att den ungerska regeringen med anledning av den svenska interventionen beslutat att inte deportera döpta judar och att befria judar som levde i blandade äktenskap från tvånget att bära davidstjärnan och att dessutom behandla alla judar human. Dessa meddelanden från Budapest tjänade blott det syftet att vilseleda världsoptionen. De svenska tidningarna återgav med förtjusning dessa falska uppgifter, ty det stärkte självmedvetandet, att ett telegram från svenska konungen varit nog för att ändra de ungerska judarnas öde. Nästan alla svenska tidningar slog på första sidan upp Horthys svar till konung Gustaf. Särskilt framhöll man satsen: "Jag skall göra allt, som under nu rådande omständighe-

ter står i min makt, för att hävda rättfärdighet och mänskliga grundprinciper."

Raoul gick i resfeber. Han kunde knappt vänta tills dagen för avresan kom. Han var stolt över att han vid förhandlingarna med Utrikesdepartementet kunnat driva upp sin månadslön till 2 000 kronor. Men när han skulle till att utrusta sig för det stora äventyret beslöt han att i stället för läderväskor ta ryggsäckar och i stället för en präktig överrock en vindtygsjacka. Hos vapenhandlaren visade man honom en modern pistol, försedd med allt tänkbart skydd mot avfyringsfel och mycket lätthanterlig. Som jämförelse demonstrerades också en pistol av äldre modell, som i allvarliga fall är ändamålsenlig bara i händerna på en verkligt erfaren pistolskytt. Raoul frågade efter prisskillnaden. "Bara åtta kronor", svarade biträdet. "Då köper jag den gamla modellen", svarade Raoul. Men när dagen för avresan väl var bestämd, offrade han utan betänkande några hundra kronor för att bjuda sina vänner på en festlig avskedssupé.

De diplomatiska herrarna blev förbluffade, när Raoul kom på avskedsvisit iförd kängor, vindtygsjacka och en stilvidrig Edenhatt, med en ryggsäck på ryggen och en annan i näven. Och ännu mera förbluffade skulle karriärdiplomaterna ha blivit, om de anat vad ryggsäckarna innehöll.

Raoul gav inte bara festliga avskedssupéer. Han träffade också samman med "herr Gustafsson", som gav honom listor över de ännu fria och de av Sztójay-regimen under jorden drivna ungerska arbetarlidarna. Herr Gustafsson är numera Ungerns minister i Stockholm Vilmos Böhm.

Raoul träffade också journalisten Gellért, tidigare stockholmskorrespondent för den en gång i tiden anglofil-la Pesti Hirlap, och fick av honom några legala och illegala adresser till antinazistiska katolska aristokrater.

Vid sin avresa hade Raoul också med sig namnlister på antinazister, som var aktiva i naziregeringen men förstått att camouflera sig så väl att de nått höga värddigheter och hade chefsposter i departementen, ja, t o m i utrikesdepartementet.

I ryggsäcken hade Raoul också med sig hundratals adresser, penningförsändelser och hälsningar till judiska anhängare från vänner och i Sverige boende flyktingar. I sin notisbok hade han dessutom adresser på svenska samarbetsmän, som bodde i Budapest och som han blivit varnad för.

Raoul behärskade konsten att för tillfället leva sig in i en helt ny roll. Det var inte bara skämt, när herr Salén och de anställda på kontoret under dessa dagar före avresan kallade Raoul "herr legationsråd". Raoul var en begåvad amatör i allt vad han företog sig. I USA var han hundraprocentig amerikansk arbetarstudent, och under flera månader var han en flitig och initiativrik arkitekt. I Sydafrika var han en duktig affärsman och handelsresande och i Haifa en arbetsam bankman. I militärjänsen och i hemvärdet var han en ambitiös plutonchef, som inte skonade varken sina egna eller de underställdas krafter. Hos Mellaneuropeiska Handels AB var han en skicklig förhandlare, inköpare och speditör.

Nu var allt detta förbi! Nu hade han som en aktör vuxit in i en helt ny roll, nu var han utåt diplomat och samtidigt beredd att som en människokärlekens partisan ta upp en hänsynslös kamp med gangsterväldet i Budapest och sätta in alla sina resurser i den kampen.

Den 6 juli går färden med flyg från Bromma till Berlin-Tempelhof. I Berlin väntar hans svåger, som han känt bara några dagar. Med bil far han till lillasyster Nina, som längtar efter honom i sitt hem i närheten av Potsdam. Hela natten diskuterar han med system och svåger. Han vet, att en stor och farlig uppgift väntar på honom.

"Stalin hölls ovetande"

Nya dokument kan ge nyckeln till Wallenbergs öde

Av THOMAS HAMBERG/TT

MOSKVA. Sovjetunionens högsta ledning inklusive diktatorn Josef Stalin kände våren 1947 förmodligen ännu inte till att Raoul Wallenberg hölls fången i deras land.


Den svenske diplomaten hade då suttit inspärrad i Moskva i två år. Och han hade enligt den officiella versionen bara några månader kvar att leva, vare sig det var ett nackskott eller en hjärtinfarkt som ändade hans liv i juli 1947.

Ett hittills topphemligt sovjetiskt dokument kan i stället tyda på att just denna brist på information - i kombination med den uppmärksamhet fallet väckte i Sverige - bidragit till att besegla Wallenbergs öde.

Moskva hade gång på gång försäkrat svenskarna att man inte kände till något om Wallenberg och dennes ungerske chaufför Vilmos Langfelder. Dokumentet visar också tydligt att de ansvariga våren 1947 så fort som möjligt ville få fallet Wallenberg ur världen.

Brev till Molotov

I ett brev den 18 maj 1947, mindre än två månader före Wallenbergs officiella dödsdag, skrev Sovjetunionens högste åklagare och vice regeringschefen Andrej Vysjinskij till utrikesministern Vjatjeslav Molotov. Han bad om




Sovjetiskt dokument visar att Stalins ovetskap om Wallenberg kan ha avgjort diplomatens öde.

instruktioner om hur ärendet skulle handläggas.

Vysjinskij hänvisade till de förfrågningar den svenska regeringen gjort i ärendet. Det var sammanlagt åtta skriftliga noter och fem muntliga förfrågningar.

"Inför ihärdigheten som svenskarna visar i denna fråga har vi oavbrutet, muntligen och i brev, gjort förfrågningar under loppet av 1945 och 1946 hos Smersj (militära kontraspionaget) och senare MGB (säkerhetsministeriet) om Wallenbergs öde och uppehållsort. Först i februari i år gav det som resultat att kamrat Fedotov i samtal med kamrat Novikov meddelade att



Wallenberg står till MGB:s förfogande och lovade rapportera till er personligen om vidare åtgärder av MGB i hans fall", skrev Vysjinskij.

Han tillade:

"Eftersom ingenting hänt i Wallenbergfallet hittills, ber jag er instruera kamrat Abakumov att presentera en redovisning av det väsentliga i saken och ett förslag om dess avveckling (likvidering)."

Enligt en av TT:s källor lämnade den sovjetiske utrikesministern över en kopia av brevet till MGB-chefen Viktor Abakumov med påskriften "Jag ber er lämna besked direkt till mig".

Abakumovs egna dagboks-

anteckningar och diarieanteckningar hos det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet visar att så också skedde:

Den 17 juli 1947 fick utrikesminister Molotov ett meddelande från Abakumov i fallet Wallenberg. Själva meddelandet har hittills inte påträffats, men det var sannolikt ett besked om den svenske diplomatens död.

"Wallenberg okänd"

Molotov noterade själv, enligt tidigare frisläppta handlingar, i slutet av juli "att frågan om Wallenberg redan behandlats i ett brev från Abakumov den 17 juli 1947".

Och månaden därpå vidarebefordrades en rapport från Abakumov till Sverige med slutklämman:

- Wallenberg finns inte på sovjetiskt territorium och är okänd för de sovjetiska myndigheterna.

En rad formuleringar i brevet från Vysjinskij till Molotov tyder på att de ansvariga i Moskva i maj månad 1947 fann fallet Wallenberg olustigt - inte bara för att Sverige officiellt tryckte på med förfrågningar och noter.

Redan i juni 1945 vände sig Sveriges dåvarande sändebud i Moskva Staffan Söderblom på en mottagning direkt till Josef Stalin med en begäran att denne skulle beordra efterforskningar om Wallenbergs öde.

14. The Katyn Murder Mystery, 1940-92

The horror of Katyn is thrust upon anyone who knows Poland and its people. It encapsulates the nation's feeling of outrage at fifty years of cruel foreign occupation, Nazi German and Soviet Russian. The story was told to me in every detail during my visits there in the 1960s, researching my biography of Wladyslaw Gomulka. It was Russia's great crime against Poland, something that could never be forgotten.

Katyn, I was soon made aware, was no mere item of wartime history, no mere episode in the destruction of 6 million of Poland's 30-million population between 1939 and 1945. It was the touchstone of the Polish predicament, the most vivid example of their ill-treatment at the hands of their eastern neighbour. It symbolized their long service as Russia's satellite and their betrayals by Britain during and after the war. It showed how Soviet Russia had decapitated and subjugated their entire nation – and how no one, not even their British allies who had guaranteed their integrity in March 1939, had seemed anxious to care about it.

On 17 September 1939, Stalin invaded Poland by agreement with Hitler, as set out in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of a few days earlier. The Red Army took many Polish prisoners, by the end of the year an estimated 180,000, and they kept them in camps in conditions of great hardship. It was noted at the time that about 15,000 prisoners, those whom the Soviet Union might be assumed to dislike most, mostly army officers but also landowners, policemen and others from the forces of law and order, including junior employees of the civil service, postmen for instance, were being kept in three special camps: at Ostashkov near Kalinin, at Starobielsk near Kharkov and at Kozielsk near Smolensk, just by the settlement known as Katyn.

Although no one outside the Kremlin knew it, these 15,000 leaders of Poland's pre-war society were doomed to be massacred. They were seen by Stalin and his men as the core of Polish hatred of the Soviet Union, and of Russia, the depth of which he had discovered himself during visits to Poland before the Revolution. These Poles, in his

view, were enemies with whom he could never become reconciled. It was a problem for which there was only one solution, the physical elimination of all the men in all three camps.

On 5 March 1940, the Soviet secret police (NKVD) chief, Lavrenti Beria, signed a TOP SECRET letter, beginning, 'TO COMRADE STALIN – The prisoner of war camps of the NKVD of the USSR and the prisons of the western districts of Ukraine and Byelorussia today contain a large quantity of former officers of the Polish army, former members of the Polish police and intelligence organs, members of Polish nationalist counter-revolutionary parties, participants in secret counter-revolutionary rebel organizations, escaped personnel and others. All of these are ferocious enemies of Soviet power, filled to the brim with hatred for the Soviet system.

These prisoners of war who are officers and police are trying to continue their counter-revolutionary work in the camps, carrying out anti-Soviet agitation. Each one of them only waits to be set free, so as to have the opportunity to join actively in the struggle against Soviet power. Organs of the NKVD in western districts of Ukraine and Byelorussia have unearthed a series of counter-revolutionary rebel organizations. The role of active leadership in these counter-revolutionary bodies was played by former officers of the former Polish army as well as by former police and gendarmes.

Among the escaped personnel and violators of our state frontier, whom we now hold, a significant number of people have also been found who are participants in counter-revolutionary espionage and rebel organizations. The prisoner-of-war camps contain altogether, not counting warrant officers and other ranks, 14,736 former officers, civil servants, landowners, policemen, gendarmes, prison guards, settlers and intelligence officers. More than 90 per cent are of Polish nationality.'

Beria went on to list these 'enemies of the people' by rank and profession, after which he advised Stalin that all 14,700 files should be transferred to the NKVD 'in order that they may be specially dealt with by the use in each case of the highest measure of punishment – death by shooting'. The cases, he suggests, should be dealt with collectively by a three-man court or 'troika' of senior NKVD men without the prisoner being brought to trial or informed of the accusation against him. Approval of Beria's suggestion is shown by the

signatures on page one of the March 1940 paper. It was signed not only by Stalin himself, but also by his key Politburo members Vyacheslav Molotov, Anastas Mikoyan and Kliment Voroshilov, with the names of Kalinin and Kaganovich added to show that they agreed orally. The paper, which was found in the Presidential Archive and came into my hands fifty-two years after it was signed, indicates that the matter was then handed over to Beria's deputy, Bogdan Kobulov, for implementation.

A few days later, knowing nothing of this scheme, the Poles in the three camps were told that they were to be moved to camps where conditions were better, from which they might soon be released. Survivors from the camps recall how cheered they all were by this announcement. Any change, they thought, must be a change for the better. And so day by day, throughout April 1940, they were entrained from the camps in groups of from 50 to 350 and taken away for what they hoped would be happier destinations. Each man went through the usual formalities before departure. Names were re-checked and registered. They were finger-printed and inoculated afresh and given certificates to prove that this had been done. They were given sandwiches for their journey and it was noted that some of these were wrapped in clean white paper, something almost unknown in the Soviet Union in 1940.¹ They were never seen again. In the course of that month, April 1940, all 14,700 Poles were murdered and buried in mass graves.

No one outside the narrowest of NKVD circles knew of these terrible events. But people began to guess that something was wrong. After April 1940 letters from the men to their families in Poland stopped arriving. The families were concerned and the Polish Red Cross sent several hundred inquiries to Moscow, but nothing was heard back and nothing could be done. The Polish government was moved to London after the fall of France. Britain was fighting alone, with only a small number of Poles as its allies, and the Soviet Union was an unfriendly neutral which had joined Hitler in occupying Polish territory. The NKVD was at this stage cooperating with Hitler's Gestapo against any signs of Polish political activity.

Hitler's attack on Russia in June 1941 from one day to the next turned these adversaries into allies. Stalin wasted no time in releasing Poles from camps, including their commander, General Wladyslaw

Anders, hoping to turn them into an army that would fight the invader from Soviet territory. However, after these massive releases were at an end, the Polish government were alarmed to find that 15,000 of their prisoners could not be traced. They made more inquiries, but the Russians produced no officers, only evasive and self-contradictory answers. In October 1941 Molotov told the Polish ambassador in Moscow, Stanislaw Kun, that he had 'no information' about them. The Poles found this incredible, since the NKVD were well known for the careful account they kept of all their prisoners. They began to fear the worst, but in the atmosphere of the time, with the Red Army and the Soviet people bearing the brunt of Hitler's aggression, with Leningrad and Moscow under siege, they felt unable to push Stalin too hard.

The blow fell on 13 April 1943. Radio Berlin announced that German occupation forces at Katyn, twenty miles from Smolensk in western Russia, had unearthed the bodies of several thousand Polish officers. Berlin claimed that they had been murdered in the spring of 1940 by the Soviet security police, the NKVD. The Soviet authorities at once denied Germany's accusation. A day or two later the Polish Prime Minister in London, Wladyslaw Sikorski, lunched with Churchill and told him what a serious problem had arisen. He had a 'wealth of evidence', he said, demonstrating that the Soviets were responsible. Churchill's immediate concern was over this threat to the wartime alliance with Russia, without which the war could not be won. He told Sikorski, 'If they are dead, nothing you can do will bring them back.'

On 19 April Anthony Eden told the Cabinet that 'he had done all he could to persuade the Poles to treat this as a German propaganda move designed to sow discord between the allies'. He was in a quandary and anxious to gloss over the question of which government was responsible. Sikorski faced an even more fearful dilemma. He too wanted to avoid an open breach with Russia, but he was outraged by Moscow's refusal to reply coherently to his many telegrams about the missing men, many of whom were relations of his close colleagues. He could not simply accept without protest the probability that they had all been massacred. Emotion ran high, and he was persuaded to invite the Red Cross to conduct an inquiry.

Stalin and his men took this request correctly as a suggestion of

Soviet guilt. Their reply was to defend themselves not by evidence but by abusing their accusers. Ivan Maisky, Soviet ambassador in London, told Churchill, 'The Poles were a brave but foolish race who had always mismanaged their affairs. Their feckless government could not understand the folly of a nation of 20 million provoking one of nearly 200 million ... Russia's patience was not inexhaustible ...'²

The British government was now bombarded with anti-Polish advice and resolutions from various British bodies. The Snowdown miners from Dover wrote, 'Tell the reactionary landlord clique of the Polish government to stop playing Goebbels's game and act "ally" to the Soviet Union or be branded Hitler's friends in Britain.' The Hampstead Garden Suburb branch of the Communist Party attacked the Poles for 'so readily falling prey to the lying and fantastic allegations of the Nazi enemy'. A cartoon by Low in the *Evening Standard*³ showed a Polish officer hammering an iron wedge into the tree of British-Soviet-American accord. Several trade union branches asked London to stop the Polish government's allocation of newspaper and transfer it to the *Daily Worker*.⁴

'Hitler's Polish accomplices' was the heading on an article in *Pravda* on 20 April, which claimed that the Poles had fallen into German hands after the Red Army's withdrawal in 1941, and then been murdered by the Nazis. The barrage of abuse continued and on 26 April came the disaster that Britain and the United States had dreaded. Stalin and his government were so disgusted by the cruel Polish accusations, they said, that they would now break off relations with the Polish government in London.

Stalin told the British ambassador in Moscow, Archibald Clark-Kerr, on 8 May, 'Its [the Polish government's] present members did not want to live in peace with this country. They had shifted to the Soviet government all the old hatred that they had felt for the Tsarist government. They did not understand the changes that had taken place. They persisted in trying to play one ally off against another, complaining today to us and the Americans about the Russians, tomorrow to the Russians about us. They thought that this was clever, but in fact God had given them no brains.' Stalin was himself the man who had given orders for the mass-murder. He was nevertheless capable, without shame, of using the Poles' correct allegation as a pretext for

breaking diplomatic ties.

On 4 May Eden told the House of Commons, choosing his words carefully, that Britain 'has no wish to attribute blame for these events to anyone except the common enemy'. He deplored 'the cynicism which permits the Nazi murderers of hundreds of thousands of innocent Poles and Russians to make use of a story of mass murder in an attempt to disturb the unity of the Allies'. Eden did not actually state that Germany was responsible for the murders, but speaking in the British government's name, he gave the clear impression that this was the case. As for what should be done about it, his only advice was 'least said, soonest mended'.

Eden's statement of 4 May 1943 was to remain as a stain on Britain's conscience for nearly fifty years. It was not exactly a lie. It was an attempt to avoid admitting what he and his Foreign Office friends then knew to be an extremely inconvenient fact. It was what is known in official circles nowadays as 'being economical with the truth'. At the time, with Stalin bearing the brunt of the war against Hitler, the deceit may have been forgivable. But it was to be allowed to continue by Eden's successors, in the face of many changes of government and of Foreign Secretaries, for half a century after any good reason for the deceit had disappeared.

British ministers and officials were repeating Eden's line for public consumption, but in their secret memoranda they were writing the opposite. They pointed out that the case raised many difficult questions. Why did all the letters home from the Poles in the three camps cease in April or May 1940? Why had not a single missing Pole ever been seen anywhere after that date? Why did all the diaries found on the bodies have their final entries in March or April 1940? Why were the Soviets being so evasive, giving contradictory answers to Polish inquiries? It all seemed to show that they must have been shot in the spring of 1940, when Katyn was under Soviet control. Owen O'Malley, British ambassador to the Polish government in exile, wrote in his emotional and disturbing paper on the affair: 'The Germans overran Smolensk in July 1941 and there is no easy answer to the question why, if any of the 10,000 had been alive between the end of May 1940 and July 1941, none of them ever succeeded in getting any word through to their families.'

He reconstructed the last moments of the Polish victims in sentences

that many in Whitehall found deeply shocking: 'If a man struggled, it seems that the executioner threw his coat over his head, tying it round his neck and leading him hooded to the pit's edge, for in many cases a man was found to be thus hooded and the coat to have been pierced by a bullet where it covered the base of the skull. But those who went quietly to their deaths must have seen a most monstrous sight. In the broad pit their comrades lay, packed closely around the edge, head to feet, like sardines in a tin, but in the middle of the grave disposed of less orderly. Up and down on the bodies the executioners trampled, hauling the bodies about and treading in the blood like butchers in a stockyard. When it was all over and the last shot had been fired and the last Polish head punctured, the butchers, perhaps trained in youth to husbandry, turned their hands to the most innocent of occupations - smoothing the clods and planting little conifers all over what had been a shambles.'

Frank Roberts and Denis Allen, then middle-rank FO officials, agreed with O'Malley that there must be a 'presumption of guilt' against the NKVD. 'This is very disturbing,' wrote Alexander Cadogan, permanent secretary at the Foreign Office. Certain moral principles lay behind Britain's war effort. How could they be reconciled to an alliance with a government capable of such a crime? How would Britain, after the war, be able to punish Nazi war criminals if she condoned this Soviet atrocity? But everyone agreed that it had to be done. The alliance had to be preserved. And so the British government went along with the Soviet version. They lied to the British people, in the British people's best interest.

But they did so not without misgivings. In his report O'Malley invited the government not to fall under St Paul's curse on those 'who see evil and burn not', to remember that by lying they were making themselves an accessory after the crime. He wrote: 'We have been obliged to appear to distort the normal and healthy operation of our intellectual and moral judgements. We have been obliged to give undue prominence to the tactlessness and impulsiveness of Poles, to restrain the Poles from putting their case clearly before the public, to discourage any attempt by the public and the press to probe the ugly story to the bottom. In general we have been obliged to deflect attention from possibilities which in the ordinary affairs of life would cry to high heaven for elucidation, and to withhold the full measure of

solicitude which, in other circumstances, would be shown to acquaintances situated as a large number of Poles now are. We have in fact perforce used the good name of England like the murderers used the little conifers to cover up a massacre...'

And so the matter was left until the war was over and Poland passed under Soviet control. At the Nuremberg trials the Soviets tried to blame Nazi Germany for the Katyn massacre, but they did not press the accusation. The matter was glossed over. The February 1945 Yalta agreement was violated by Stalin and the grand alliance dissolved into cold war. In 1952 the Madden Commission of the US House of Representatives declared the Soviet Union guilty of the crime. Western historians of the period universally supported this verdict. But the British authorities, even though there was no longer any overriding need to preserve British-Soviet relations, refused to move from the 'neutral' position taken at the end of the war. Eden's suggestion of German responsibility, pronounced in 1943, was allowed to remain as Britain's final word.

Examples of the Foreign Office's very cautious attitude emerged in a debate about Katyn in the House of Lords on 17 June 1971, when the minister Lord Aberdare said, 'Governments are not at liberty to voice half-formed views, speculations or suspicions.' The British government, he said, 'has absolutely no standing in the matter'. It had never been involved in any inquiry into Katyn and the inquiry at Nuremberg had been inconclusive. The Polish government, 'whose wishes should surely be respected', saw the matter as closed. Any British pronouncement now would open old wounds and lead to 'pain, disagreement and ill-will'. These comments by a British minister, presumably drafted by the Foreign Office, caused great offence among Poles at home and abroad. Katyn was the crime that had not only deprived Poland of many thousands of their finest men, but also brought abuse from East and West alike raining down on Poland's head. The crime had been committed against Poland, and Poland had been made to appear the guilty party. The victim had become the person accused. Also, the crime had caused a breach between the Soviet and Polish governments. And it was that breach that had led to the recognition by Moscow of its alternative regime, the communists based on Soviet territory, who were eventually to supplant the London government of Poland and, in the spring of 1945, be recognized as

Poland's legitimate regime.

It was absurd for Lord Aberdare, as a British minister, to suggest in 1971 that the Polish communist government's view of Katyn ought to be respected. Warsaw operated under Soviet control and was bound to support the Soviet version. It was wrong to suggest that Britain had no standing. In 1943 Anthony Eden had supported the Soviet version. Did he and his successor still support it? In 1943, according to a British ambassador, England's good name had been used to cover up a massacre. Was this still the case? And as for pain or ill-will, the pain felt by the Poles over the mass murder of friends and betrayals by allies was not going to be lessened by evasive answers from British ministers. Foreign Office men like Cadogan and Roberts had made it clear in 1943, albeit in their private memoranda, that Stalin was guilty. Why could they not say the same publicly now that the war was over, now that there was no longer any reason to lie?

It was a prime demonstration of how Poland had endured so much and been rewarded with so little. In six years of war, 20 per cent of her population, including 90 per cent of her 3 million Jews, perished at Nazi hands. Victory came in 1945, but the sufferings were only just beginning. Stalin decided that he needed a Poland 'friendly to the Soviet Union' as part of his ring of buffer zones that surrounded his territory. He therefore maintained a strong army garrison in the 'liberated' land, forcing upon it a communist-dominated government that he had himself previously created on Soviet soil. Poland was thus 'given away' to Soviet control in the February 1945 Yalta Agreement. It passed, not without more bloodshed, from one foreign occupation to another.

Poland's sad predicament affected me not only because of its essential injustice, but also because Britain and the United States had allowed it to happen with so little protest. Poland was Britain's gallant ally from the first day of the war. Her government-in-exile was set up in London. Polish soldiers fought alongside ours at Monte Cassino in Italy. Polish airmen fought with the Royal Air Force over Britain's skies. They received no reward other than to be allowed to stay in Britain, if they wished, as refugees. Stalin promised at Yalta to hold 'free and unfettered elections' in Poland. Elections took place in January 1947, but they were organized by the communists and guaranteed to produce a pro-communist result.

Wladyslaw Gombulka took power in Poland amid a wave of anti-

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Stalinist revulsion in 1956. Although still one of Poland's few believing communists, he gave his people certain concessions that those in other satellite countries did not enjoy. The power of the secret police was curbed. Private ownership of land was tolerated. There was some freedom of speech, though not of written expression. And Poles with access to foreign currency, for instance through a relative, could usually travel abroad. But it was not much and even he, the so-called 'Pole first and communist second', was ready to follow the Moscow line by describing the Katyn massacre as 'a provocation organized by Joseph Goebbels'.

After the 1956 events, Stalin's statues were removed from Polish cities. The secret police were tamed. A limited freedom of speech was allowed. But still no Polish or Soviet authority seemed ready to admit Stalin's crime against the Polish nation in 1940. Only in Moscow, and at the highest and most intimate level, was the truth consigned to paper. On 3 March 1959, the then KGB chief Alexander Shelepin summarized the problem in chilling terms: 'TOP SECRET - TO COMRADE KHRUSHCHEV, N.S. - In the KGB we hold personal files and other materials, dated 1940, referring to the shooting that same year of imprisoned or interned officers, gendarmes, police, settlers, landowners and other such persons from the former bourgeois Poland. In all, by decision of a special "troyka" of the Soviet NKVD 21,857 people were shot: 4,421 in Katyn forest (Smolensk district), 3,820 from Starobielsk camp near Kharkov, 6,311 from Ostashkov camp near Kalinin and 7,305 from other camps and prisons of the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia ...'

The letter went on to refer to Stalin's order of March 1940 that had ordered the massacre, as quoted above, and to raise the question of what was to be done with the 21,857 personal files. They were of no operational or historical interest to the KGB, he observed, nor were 'our Polish friends' ever likely to need them: 'On the contrary, some unforeseen circumstance might lead to the discovery (literally "deconspiracy") of the truth about the operation, with undesirable consequences for our state, especially since there already exists an "official version" of the Katyn forest events ...' He asked Khrushchev's permission to destroy the individual files. And this was done.

By 1959 I was already aware of Katyn's importance. It infuriated

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me that the Soviets would not admit what they had done in 1940, that the British seemed still to be backing the Soviet version of events. It was yet another burden that the Poles were being forced to bear. Why should the murderers of their young men go undetected? And why was the Foreign Office of Britain, decades after the war was over, still taking part in the cover-up? I vowed then that I would do what I could to unearth the truth.

In 1972, shortly after being banned from the Soviet bloc, I found O'Malley's report and the main 1943 Katyn documents in the Public Record Office in Chancery Lane, London, and my long article based on these papers for the *Sunday Times* was the first airing of the idea that the British government had all along, ever since 1943, been convinced of Soviet guilt. It called for 'a liberal application of facts', which might 'shock the patient momentarily' but would 'disinfect the wound'. There could be no hope that Poles and Russians would be reconciled, until the truth was admitted on the Russian side. It was also, since we had backed the Soviet version in 1943, Britain's duty to set the record straight.

While preparing this article in April 1972, I wrote to Anthony Eden (Lord Avon), reminding him of what he had said in the House of Commons in 1943, how he had said one thing while believing another, and asking him if he now might like to comment further. His reply (1 May) was short and evasive, merely referring me to the House of Lords debate a year earlier: 'It seems to me that however strong one's feelings about the horror of Katyn, Lord Aberdare's conclusion is inescapable and I accept it.' His simple belief in the idea 'least said, soonest mended' had apparently not changed since 1943. My own view, which I wrote in the *Sunday Times*, was that so long as the truth remained concealed the wound of Katyn would continue to fester, growing ever more filled with poison.

The Memorial

The Polish community in London were outraged by the Public Record Office revelations. They began raising money to commemorate the massacre's victims and by 1974 the funds were ready and a site agreed - St Luke's churchyard in London's Chelsea. But it was only the beginning of the organizers' problems. They then found themselves

in a bureaucratic imbroglio which was to cause further grief to all those whose families had been killed by the NKVD.

A bizarre alliance emerged of worthy British bodies determined not to allow the Poles to honour the memory of their relatives. The Church of England lodged an objection to the St Luke's site and a number of local residents also protested. In the Court of Arches, the Church's highest tribunal, the Bishop of London's representative George Newsom ruled against giving the site to the Poles for their memorial. It was, his verdict proclaimed, likely to perpetuate bitter feelings and was 'not consistent with the Church's ministry of reconciliation'. He was disturbed that the memorial would carry the date 1940. This would be an assertion of Soviet guilt 'without giving those who are accused the chance to defend themselves'.

The Church of England was at once accused by the Poles' colourful spokesman Louis Fitzgibbon of 'acting like Pontius Pilate', but their objection was supported by the Chelsea Society and the Victorian Society. Local people living near the church protested that St Luke's was 'a sunny little garden bright with flowers, much used and enjoyed by people of all ages'. An obelisk, they said, would cast a shadow over it in more than one sense. The Archdeacon of Middlesex, John Hayward, also objected to an obelisk, since it would seem like 'a finger pointing to the sky asking for justice'. Frequent visits to the memorial by Polish pilgrims 'would entail the removal of flower beds and much wear and tear of the turf'.

Again, the Poles had good reason to feel that scant account was being taken of the theft of their country, of their unique contribution to victory over Hitler or of their predicament as exiles. The British authorities had decided, it seemed to them, that problems of flower beds were more important than the memory of their 21,000 murdered friends and relatives. The St Luke's site was taken from them and eventually Kensington and Chelsea Council agreed to provide an alternative site at Gunnersbury on London's western outskirts.

It was now the turn of the Soviet government, helped by their Polish comrades, to enter the picture. In 1972, according to the then Foreign Office minister Julian Amery,⁸ they had asked him 'as an extremely important request' to stop the Katyn project. He then demanded to see all available documents and concluded, 'It was perfectly clear that the Russians were responsible for the massacre.'

The project therefore continued, running past the Labour Party's victory in 1974, after which no fewer than ten protests were made by the two embassies to Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland and Defence Secretary Roy Mason. Polish ambassador Artur Starewicz protested personally to the Mayor of Kensington and Chelsea, Joseph Sundius-Smith. Vladimir Semyonov, Counsellor at the Soviet embassy, wrote her a threatening letter accusing the Council of 'following in the footsteps of the Goebbels lie against Britain's ally in the Second World War' and ordering her 'to prevent' the memorial.

The monument was nevertheless erected at the alternative site near Chiswick, but by the time the moment came for the unveiling, Britain's Labour government felt yet again inclined to surrender to the communists' crude bullying. In spite of what Julian Amery had concluded four years earlier, Crosland wrote to the Katyn committee repeating the Foreign Office's ancient theory that the evidence was not firm enough to allow him to reach a conclusion on who was guilty. Airey Neave, Margaret Thatcher's friend, criticized Crosland's 'craven attitude',⁹ but this did not prevent the government from taking a number of decisions calculated to fudge the issue and insult Britain's murdered allies. They could not, or would not, ban the project altogether, but they would distance the government from it in an attempt to minimize Soviet anger.

Roy Mason explained that the proposed inscription on the obelisk, 'KATYN 1940', was a clear attribution of guilt to the NKVD, a charge which the Soviet government denied. It would therefore be wrong for the government 'to endorse one particular view by being represented at the unveiling ceremony'. He cancelled the British regimental band that was booked to play funeral music and gave orders that no British serviceman could attend in uniform, even in a personal capacity.

No British minister was present at the ceremony on 18 September, 1976, the day after the thirty-sixth anniversary of Stalin's invasion. 'Who are they afraid of? The big bad wolf?' remarked Emmanuel Shinwell, the only Labour politician who attended, of his government's decision to boycott the event and impose their boycott on others. A few Conservative opposition MPs were there, happy to criticize the government for its rudeness and timidity but, of course, unable to

It was typical of the defeatism of those days, I wrote,¹⁰ that British ministers were so cowed by their fear of Soviet reaction that they were unwilling to honour the memory of murdered wartime allies, that they were ready even thirty-six years after the event to allow the truth about the massacres to be covered up by the good name of Britain, like the conifers planted in 1940 to cover up the mass graves by the murderers themselves.

On my return home from the ceremony I telephoned James Callaghan's office, begging him as Prime Minister to make at least some expression of sympathy with the families of the Polish victims. A week later I received a low-level reply from a junior Foreign Office minister, Geronwy Roberts, emphasizing the 'deep sense of repugnance which the tragic crime of Katyn engenders in all those who know of it'. The letter was an attempt to be sympathetic, and as such it was printed in London's daily Polish newspaper,¹¹ even though it totally ignored the question of which government was guilty of the crime.

The Katyn affair was therefore allowed to fester for more years as a shocking example not only of Soviet brutality, but also of British cowardice and ingratitude. After Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979 British ministers were allowed to attend the annual ceremony at the Katyn memorial. In May 1980 a number of Soviet dissidents outside Russia, including Vladimir Bukovsky, expressed their regret at what their country's police had done to Poles forty years earlier. The issue nevertheless remained stagnant until Mikhail Gorbachev and his glasnost campaign started to consider it.

In July 1987, visiting Poland for the first time since 1969, I was told about the Soviet-Polish historical commission, newly set up to investigate the 'blank spots' in past relations between the two countries. They had in mind Stalin's pact with Hitler, the partition of Poland in 1939, the mass deportations of Poles to the East in 1940, the Red Army's failure to help Polish forces in the 1944 Warsaw uprising, the faked 1947 elections and, of course, the Katyn affair. It seemed doubtful whether they would find anything of value. Wlodzimierz Kowalski, a Polish member of the commission and a charmingly drunken pro-Soviet manipulator, told me first that all documents on Katyn had been destroyed, second that all those involved in the

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On 28 May 1988 came a sign of a breakthrough. Moscow Radio referred to Katyn as a historical 'blank spot' and questioned the 'accepted view' that the Nazis were responsible. It seemed as if they were on the point of admitting the truth. I wrote that the admission, if it came, would be 'the most striking example of glasnost to have emerged from the Gorbachev era so far'. Meanwhile the British remained unmoved. On 11 July the Foreign Office minister Lord Glenarthur repeated the old story that there was 'no conclusive evidence'. I complained to Margaret Thatcher, advising her that anyone who believed that would believe anything, and on 27 July the Foreign Office at last reversed itself, partially, and took a step forward, admitting that there was 'substantial circumstantial evidence pointing to Soviet responsibility'.

In Moscow glasnost was gathering momentum and making more progress on the Katyn issue than London was. In April 1990 the moment of truth finally arrived. Gorbachev gave President Jaruzelski of Poland a file of documents, including lists of the names and dates of birth of more than 15,000 murdered men, together with a formal apology for what his predecessor had done exactly fifty years earlier.

Was this to be the end of our long quest? Could the Katyn affair now be laid to rest? Was Polish honour satisfied? It seemed that there were many in Poland who felt that a mere apology from Gorbachev was not enough. What about the men who had done it? An NKVD officer aged thirty in 1940 might well be alive, a sprightly eighty, in 1990. Germans suspected of war crimes were still being pursued in many countries, including Britain, even half a century after the event. Moscow was insisting that such prosecutions continue.

I went to Moscow in June 1990 and found Soviet officials apparently keen to tell more about their country's past crimes, including Katyn. Defenders of the old system were under attack at home and, in terms of foreign policy, there was a feeling that Russia should purge itself of past horrors by confessing them and repenting. I made some inquiries at various archives and in the end, rather surprisingly, found myself invited on 11 June to meet archivists from the Central Committee of the Communist Party, just down the hill from KGB headquarters. It was there that I discovered that there was at least one man still alive who was closely involved in the mass murder.

I was shown documents, some of them initialled by Stalin's secret

police chief Lavrenti Beria himself, consigning quantities of Polish prisoners to their deaths. There were other papers describing the detail of the operation, some of them drafted by a NKVD officer, a Major of State Security then aged thirty-two, who in spite of his youth had been placed in charge of all Polish prisoners of war and interned persons in 1939-40. His name was Pyotr Karpovich Soprunenko.

I saw a document that Soprunenko had signed on 20 February 1940, asking for a group of 400 Polish officers, landowners and frontier guards to be 'handed over to the NKVD Special Commission'. The papers were marked with Beria's initials to show agreement. It was the equivalent of a mass death sentence. The NKVD Special Commission, it was explained to me by Central Committee official Valentin Alexandrov, was a three-man tribunal that considered political cases in Stalin's time. Neither the accused nor any lawyers needed to be present. The 'judges' acted on the basis only of a list of names with short biographical notes. Sentence of death was then passed by a stroke of the pen without the accused being informed.

No photocopying was allowed, but I made notes from the few documents shown to me by Alexandrov that day, including Soprunenko's report, and I summarized them in the British press.¹² The evidence showed that 15,131 Poles had been 'placed at the disposal of the 1st Special Detachment of the NKVD in April/May 1940', in other words, shot. Another Soprunenko paper confirmed that he had destroyed by burning all their records - card indexes, photographs and files. So where was this Soprunenko now? Alexandrov told me that he was still alive. He was living in Moscow, in a large apartment off Sadovoye Koltso, on his pension as a retired army major-general. I telephoned the flat and his daughter Elena answered. The general was too old and ill to talk, she said. 'These stories are very upsetting for him. He cannot discuss them. He is very ill. I can tell you one thing. The order about the Polish officers came from Stalin himself. My father says he saw the actual paper with Stalin's signature on it. So what was he to do? Get himself arrested? Or shoot himself? My father is being made a scapegoat for things that were done by other people.'

I had little time for her excuses. The same pleas were being made

on behalf of eighty-year-old Latvians who had murdered Jews in 1943. I was interested, though, to hear this eye-witness confirmation, albeit at second hand, that such a document signed by Stalin had once existed. It was important to find it so as to prove that the massacres had been no capricious act, ordered by some local commander. They were authorized at the highest level as an act of policy. Gorbachev now regretted what was done, but many in the Soviet Union disagreed with him. The chief archivist, Valentin Alexandrov, told me, 'We in the Central Committee receive many letters from veterans' organizations, asking us why we besmirch the names of men who were only doing their duty against the enemies of socialism.'

It was clear that Soprunenko was a war criminal of the first degree. And the question now arose, would he be brought to trial for murder, either in Poland or in his own country? On 17 July I was told in the House of Lords that 'in view of the long-standing concern in this country over the Katyn massacre' the British embassy in Moscow would inquire what was to be done in the case. Quite apart from such a case's legal merits, it was convenient for London to do this, since Moscow was pressing for the extradition of a handful of suspected Nazi war criminals still alive in Britain. It was useful to be able to point out that there were Soviet war criminals too.

I continued my investigations in Warsaw and on 14 September Poland's deputy Minister of Defence, the former Solidarity spokesman Janusz Onyszkiewicz, gave me copies of all the papers that Gorbachev had given Jaruzelski in April. They were mostly lists of thousands of Polish names and dates of birth, probably the same lists that the NKVD Special Commission had considered as the basis for its mass death sentences.

A typical document, headed TOP SECRET and FOR YOUR EYES ONLY and dated 1 April 1940, was addressed to Major Borisovyets at Ostashkov camp near Kalinin (now renamed Tver), north of Moscow. It began, 'On receipt of this order you will dispatch to Kalinin the under-mentioned prisoners of war now held in Ostashkov camp. They will be placed at the disposal of the NKVD commander of Kalinin district ...' There follow forty-nine Polish surnames, first names and patronymics and the man's date of birth. The paper is signed 'SOPRUNENKO'.

The documents Onyszkiewicz gave me indicate that throughout

April 1940 a total of about 500 Poles a day were shot in three separate Soviet localities - near Kalinin in the north, near Kharkov in the south and near Smolensk in the west. Many of these mass death warrants bear Soprunenko's signature. The 14,552 murdered Poles mentioned in Alexander Shelepin's memorandum of March 1959 were thus accounted for, although no news of the other 7,305 ever emerged. By now the Polish Ministry of Justice was asking the Russians for permission to question Soprunenko. The British ambassador in Moscow, Rodric Braithwaite, made two inquiries but received no reply and let the matter drop. Nothing much more was done by the Foreign Office or by the Moscow embassy.

Returning from Warsaw, I reported¹³ that the net was tightening around the former NKVD commander and, sure enough, in April 1991 he was interrogated for several hours on videotape by officers of the Military Prosecutor's office in Moscow, under the command of Major-General Vladimir Kupiets, at his apartment and in the presence of his two daughters. They made good progress and in September 1991, a few days after the failed *coup d'état* against Gorbachev, I was told that the military prosecutor in Moscow was ready to discuss with me the progress that he had made in his investigations.

The Soprunenko video, a copy of which I later obtained, explained how Stalin's order of 5 March 1940 for the murder of the Poles had been put into effect. And it gave us our first pictures of the war criminal, who was by then in hiding. It showed a gaunt old man trying without success to show himself as innocent of the terrible charge. His behaviour was shifty and evasive. At first he denied knowing anything of any massacre of Polish prisoners and claimed to have spent all April 1940 at Vyborg on the Finnish border. But then video testimony by another witness, eighty-nine-year-old Vladimir Tokaryev, who had been the NKVD chief in Kalinin district in 1940 and the recipient of many of his death warrants, was played to him to jog his memory.

Although weak and blind, Tokaryev spoke firmly. His memory seemed clear and what he said corresponded entirely with the documents. 'In March 1940 we were taken to the office of Beria's deputy, Bogdan Kobulov, about fifteen or twenty of us, and told that 14,000 Poles were to be shot "on orders of higher authority"'. I later learnt that "higher authority" meant the Politburo. When I learnt of the

scale of the operation, I asked Kobulov if I could stay behind after the meeting for a word, just the two of us. I told him that I had never taken part in any such operation, especially on such a scale ... Soprunenko knew about everything. He was in charge of all the Polish prisoners of war and he prepared everything. He addressed us at that March 1940 meeting with Kobulov.'

At last Soprunenko admitted that he was 'probably' at the meeting. Then, under pressure from interrogator Lieutenant-Colonel Anatoli Yablokov, he said that he recalled being handed the actual Politburo order, signed by Stalin himself and that he 'felt bad' about it. He was then shown lists of executed Poles, each paper with his signature on it. Again and again the interrogators asked him, 'Is this your signature?' Again and again, in spite of expert evidence to the contrary, he denied that the writing was his.

Viewing the three-hour tape, I was left with a feeling of disgust at the old NKVD man's pathetic attempts to distance himself from the murders. There was no doubt that he was guilty. If he had been a German, if he had carried out such a duty on Hitler's behalf rather than on Stalin's, he would certainly have been hanged after the end of the war. He seemed to me to symbolize all that was rotten about Soviet society.

Tokaryev gave a different impression. He seemed to speak frankly and he gave his interrogators a chilling description of what happened in April 1940 at his Kalinin headquarters. The actual killings, he said, were done by three trained executioners specially sent from Moscow - Blokhin, Sinyegrubov and Krivenko: 'They took the Poles along the corridor one by one, turned left and took them into the Red Corner, the rest room for prison staff. Each man was asked his surname, first name and date of birth - just enough to identify him. Then he was taken to the room next door, which was sound-proofed, and shot in the back of the head.'

'Nothing was read to them, no decision of any court or Special Commission. They were just handcuffed and taken to the execution room. There was a rule then that a prosecutor must be present at all executions, but in this case there was no prosecutor, again for the reason that Kobulov mentioned, that there must be no witness who was not himself involved. Otherwise he might give away the truth.'

'There were 300 shot that first night. I remember Sukharev, my

driver, boasting about what a hard night's work it had been. But it was too many, because it was light by the time they had finished and they had a rule that everything must be done in darkness. So they reduced the number to 250 a night. How many nights did it last? Work it out for yourself: 6,000 men at 250 a night. Allowing for holidays, that makes about a month, the whole of April 1940.

I remember a few individual Poles, for instance a young man. I asked him his age. He said he was eighteen. He smiled like a young boy. I asked him how long he had been in the frontier police. He counted on his fingers. Six months. What had he done there? He had been a telephone operator.

'Blokhin made sure that everyone in the execution team got a supply of vodka after each night's work. Every evening he brought it into the prison in boxes. They drank nothing before the shooting or during the shooting, but afterwards they all had a few glasses before going home to bed.

'I asked Blokhin and the other two: "Won't it take a lot of men to dig 6,000 graves?" They laughed at me. Blokhin said that he had brought an excavator from Moscow and two NKVD men to work it. So the dead Poles were taken out through the far door of the execution room, loaded into covered trucks and taken to the burial place ... When it was all over, the three men from Moscow organized a big banquet to celebrate ...'

In September 1991, shortly after the *coup d'état*, I discussed this terrible confession with the Moscow military prosecutors. We viewed the tapes of the interrogations and I congratulated them on the work they had done to bring the crime of Katyn to light. General Kupiets and his officers, showing me the tapes in September 1991, in those brief days of Russian 'freedom of information' that followed the *coup's* collapse, were as moved to horror as I was by these bloody revelations. They seemed determined to bring the matter to court for the sake of Russia's good name and they were sure that there was a case to answer-against Soprunenko, Tokaryev and several others involved in the Katyn murders. Neither their age nor the fact that they operated under Stalin's and Beria's orders would exonerate them, they said, any more than German defendants at the Nuremberg trials were forgiven because they obeyed orders and were now close to death. It was unlikely, said Kupiets, that anyone would want to lock

the killers away for the last months of their sad lives. He did, however, believe that the truth ought to be made public at a public tribunal: 'The system of NKVD special commissions was completely outside the Soviet constitution. It had no basis in law, even in those days. An execution carried out under their authority was, quite simply, a murder.'

Major Sergei Shalamayev, another interrogator, said, 'I am not saying that Tokaryev and Soprunenko should be dragged out of their apartments and shot. But we do want to see the truth established in all its detail, and where we believe that guilt exists for crimes of such unspeakable horror, a proper verdict passed by an appropriate court of law.'

The military prosecutors did not get their wish. Russia's post-communist government was ready to put Stalinist or Brezhnevite criminals on trial in the flush of liberalism that followed the August 1991 coup. The mood did not last, though, and Yeltsin's government needed the new KGB to keep order amid the crime wave that Russia now endures. He found it hard to select the few murdering monsters who most deserved to be put on trial. Russia after the Soviet Union was not like Germany after Hitler. The system changed, but the same people remained in positions of power and no one relished the strife that would accompany any search for the 'guilty men' of the Stalin or Brezhnev period.

Lech Walesa's new Polish government also seemed content. In their view, the confessions of the Soviet and Russian governments had purged the offence by their apology and national honour was satisfied. Economic progress was now their priority and the great sin of half a century ago could be left on one side. A political decision was therefore taken in Warsaw, once the truth about Katyn and other horrors had been fully made known, to put the file back in its drawer and leave the criminals alone.

Finally, on 11 November 1991, the Foreign Office minister Lord Caithness admitted the truth that his Department had known from the very outset in 1943, 'The Soviet authorities' admission in April 1990 that the NKVD (forerunner of the KGB) was responsible for the massacre was very welcome.' And then in October 1992 a telefax arrived from Moscow and I held in my hand the long-awaited document,¹⁵ the last piece of the bloody jigsaw, the paper ordering

the massacre with Stalin's actual signature on it, sent to me by a Moscow friend. At last, fifty years too late, it could reasonably be said that the story was told.¹⁶

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Den sovjetiske regissören Alexander Rodnianskij (t v) har gjort en dokumentär som försöker svara på vad som hände med Raoul Wallenberg.

Sovjet söker Wallenberg

fallet Raoul Wallenberg?
Skulle han ha kunnat överleva årtionden i olika sovjetiska fängelser utan att hans identitet avslöjades?

Det är några av de frågor som ställs i Alexander Rodnianskij och Leonid Gurevitjjs timslånga dokumentärfilm "Uppdrag Raoul Wallenberg" från hösten 1990.

En mindre genre har uppstått både inom filmen och litteraturen kring den svenske diplomaten tragiska öde. Allt ifrån hans hjältemodiga insatser under andra hälften av 1944 då han räddade tiotusentals judar i ett kaotiskt Budapest undan en säker död i tyska förintelsläger, till vad som hände efter att Röda armén trängde in i den ungerska huvudstaden och Wallenberg greps av sovjetisk militär i Budapest den 17 januari 1945.

Sovjetiska arkiv

"Uppdrag Raoul Wallenberg" är såvitt bekant den första filmen om Wallenberg som producerats i Sovjet. Dokumentären är delvis ett resultat av de forskningar i Wallenberggåtan som sedan flera år bedrivits av en grupp sovjetiska historiker, filmare och journalister. En av dessa, som också framträder i filmen, är Aleksej Kartsev vid tidningen Komsomolskaja Pravda som envist försökt gräva sig fram i sovjetiska arkiv.

Rodnianskij/Gurevitj tar inte direkt ställning till vad som är sant i denna historia. De konstaterar bara att spåren leder till Gulags fängelser och fängelser. Wallenbergskommittén har i alla år vidhållit att Wallenberg är i livet, så länge motsatsen inte har bevisats. Den "slutgiltiga" sovjetiska versionen som Gurevitj myko delgav Erlander 1957 — att Wallenberg avled av hjärtinfarkt i Lubjankafängelset 1947 — har det officiella Sovjet numera i all tydlighet ifrågasatt. Sinnesförändring



Filmen "Uppdrag Raoul Wallenberg" är den första sovjetiska versionen om hans öde.

ringen manifesterades i augusti 1990 då Raoul Wallenbergs halvbror Guy von Dardel under ett Moskvasök fick beskedet att sovjetiska representanter nu skulle delta i den internationella Wallenbergkommissionens efterforskningar.

En gemensam delegation be-

En gemensam delegation be-

18.2.1991

Wallenberg enligt vittnen ska ha syns till på 1950-talet och till och med ännu senare i filmen visas den resultatlösa granskningen av Vladimirfängelsets arkiv. Vad det nu kunde vara hetsjälstenen från att för länge sedan ståda ur kartoteken.

I filmen uppträder ett antal personer som säger sig ha sett Raoul Wallenberg i olika läger och fängelser genom åren. Några är "gamla" Wallenbergvittnen, några är nya. En armenier påstår sig ha suttit intill Wallenberg när denne avled i fånglägret i Perm strax efter Stalins död 1953. En man säger sig vara Wallenbergs son, och en annan man berättar att han själv begravde Raoul Wallenberg i en karelsk by, oklart vilket år.

Juvelstöld

I dokumentären framkastas också flera tänkbara förklaringar till att Wallenberg arresterades. Enligt en version skulle Leonid Brezjnev, politisk officer i Ungern 1945, ha låtit gripa Wallenberg för att dölja en juvelstöld av den blivande partichefen. Enligt en simplare förklaring greps Wallenberg för att han protesterade mot att hans tjänstebil beslagtogs av Sovjetmilitären.

Hur det nu än förhåller sig med alla dessa utsagor är det ingen annan än den sovjetiska kommittén för stats säkerhet, KGB, som ruvar på sanningen, hävdar Aleksej Kartsev. När Wallenberg greps var det Smersj, det dåvarande kontraspionaget, som hade ansvaret för den svenske diplomaten. När Smersj upplöstes överledd dess arkiv till KGB. Om den sovjetiska ledningen bara vill kan KGB när som helst plocka fram Wallenbergs dossier, är slutsatsen.

Uppdrag Raoul Wallenberg, Kanal 1 fredag 22/2 kl 20.00—21.00.

*A 2. 1991 bit -
En i källaren
Lupus (Schiller)
Sant, det var
Lupus Sant
Lupus Sant
Lupus Sant
Lupus Sant*

RAOUL WALLENBERG!

To the captive hero of humanity, Raoul Wallenberg,
at the Moscow University Polyclinic,
Petravskidskaya 10, Moscow.

Best wishes for your 76th birthday,
August 4, for health, hope and freedom very soon.

Rescue Wallenberg Committee,
P.O.B. 3576, Jerusalem. 02-525353

AG202.04

Week ending August 13, 1988

THE JERU

The Jerusalem Post

This is what Raoul Wallenberg in the Gulag would want to say to Mikhail Gorbachev in the United States:

I have remained alive all these years despite your country's repeated claims that I died of a heart attack in 1947. Here I am, 76 years old, a sick, bent old Swede. January 17 will be the 44th anniversary of my arrest, abduction and life incarceration, on January 17, 1945 in Budapest.

I was framed by the Soviet generals of the invading Red Army because I knew that they stole the safe in the Swedish legation containing a great sum of money and valuables belonging to the Jewish community of Hungary. I knew exactly how much was in the safe and who took it, and for this knowledge I have paid till this day in your prisons and psychiatric hospitals.

Maybe I got lost after all these years in your vast and pitiless prison system. If Raoul Wallenberg no longer exists in your records then look for a Swede listed as Erik Arvid Andersen, the name given to me by Abakumov in 1950.

Last year I received treatment in the Moscow University Polyclinic at 10 Petravskidskaya Street and I was also a patient last year in the secret political hospital in the town of KUNSAVA near Moscow.

I heard that you are planning to release some political prisoners soon. Am I on your list? If not, put me there and in the spirit of glasnost at last reveal the truth about my case and allow me a few remaining years of freedom and justice. After all, I did save 100,000 Jews from the Nazis many years ago.

You will be visiting the United States during the Hanukka festival, the festival of the miracle of the little jar of oil that lasted 8 days. Grant the miracle of freedom to a poor old Swede whose flame of life flickers on after 44 years in the Gulag.

Rescue Wallenberg Committee, Jerusalem, P.O.B. 3576,
Tel. 02-525353.

Communicated!



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THE JERU

MR. GORBACHEV, THERE IS NOT MUCH TIME LEFT TO SAVE RAOUL WALLENBERG! YOU MUST RELEASE HIM NOW!

On Thursday April 23, 1986, in the afternoon we made contact with Raoul Wallenberg in his prison in Siberia. He is alive but he suffers terribly from the cold and the wetness. He is alone in his prison cell and is constantly watched. He is very depressed because they have totally cut him off from the outside world. He has lost all sense of direction. He is in a terrible physical condition. His whole body is swollen and bloated and he can't urinate properly. His fingers are crippled by arthritis. His knees are terribly sore. His teeth are rotten and his hair is very thin and short. He has great pain in his chest and eyes. He has a very painful abscess in his mouth. He has very bad circulation in his feet. He can't bend his leg. He can't sit straight because of the pain in his spine. His mind is still clear, but his morale is very low and he doesn't think he can hold out much longer. He wants us to continue to help him very much. His dearest wish is to come to Israel because the people he saved are there. He says that the year is still long and he doesn't think he will live long enough to be free. He thinks that every day may be his last. They don't give him a name. They don't talk to him. They put his food on the floor and he is like an animal. They don't have the heart to destroy him, but they want him to die quick...

Mr. Gorbachev, when you read these lines, act immediately to release Raoul Wallenberg. If he dies in captivity it will be one of the worst crimes in history. In the new society you are building the freeing of Raoul Wallenberg must be a top priority.

* A full transcript of our contacts with Raoul Wallenberg is being sent to all heads of governments, to the United Nations and newspaper editors. RESCUE PUBLISHING COMPANY, POB 3576, JERUSALEM 02-525353

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THE JERUSALEM POST INTERNATIONAL

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man siten
tandru*

Enough: Roden



Överkommando
med Jacob Wallenberg
och överlämnar 2000
judiska barn till
neutrala länder,
och att hans vän
Karl Gervadica förmedlar
d. 2. 1945

verka till denna första transaktion med barn för dollars är enligt Eichmanns egen förklaring ett löfte han givit den arabiske muftin av Jerusalem, som hade sökt sin tillflykt till Berlin. Det gäller att undvika att den judiska kolonien i Palestina ökades genom tillförsel av barn som räddas på olika håll i Europa.

Sedan Europaplanen sålunda havererat i Bratislava återföddes den i Bukarest. I samförstånd med Gizi Fleischmann, en av Waadas ledare, försöker Rezső Kastner komma till tals med den bevisligen påverkbara Wisliceny, som nu blivit Eichmanns närmaste medhjälpare i *Einsatzkommando Ungarn*. Framstötten passar Himmler precis. Han har samtidigt sänt sin intendentöverste Kurt Becher till den ungerska huvudstaden för att pressa ut pengar av Weiss-Chorin-gruppen och överta den för egen del. Han beordrar nu Becher att stanna för att köpa upp hästar, men också för att sondera sionisternas avsikter ... "Lova dem vad som helst", säger han. "Sedan får vi se ..."

Becher ger sig på jakt utan att konsultera Eichmann, precis som i fallet Weiss-Chorin. Hans *Reichführer* vill alltid ha två järn i elden på samma gång. Han tycker om att satsa dubbelt, att begära det av den ene som han redan fått av någon annan. På Himmlers uttryckliga order bemödar sig Eichmann om de

Wallenberg

första deportationerna, samtidigt som han inläter sig på diskussioner med Waada. Den första transporten sänds iväg den 17 april, de första diskussionerna börjar den 25.

Den dagen är Joël Brand ombedd att infinna sig på Hôtel Majestic. Mannen är ingalunda okänd på avdelningen IV B 4. Wisliceny har redan tagit emot honom i sällskap med Kastner när Waada kom med sitt bidrag till vad Einsatzkommando begär, strax efter hans utnämning.

Men varför be att få tala med Brand i stället för med Komoly, som i alla fall är Waadas verklige ledare? Valet har gjorts på grund av Brands vältalighet och de bekännelser som Abwehrs agenter avlagt, under hårda förhör med sina kolleger inom SD. Himmler har skickat ett av sina utvalda specialförband, kommandot F, till Budapest för att likvidera det lokala tyska kontraspionaget och för egen del ta hand om den rivaliserande organisationens uppgifter. Uppdraget slutförs några månader senare då Canaris avrättas och Abwehr införlivas i SS. Under hård press erkänner dr. Schmidts män de tjänster de gjort åt räddningsorganisationen Tijul. Alla nämner samma namn i sammanhanget: Joël Brand. För att klara ut allt detta väntar Eichmann honom på Majestic tillsammans med kapten Otto Clages, som är chef för kommando F och den nu civilklädde Becher.

Brand är väl medveten om sin förmåga att verka självsäker och vet hur han skall dölja sin oro, men den här gången väntar han sig i alla fall det värsta. Eichmanns öppningsfras förbluffar honom: "Ni vet vem jag är. Ni känner säkert mitt rykte från Polen och Tjeckoslovakien. Nu är det Ungerns tur. Men jag har ett förslag att göra er. Jag är beredd att byta människor mot ägodelar. Hur vill ni ha det? Kvinnor i fruktbar ålder, arbetsföra män, barn och äldre. Säg själv!"

Brand stannar av häpnad.

"Bege er till utlandet", vrålar Eichmann plötsligt emot honom. "Far vart ni vill, till Schweiz eller Turkiet, men försök inte att lura mig!"

Brand återvänder, helt obehindrad, på allra bästa humör.

novskij, men vägras tillstånd. Bak i bilen har han tre väskor och en sovsäck. Kemisten Seteszy har också berättat att han sett Raoul i ett skyddsrum, där denne diskuterar med ryska officerare.

Tidigt på morgonen onsdagen den 17 januari får några judiska tvångsarbetsare, som är anställda på Svenska Röda korsets transportavdelning, äntligen se Wallenberg komma tillbaka i sin eviga sportkostym. Han är nu i sällskap med major Demtjikov. Han är på bästa humör och har bara återvänt till 16 Benczur utca för att hämta sin sovsäck och sin plånbok. Han tar farväl av alla och skämtar glatt om sin förflyttning till marskalk Malinovskijs stora högkvarter i Debreceen.

Han talar särskilt med sin barndomsvän László Petö, som introducerat honom inför det judiska rådet efter hans ankomst i juli. De gör tillsammans en sväng förbi Tátra utca för att se hur det ser ut hos vännerna i det befriade internationella ghetton, innan han ger sig iväg.

Den ljusblå bilen med Vilmos Langfelder vid ratten är inte hans egen. Denna står kvar i garaget, eftersom den inte hade klarat den långa resan. Med är nu en läkare, doktor István Szabados och en tvångsarbetsinkallad. Langfelder är tystlåten som vanligt. Det är över en vecka sedan nu, som han lämnade sin syster och sväger i en av legationens fastigheter, för att följa sin "husbonde" på okända vägar. Han är mer än chaufför åt Wallenberg, snarast en allt i allo som tjänstgör också som privatsekreterare och förtroendemän. Han är en utbildad civilingenjör, som tack vare sin andra sväger i Sverige fick ett svenskt skyddspass när han kallades ut till tvångsarbete. I december hade han officiellt tilldelats kansliet vid Ullöiavenyn.

Två motorcyklister är med som eskort. En framför med en beväpnad soldat bakom föraren, en annan efter, med en officer i sidvagnen. Under färden genom Pests ruiner hänvisar Wallenberg i uppsluppen ton till denna eskort:

"Dom är här för min räddning, men jag vet inte om de är med för att skydda mig eller för att bevaka mig. Jag är inte riktigt säker på om jag är gäst eller fånge."

Sedan de kommit fram till legationens annex, 6 Tátra utca, beger sig Wallenberg ensam upp i övervåningen där kanslit är installerat. De andra ger sig ut i det internationella ghetton för att leta efter bekanta. Den ryske officeren stegar fram och tillbaka framför porten i väntan på att de skall komma tillbaka. Wallenberg uttrycker sin glädje över att man i alla fall lyckats rädda de flesta skyddslingarna. Han ber doktor Gergely ge honom detaljer om hur befrielsen gått till och frågar om denne kan ha översyn över det hela, eftersom han själv knappast kan vara tillbaka på åtminstone en vecka. Han har mycket bråttom. Bilen väntar där nere för att köra honom till Malinovskijs högkvarter och till den provisoriska regeringens säte i Debreceen. Han berättar för sin medhjälpare Rezső Müller att han måste dit för att ta kontakter med det sovjetiska överbefälet och med regeringen. Han har ingen aning om hur lång tid det kommer att ta. Det gäller att man fortsätter så gott man kan utan honom.

"Kanske jag borde lämna litet pengar? Vad behöver ni?"

- Vi är glada för vad vi får.

Raoul plockar upp 100.000 pengö ur sin väldiga plånbok, som ser ut att rymma tio gånger så mycket. Kanslistens kassaförvaltare skriver ett kvitto. Man kallpratar i ungefär femton minuter. Så, just innan han ger sig iväg igen, vänder sig Wallenberg till Müller:

"Glöm inte bort att vi har en massa diamanter och värdepapper deponerade i Hazaibanken utan några depositionsbevis."

- Det är klart att jag kommer ihåg det, varför fråga mig om en sådan sak?

- Jag ville bara erinra om det, så att ni en dag kan omvittna att jag tagit upp det.

Ute på gatan börjar den ryske officeren bli otålig. Raoul också. Petö som beslutat följa honom till Debreceen tycks ha blivit uppehållen. Doktor Szabados lämnar dem för att titta in i till sina föräldrar, som han anträffat välbehållna i ett närliggande kvarter. När Petö återkommer gör Wallenberg honom livliga förebråelser, som officeren tycks förstå. Ty innan han ger

Karl Dönitz, som utses att efterträda Hitler, får titeln Reichs-president och blir dessutom överbefälhavare över de väpnade styrkorna. I ett andra testamente tillkännager Hitler sitt förestående självmord.

Den 30 april kl. 15.30 tar Adolf och Eva Hitler livet av sig. Tyska radion kamouflerar självmordet, der Führers sista flykt, med budet att han dött i strid för Berlins försvar.

Das Reich har ännu miljontals män under vapen, som kämpar i fyra hörn av Europa. Men nazisternas värde krymper för varje timme. Den 25 april möts Jukovs och Konjovs arméer i Potsdam, strax utanför Berlin. Inne i staden har de ryska truperna nått fram till Spree och kämpar redan i U-bahns underjordiska korridorer. De hitlerska fanatikerna ger dock inte upp. 600.000 hus i huvudstaden utgör lika många fästningar. Under dessa gatustrider, som pågår till den 2 maj, förlorar ryssarna 304.887 döda, sårade eller försvunna. De kvarlämnar i stridsområdet 2156 sönderskjutna stridsvagnar och motoriserade kanoner, 1200 artilleripjäser, samt 527 flygplan.

Äran av att på egen hand ha erövrat Berlin kostar den Röda armén dyrt.

De tyska arméerna släpper det ena frontavsnittet efter det andra, utom det i Böhmen där general Ferdinand Schörner kämpar förtvivlat. Från den 29 april ger de tyska arméerna i Italien upp kampen, på villkor som i hemlighet beslutats mellan SS-generalen Otto Wolf och chefen för amerikanska OSS, Allen Dulles. Äntligen har underjordisk diplomati åtminstone uppnått något också på slagfältet. Den 4 maj kapitulerar tyska överkommandot i Nordvästeuropa, Danmark och Holland inför Montgomery. Samma dag försöker Dönitz i en sista manöver att försöka uppnå en separatfred med Västmakterna. Amiral Hans von Friedeburg kommer till Eisenhower's högkvarter i Reims med ett förslag, som enbart gäller de tyska trupper som står emot briter och amerikaner. Eisenhower rör inte en min. Det stora spelets små subtiliteter bryr han sig inte om. Han kräver kapitulation utan villkor, på alla fronter.

Den 7 maj kl. 2.41 på morgonen ger Tyskland äntligen upp. På begäran av Stalin, som missänkar någon sorts uppgörelse i sista stund mellan västmakter och nazister, upprepas manöver vid en ceremoni i Berlin den 8 maj. Det är den första dagen sedan den 1 september 1939, som man inte slåss längre i Europa. Även om Japan ännu inte givit upp är nazismens långa natt över. Man omfamnar varandra på gatorna och firar, i Prag som i Paris, i Budapest som i Stockholm. Kriget är slut!

Det stora spelet har blivit meningslöst. Vart har de medverkande plötsligt tagit vägen? Vad har hänt de tyskar, ungrare, amerikaner och svenskar, som medverkade i dessa krigsårens allra hemligaste överläggningar? På tysk sida hade några redan med sina liv nödgats betala den roll de spelat i denna farliga lek. Jacob Wallenbergs vän Karl Goerdeler hade hängts den 2 februari 1945 i fängelset i Plötzensee. Den 9 april hade amiral Canaris släpats naken till galgen. Han avrättades bara kort innan de amerikaner kom, som han drömde om att kunna sluta fred med.

För Himmler och hans underordnade drog ödet helt olikartade kort. Mellan 8 och 20 maj 1945 döljer sig der Reichsführer SS i närheten av Flensburg med sina sista trogna.

Men det är svårt att hålla sig undan när man heter Heinrich Himmler. Porträttet på den främste av alla krigsförbrytare finns anslaget överallt, inom de olika ockupationszonerna. Den 20 maj beslutar han sig för att pröva sin lycka och bege sig till Bayern. Det är därifrån som flyktorganisationen Odessa fungerar. Hans idé består i att helt enkelt blanda sig med den väldiga flyktingströmmen, där det inte går att driva någon individuell kontroll.

Den 21 maj presenterar en flykting med svårt bindel för vänster öga en alldeles färsk passersedel, som det står Heinrich Himmler på, för en brittisk vaktpost i närheten av "Djävulskärret" mellan Bremervörde och Bremen. När han blir anhållen beslutar han att spela högt, röjer sin identitet och ber att få träffa marskalk Montgomery. Denne får han aldrig se. Det

från sin post innan efterföljande militära förband anlät.

Så gick det till när Wallenberg mötte Röda armén enligt den 75-åriga officerens håkomster. De motsägs inte av de mer samtida uppgifterna om hur Raoul Wallenberg togs under beskydd av sovjetisk militär.³

Nu har också den order återfunnits i sovjetiska försvarsmisteriets arkiv enligt vilken den svenska beskickningen skulle skyddas om den påträffades vid Budapests ockupation. Wallenbergs namn fanns på listan över legationens personal.⁴ Den speciella ordern att ta svenska legationen i beskydd kände dock inte Siljava till. Det hade varit hans eget initiativ. Siljava framhöll att han hade fått högre utbildning och visste att folk-rätten krävde skydd för legationer etc.⁵

Raoul Wallenberg fick snart nytt ryskt besök på Benczúrgatan 16. Besökaren, som nu också hört av sig till *Komsomolskaja Pravda*, hette Chorosjilov och tillhörde samma förband som Siljava. Han kom för att ta Wallenbergs bil som ju i obrukbart skick hade satts in på gården av de första ryssarna.

Chorosjilov hade fått rapport om att en stor och snygg svart bil stod i ett halvtäckt garage vid huset. När han ville lägga beslag på den hade en tunnhårig man i 40-årsåldern vägrat och förklarat att de var neutrala. Till sist hade svensken fått överlämna bilnycklarna. Han hade också upplyst militärerna att bilen gick på sprit.

Bilen måste ha varit attraktiv för redan efter en dag hos divisionschefen, som gett Chorosjilov ordern att konfiskera den, hade självaste generalen I M Afonin, chef för hela armégruppen som belägrade Budapest, bestämt att han ville ha den.⁶

Flera ryska militärer har nu berättat att de hört om beslagtagandet av Wallenbergs bil.⁷ En av dem har berättat hur han fått motta klagomål direkt av Wallenberg.

Danilasz var tjeckisk medborgare och hade hamnat i Röda armén som tolk. Någon dag mellan den 8 och 14 januari 1945 i Pest hade han fått rycka in när en av förbandets tysktalande

tolkar inte ville tala med en svensk diplomat, som ställde obehagliga frågor till honom. Chefen för underrättelsetjänsten vid den 30. skyttekåren utsåg då Danilasz.

Mannen som Danilasz mötte beskriver han som mörkhårig, magerlagd, inte särskilt blek utan snarare lätt mörkhyad, ålder mellan 30 och 40 år. Mannen var klädd i svart kostym och satt vid mitten av ett bord. Där satt också vid bordets högersida en undersätsig man i svart skinnjacka. Mannen vid bordets mitt presenterade sig själv som sekreterare Wallenberg vid svenska ambassaden och den andre som sin chaufför.

Samtalet tillgick så att Wallenberg talade till sin chaufför på tyska och chauffören på ungerska till Danilasz.

Wallenberg frågade först hur Danilasz hamnat i Röda armén. "Därefter ställde han följande fråga till mig: 'Hur vill ni förklara, att Röda armén förflyttat sig så snabbt framåt -- beror det på att ni är så starka eller är det för att tyskarna är så svaga?' (Troligen var det den frågan som skrämt Sinitjev /den förste tolken/ och gjort att denne inte ville fortsätta samtalet med Wallenberg.)

Jag svarade vad jag hade hört från våra officerare, att efter det att tyskarna förlorat Stalingrad så hade tyska armén förlorat sin stridsmoral och nu var det redan för sent för dem att få tillbaka stridsviljan. Så kom nästa fråga: 'Hur förhåller sig Röda armén till civilbefolkning och krigsfångar på ockuperade områden, förekommer det någon förföljelse av religiösa grupper, judar etc.'

Jag svarade, att under den korta tid som staben varit förlagd på olika platser så hade jag själv inte märkt något negativt av dessa saker.

Efter detta meddelade Wallenberg mig följande: 'När Röda arméns stötkupper kommit in i Budapest togs min tjänstebil ifrån mig. Jag har gjort alla upptänkliga försök att få tillbaka den, men i stället för min egen bil har jag fått en bil som tagits som krigsbyte. Och det är något som jag inte godtar och aldrig kommer att godta. Jag kräver tillbaka min bil och kommer inte att gå med på något byte.'

Las Gy. Son. Bely. *Boken som jag vill ha*

överens om att utse mig till deras nye chef. Under min ledning och i beskickningens namn skulle man kunna uträtta mycket för den svårt lidande judiska kolonin i Budapest. Sjukhus och folkök skulle inrättas. Barnhem och skolor öppnas. Ekonomisk hjälp och matvaror utdelas åt nödlidande. Nödvändiga medel fanns, man hade redan minst en miljon pengö till sin disposition. Hus, våningar och all materiel skulle ställas till vårt fria förfogande, bara beskickningen lånade ut sitt namn på en skylt eller ett papper.

Jag tackade för det hedrande uppdraget, vilket var desto mer förvånande, som dessa män väl visste, att jag redan tidigare varit principiell motståndare till avdelningens alltför långt gående utsvävningar. Men jag måste avböja, då det numera låg utanför beskickningens verksamhetsområde att uppträda som judarnas eller några andra ungerska medborgares beskyddare. Humanitär verksamhet kunde givetvis alltiämt fortsättas men icke i beskickningens namn. För övrigt borde allt dylikt arbete i svenskt namn sammanföras under en hand, lämpligast Svenska Röda Korset. Kommittén förklarade emellertid omedelbart, att den icke var villig att samarbeta med Langlet, utan att man ville arbeta på egen hand. Jag kunde inte hindra dessa allvarliga och duktiga män att arbeta med egna medel för sina judiska medbröders fromma. Ej heller kunde jag avböja deras anhållan att få uppkalla deras första sjukhus efter Raoul Wallenberg. Sedan de lovat att icke använda beskickningens namn i sin fortsatta verksamhet, skildes vi åt i bästa samförstånd.

Innan de gick, hade jag gjort upp om ett möte med dr Hegedius följande dag. Det gällde att föra i säkerhet en värdefull deposition, som Wallenberg lämnat på Hazai Bank, i vars hus han haft ett av sina kontor.

Vi möttes vid banken, och jag blev presenterad för en av direktörerna. Denne såg minst av allt ut som en bankdirektör. Hade jag mött honom på gatan, hade jag snarare trott honom vara en arbetslös sjåare. Det var säkert en utmärkt förklädning i Budapest just då. Han berättade, att hans bank liksom alla andra banker i Budapest hade blivit utplundrad av ryssarna. I

en källare, som stod under vatten, hade emellertid ryssarna förbisett en del värdeföremål, bland annat ett paket, som hade deponerats i banken av Wallenberg. Då han sedermera hade påträffat detta, hade han placerat det i ett av de nu tomma kassaskåpen.

It hans och Hegedius' närvaro öppnade jag paketet, som bar Raoul Wallenbergs namn. Det visade sig innehålla 870.000 pengö i sedlar, en ring med en osedvanligt stor diamant, en koppartallrik samt en skrift, som i klingande vers och synnerligen artistiska illustrationer skildrade Raouls gärning i Ungern. Tydligt en julgåva från någon av hans medarbetare och beundrare.

Detta såg ut att vara Raouls personliga egendom och måste tillvaratas för hans räkning. Men hur skulle jag kunna föra dessa dyrbarheter genom staden, där man på gatorna knappast var säker på att få behålla ens sina kläder? Till att börja med gav jag bankdirektören ett specificerat kvitto å paketet. Därefter stoppade jag ringen och så många sedelbuntar som möjligt i stövelskaften. Tusentals pengö i alla fickor samt slutligen fatet och den lilla boken innanför kavajen. Jag såg onekligen fet och välmående ut för att ha genomlidit en så lång belägring, men det kunde inte hjälpas. Lyckligtvis var det bara något mer än en kilometer från Hazai Bank till Ullöi-utca 32, men vägen dit syntes dock oändligt lång. Varje gång jag såg en ryss stannade hjärtat, och jag bara väntade på att bli stoppad och utsatt för en av de vanliga kroppsvitationerna. Men Gud står därar bi, och jag kom tillbaka till beskickningen både helskinnad och med alla dyrbarheterna i behåll.

Det stora penningbeloppet kunde jag inte med säkerhet avgöra, om det var Raouls eget. Min avsikt var dock att söka överföra detsamma i form av guld eller schweizerfrancs till Sverige och deponera det där i avvaktan på Raouls hemkomst. Tyvärr blev sedermera den av ryssarna påtvingna avresan så brådstörtad, att jag ej hann växla pengosedlarna. Jag lämnade i stället dessa till Svenska Röda Korsets generalsekreterare, advokaten Josefovits, så att han skulle växla dem och sicka hem

beloppet med Langlet vid dennes instundande hemresa. Av olika skäl blev denna växling aldrig utförd, men kom beloppet i alla fall att tjäna ett humanitärt ändamål, vilket säkerligen varit dess ursprungliga syfte.

Ringens, talriken och boken överlämnade jag långt senare till Raouls moder i Stockholm. Det var tyvärr den enda hälsning, som jag hade från hennes försvunne son.

Svenska Röda Korset var närmast lektor Langlets angelägenhet, och han och hans duktiga maka behövde ingen hjälp i sitt storartade arbete. Som svensk institution stod dock Langlets organisation under beskickningens uppsikt, och det var inte utan en viss oro, som jag sett Langlets goda hjärta gång efter annan giva efter för en hjälpsökandes bön om anställning eller ett skyddsdokument.

Langlet hade egentligen bara ett fel, hans alltför stora och öppna hjärta, till vilket ingen vädjade förgäves. Denna hjärtegodhet kämpade en ständig kamp mot hans kloket och försiktighet. För att göra Langlet rättvisa måste jag dock medge, att han nu var betydligt mera återhållsam än på pilkorsarnas tid och i regel lät respekten för och sin ingående kännedom om ryssarna dämpa hans beredvillighet och iver att hjälpa de nödlidande. Vad som däremot aldrig dämpades var hans entusiasm och arbetsförmåga. Langlet var gammal och ganska sjuk men ryggade aldrig tillbaka för den tyngsta arbetsbörda.

Under tyskarnas och pilkorsarnas herradöme hade Svenska Röda Korset ofta fått låna beskickningens namn för att göra skyddet av sina skyltar och dokument mera effektivt. Nu, när legationens »skydd» ej kunde upprätthållas gentemot ryssarna, tjänade denna beskickningens täckmantel ej längre något ändamål. Vi kom därför överens om, att det säkerligen skulle vara mest ändamålsenligt att frigöra Svenska Röda Korset så mycket som möjligt från beskickningen, vilket också skedde. Langlet och jag behövde därefter aldrig lägga oss i varandras uppgifter, utan arbetade vi självständigt var och en på sitt håll.

Utrikesdepartementet och jag står dock i stor skuld till lektor

Langlet både för hans effektiva bistånd i sökandet efter missioner och för den alltid lika vänliga hjälp han lämnade mig och den improviserade lilla beskickningen med lokal, mat och annat.

Ännu intill den dag belägringen av Budapest började, hade Ekmark och hans s. k. C-avdelning varit sysselsatt med att på olika ställen i staden lägga upp förråd av mångahanda slag för kommande ofärdstider. Kontrakt gjordes upp med stora firmor, att beskickningen skulle få övertaga en del av deras lager, mot att återstoden beskyddades av en skylt med beskickningens namn. Stora mängder av mat och läkemedel inköptes även för medel, som Wallenbergs avdelning ställde till Ekmarks förfogande. Förråden var avsedda att, sedan ryssarna intagit staden, sörja dels för beskickningens och svenskarnas behov dels också för nödlidande i allmänhet. Svenska Röda Korset skulle säkert komma att behöva alla de läkemedel och matvaror det kunde få, när kriget en gång dragit förbi staden.

Flera av C-avdelningens förråd hade blivit plundrade av pilkorsarna under de sista dagarna av deras korta tid vid makten. Men alljämt borde många och stora förråd återstå. Tyvärr var Ekmark försvunnen liksom de andra svenskarna, och alla hans papper hade bränts upp vid branden å finska legationen, där också C-avdelningen varit inrymd. Med hjälp av en av Ekmarks ungerska medarbetare kunde dock en lista göras upp över de förråd, som ännu borde finnas kvar. Säkerligen hade största delen av dessa redan plundrats av ryssarna eller mindre nogräknade förvaltare, men åtminstone något borde kunna räddas. De stora avstånden och osäkerheten på gatorna gjorde, att en allmän inventering inte kunde göras. Men Langlets generalsekreterare Josefovits lyckades dock ordna, så att en stor del av de ännu återstående förråden avhämtades med häst och vagn. De kom väl till pass som förstärkning till Svenska Röda Korsets hårt ansträngda lager av läkemedel och matvaror.

Beskickningens B-avdelning, d. v. s. avdelningen för tillvaragande av främmande makters intressen i Ungern, hade alltså jämt ett stort antal besökande. Dels framfördes ständigt nya klagomål över ryssarnas övergrepp mot dessa deras allierades liv och egendom. Dels var man trots allt angelägen att dokumentera sitt utländska medborgarskap, om inte annat så för att bli hemskickad till det egna landet.

Tyvärr kunde B-avdelningen inte göra så mycket för sina skyddslingar, då general Tjernysjov låtit framföra genom greve Tolstoj, att han inte ansåg svenska legationen längre berättigad att handlägga skyddsmaktsärenden. Alla utlännningar hade i stället att vända sig till stadskommentaturens utlänningsbyrå, d. v. s. till Tolstoj.

Visserligen utövade Tjernysjov såsom den ryska ockupationsmaktens befälhavare i staden den högsta makten i Budapest, men då en ny ungersk regering redan bildats med säte i Debrecen, en gammal residensstad cirka 100 kilometer från Budapest, var jag inte säker på, att generalen formellt sett hade rätten på sin sida. Att rådföra utrikesdepartementet var omöjligt, då ryssarna alltså vägrade att vidarebefordra telegram till Sverige. Otivelaktigt hade Tjernysjov emellertid i alla högsta grad makten på sin sida, så jag avstod från att framföra några protester mot hans muntliga meddelande. Ej heller gjorde jag i fortsättningen några framställningar hos ryssarna i skyddsmaktsärenden.

Att lämna någon som helst hjälp mot ryssarnas fortsatta plundringar var omöjligt. På den punkten hade jag fortfarande inte ens kunnat bispringa de gamla beskickningslokalerna på Gyopár-utca.

Däremot försågs de besökandes pass och andra legitimationspapper med beskickningens påskrift, att de var äkta och giltiga dokument. Denna verksamhet var känd av stadskommentaturen, och det hände t. o. m. vid ett flertal tillfällen, att utlännningar blev överskickade från Tolstoj's byrå till B-avdelningen för att i tveksamma fall få sina dokument legaliserade.

Alla besökande hade samma historia att berätta. Först om

den långa svåra beläringen, då de varje dag fruktade att bli levande begravnade under husruinerna. Sedan om »befrielsen» av den röda armén. De hade öppnat sina dörrar på vid gavel för ryssarna och förhoppningsfullt visat upp sina pass och på ryska avfattade skyddsdokument från svenska beskickningen. Men ryssarna hade inte tagit några som helst hänsyn, antingen de nu kunde läsa eller inte. De holländska flickorna hade blivit våldtagna sida vid sida med de ungerska, här gjordes ingen åtskillnad. Knappast någon av alla mina besökande hade fått behålla sin personliga egendom. De var utblottade och desillusionerade. Hur kunde ryssarna behandla sina allierade vänner på det sättet? Nog hade tyskarna varit svåra mot dem men aldrig så djävulskt hänsynslösa.

Ännu mer bestörta blev mina besökande, när jag berättade för dem, hur även svenska beskickningen hade blivit skövlad. Det var då höjden av otacksamhet, efter det att beskickningen i flera år kämpat mot nazisterna för att skydda Rysslands intressen i Ungern, tyckte man. Varken de eller jag hade då ännu hunnit fatta ryssarnas genomgående taktik — att göra *allt*, som de inte blir med våld hindrade från. Varför inte plundra och föra bort allt flyttbart från Ungern? Varför inte våldtaga de amerikanska flickorna i Budapest? Varför inte spränga den svenska legationens kassaskåp? Det fanns ingen polis, som hindrade dem. Ingen domstol, som utmätte straff och lät verkställa dem. Varför vara västerländskt degenererad och ta hänsyn till internationell sedvänja, ingångna traktat eller humanitära krav? Låt de dumma demokratiska överklassländerna vara bundna av så förlegade dogmer. Man vinner så mycket mera genom att handla snabbt och utan moraliska skrupler.

Denna den kommunistiska diktaturens lära, som nu så många östeuropeiska folk fått lida för, var vid Budapests fall ännu inte känd, utan man var alljämt indignerad över ryssarnas skändliga behandling av sina medallierade.

Men om man också var utplundrad och illa behandlad, hade man i alla fall en sak att se fram emot. Man skulle få åter-

importance, he faced a dilemma: those of his family still in the Soviet Union might be jeopardized through his revelation. The new Oleh (immigrant) chose to come forward and tell his story to *Sheva*, the local Beersheba paper.

Chanukiev reported that he had met Wallenberg at a Sverdlovsk jail hospital in March, 1972. The Swede rested on a stretcher, suffering from stomach trouble. Chanukiev learned from Raoul that the Russians had arrested him because he saved Jews. The two prisoners shared a cell for four days. In inadvertent confirmation of his truthfulness, Chanukiev voluntarily described Raoul as being bald: the 1944 photos from Hungary show Wallenberg with a receding hairline.

In July, 1984, Ukrainian human rights activist and priest Iosif Terelya sent a letter to the Raoul Wallenberg Committee in Sweden in which he declared that between 1962 and 1976 he had spent fourteen years in Soviet labor colonies and psychiatric hospitals. The Soviets rearrested him in 1977, and he spent four more years in a psychiatric hospital. Terelya was released in 1981 but was again rearrested in 1985 and confined for a twelve-year term. Amnesty International has adopted Terelya as a prisoner of conscience. The international human rights organization declares that Terelya's letter to the Wallenberg Committee "is the single most detailed report on the Wallenberg case to have appeared from the USSR for many years."

In a letter to Amnesty International, dated July 8, 1984, Terelya elaborates on Wallenberg's arrest. According to Terelya, Brezhnev issued the direct orders to arrest Wallenberg. One of Brezhnev's captains robbed Wallenberg and confiscated the Studebaker, his diplomatic car. The priest writes:

Wallenberg demanded his car back and insisted on having his own rather than anyone else's. But Brezhnev had already made a present of Wallenberg's car to his superior. . . . Knowing that Wallenberg would appeal directly to Marshal Malinovsky, Brezhnev decided to arrest the Swedish diplomat. Wallenberg and his driver were arrested and sent to Uzhgorod . . . prison accused of being German spies without proper papers. From there they were sent to Norilsk, where at the time the Soviets were taking the best men of Europe and urging them to cooperate with Soviet intelligence.

Information regarding the heroic Swede came to the Wallenberg camp not through official pronouncements from the Soviet Union, but through the personal testimony of individuals who had seen Wallenberg firsthand.

Dr. Marvin Makinen, who served on the Soviet-International Commission on the Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg, disputes this account, calling it "pure nonsense." Makinen said that in his several interviews with Terelya, the Ukrainian never offered that version of Wallenberg's arrest.

Terelya traces the Wallenberg odyssey further. The Ukrainian links the Swede to a Lithuanian patriot Bogdanas, an officer in the Wehrmacht

who was arrested by Soviet counterintelligence in 1945. The Soviets imprisoned the officer in the Norilsk complex, in a camp that held foreigners. There, Bogdanas met Wallenberg and their fates became inextricably entwined. They were among the 420 prisoners who survived the Norilsk revolt in which 8,000 inmates perished.

"Both Wallenberg and Bogdanas were sent to the special prison [hospital] in Kazan," Terelya reported. "They started to cure Wallenberg of being himself. . . . They diagnosed that he was suffering from 'megalo-mania,' that he purported to be a Swedish diplomat. . . . In 1962 Bogdanas was taken away from Kazan to Sychovka and no one has heard of Wallenberg since."

Terelya surfaces again in a Simon Wiesenthal Center newsletter in 1986. A newsnote cites a Swiss-based Christian newsletter that refers to the prisoner Terelya in the Gulag. The "smuggled report" says that a KGB officer had threatened to lock Terelya in a cell with Wallenberg. With sarcasm, the officer reportedly promised the prisoner, "Then you can help each other."

A recently told anecdote of Wallenberg's last days in Budapest gives an ironic twist to Terelya's account. Laszlo Hertelendy, a member of a well-known Hungarian family, claimed in an interview that he was the last man to see Wallenberg before he vanished from Hungary:

I last met him [Wallenberg] on February 12 at the Krisztina Church's parish office [disputing the widely accepted January 17 disappearance date]. . . . Physically he was not in bad condition but looked most dejected. . . . When we asked him what was wrong with him, he said, "This is not the way I thought things would be like." Perhaps he had an illusion that the Soviets would deal with him as a very important man. He said, "Perhaps tomorrow it will be me asking you to help me."

A sighting announced in 1988 placed Wallenberg in the hospital of a large Soviet prison camp in Blagoveschensk, near the Chinese border, on December 22, 1986. Swedish businessman and novelist Kenne Fant, a past president of Sweden's largest movie studio, provided news of the captive. Fant said that according to a reliable informant now in the West, "an old Scandinavian diplomat" who had rescued Jews in Budapest at the end of World War II received treatment for frostbite of the right foot. Mr. Fant also revealed that other reliable witnesses had seen a man fitting Wallenberg's description in a Blagoveschensk psychiatric hospital from February to December, 1978.

Wallenberg searchers first became familiar with the name of Efim Moshinsky in the '70s. Moshinsky, who now lives in Israel, claims to be both the KGB officer who arrested Wallenberg in Budapest, and a fellow prisoner who served a term with Raoul in the early '60s at the Arctic

Circle camp of Wrangel Island. Although the Wallenberg family has questioned the truth of Moshinsky's various testimonies, in early 1987 Moshinsky alleged that Wallenberg was alive as late as December, 1986.

Moshinsky told the Associated Press in Tel Aviv, "I have received letters [indirectly] from Wallenberg." Since arriving in Israel in the mid-'60s, Moshinsky claimed he had been searching for Wallenberg through his KGB friends. In exchange for the food and clothing Moshinsky sent them, they forwarded Wallenberg's letters to him. Moshinsky said that his contact told him that the Soviets made Wallenberg, under a pseudonym, an inmate of a hospital for the mentally ill. They later moved him to a labor camp at Krasnoyarsk, Siberia.

Before leaving for Moscow with the delegation monitoring the Helsinki human rights accords in early 1988, McGill University Law Professor Irwin Cotler announced that he had confidential information from a "highly placed Swedish diplomat." As recently as October, 1987, Wallenberg "was alive and incarcerated in a prison not far from Moscow."

Top Soviet spy General Pavel Sudoplatov has made a sensational claim about Wallenberg's death in the much-publicized book *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster* (Little, Brown, 1994).

Sudoplatov, who had close ties to Stalin and his security chief Lavrenti Beria, states that Wallenberg was probably killed by lethal injection in Lubianka prison in 1947. The general alleges that Wallenberg's execution resulted from his refusal to work as a Soviet agent, as Stalin had demanded. Sudoplatov, now 87, claims to possess such secret information because he headed the NKVD's "Administration for Special Tasks," the department with responsibility for sabotage and assassinations abroad.

"My best estimate," Sudoplatov says, "is that Wallenberg was killed by Maironovsky [Grigori Moiseyevich, head of MGB toxicological research] who was ordered to inject him with poison under the guise of medical treatment."

Eric Breindel of the *New York Post* finds Sudoplatov's account credible. The Soviets already believed the Swede acted as an agent for the American OSS, British intelligence, and Jewish-Zionist organizations. They probably thought they could induce him into Stalin's service if they spirited him away from war-torn Budapest and tried their suasions amid a little luxury. However, as time dragged on and Wallenberg resisted their recruitment, the Soviets found themselves with an embarrassing liability on their hands. They had concealed the fact that they had held an internationally known diplomatic figure captive for more than two years. The embarrassing person of Raoul Wallenberg had to be disposed of, and an order from on high dictated his murder. As Sudoplatov suggests, Wallenberg was poisoned, then cremated, probably upon the 1947 instruc-

Deke
Brown
Walter
Public
Trust
Deke
Rach
Wallenberg
alive
at home
1987



■ Den svenska regeringen skulle nöja sig med ett besked om att Raoul Wallenbergs försvinnande var "Berias verk".
■ Det budskapet gav Sveriges utrikesminister Östen Undén 1956 till den sovjetiska ambassadören enligt sovjetiska dokument som Expressen tagit del av.

"Sverige ville få Wallenberg-affären ur världen"

Flera vittnen påstår att Wallenberg var vid liv 1956, i så fall 44 år gammal.

— Östen Undén ville få Wallenbergaffären ur världen och det tog sovjeterna fasta på, säger Osteuropaexperten Kristian Gerner till Expressen.

Kristian Gerner har tagit del av alla tillgängliga interna rapporter och promemorior inom sovjetiska UD och Expressen kan nu publicera ett utdrag.

Bakgrunden till dokumenten är att Nikita Chrusjtjov i mars 1956 hållit sitt berömda tal och signalerat att Stalins tid var förbi. Nu kunde man ge Stalin skulden för Wallenbergs försvinnande.

I en intern rapport från 28 april 1956 skriver dåvarande utrikesminister Molotov och KGB-chefen Serov till kommunistpartiets centralkommitte.

Budskapet är att Sovjet nu ska portionera ut nyheter till svenskarna om Wallenberg och vid lämplig tidpunkt ge Sverige en rapport om den sovjetiska utredningen om Wallenberg.

— De ger intrycket att de bedriver en utredning genom att be om ytterligare information om Wallenberg, men i själva verket bedriver de en "lätsas-utredning". En lämplig tidpunkt för att släppa material anses vara efter det svenska riksdagsvalet för att inte skada sossarna, säger Kristian Gerner till Expressen.

På uppdrag av svenska UD åkte Gerner i december förra året till Moskva. Där stude-
rade han allt material i sovjetiska

UD:s arkiv som rörde Raoul Wallenberg och kontakterna med svenska UD.

— Jag gick igenom ett hundratal akter där man får en ny bild av hur Sovjet uppfattade den svenska utrikespolitiken, säger Gerner.

Sovjet ansåg att Wallenberg-affären var ett irritationsmoment och de uppfattade Östen Undéns signaler som att även han ville få historien ur världen. Men att de var upp till Sovjet att bedöma om sanningen skulle yppas eller ej.

I en PM från den 30 december 1956 av en handläggare i Tugarinov inom sovjetiska UD, beskrivs den svenska motparten på följande sätt:

"Sveriges utrikesminister Östen Undén lät i ett samtal med den sovjetiske ambassadören den 10 mars 1956 förstå att den svenska regeringen skulle vara tillfreds med ett svar som innehöll en anspelning på att Wallenbergs försvinnande var ett 'Berias verk'". (Sovjetiska hemliga säkerhetspolisen, reds anmärkning.)

I Östen Undéns "Strängt förtroliga PM" från samma möte med ambassadören Rodionov daterat 10/3 1956 beskriver han en hypotes för ambassadören:

"Under Berias regim inom säkerhetspolisen har tydligen grova missbruk förekommit. Detta hade Sovjetregeringen själv undersökt i ett visst sammanhang. Enuru jag inte kunde till hur den ryska byrån arbetade, frågade jag mig om inte laget kunde vara det att säkerhetspolisen från början angivit en osann rapport, var förkla-



Östen Undén. Foto ROLAND JANSSON

rades att W. inte fanns i Sovjetunionen. Därefter kanske senare efterforskningar stannat vid denna tidigare rapport såsom definitivt besked, grundat på fakta."

Undén påpekar också att det fanns andra fall där Sovjetregeringen först förnekade att eftersökta personer fanns i Sovjetunionen.

— Undén ger en signal till Rodionov att han vill ha saken ur världen. Sedan är det upp till Sovjet att bestämma om de ska skylla på Stalinregimen eller ej. Om de gör det är saken utagerad för evigt, säger Gerner.

Så sker också 1957. Sovjet meddelar då i den så kallade Smoltsov-rapporten Sverige att Wallenberg avlidit i sovjetiskt fängelse redan 1947. Då hette chefen för säkerhetspolisen Abakumov.

— Abakumov hade avrättats som Sovjets fiende och det var perfekt eftersom han då inte kunde vittna, säger Gerner.

— Men uppgiften om Wallenbergs död presenteras två månader efter att det sossarna vunnit valet. En månad tidigare hade Östen Undén fördömt Sovjets krossande av revolten i Ungern. Relationerna var utåt dåliga så då kunde man lika gärna meddela en dålig nyhet, säger Gerner.

Arbetet med att bygga upp nya relationer mellan länderna skulle då fortsättningsvis inte belastas med Wallenbergaffären
EVA BRANDT

FOTNOT: Lavrentij Beria var folkkommissarie för inrikesärenden och chef för sovjetiska säkerhetspolisen.

EDICPARK

Raoul Wallenberg i sitt tjänsterum i Budapest november 1944

*Har tröt ut-tricket (en svensk häll)
att Östen Undén var den "största skurken".*

Ryssland kan tiga i 50 år till

Sjöboms - Protén
(Rik)
17/11

MOSKVA:

I dag är det femtio år sedan Raoul Wallenberg försvann. Exakt vad som hände den svenske diplomaten i sovjetisk fångenskap är ännu oklart.

Det är inte många ryssar som intresserar sig för hans öde.

- Vet ni vem Raoul Wallenberg var? frågade jag häromdagen tio på måfå utvalda människor på Ljubljanka-torget vid KGB:s byggnad. KGB heter numera Federala kontraspionaget.

Två unga flickor sade att de visserligen hört namnet, men det var också allt. Fyra personer svarade att de inte hade en aning om vem Wallenberg var. Två män sa att jag var en idiot som ödslade min tid på dumma frågor. En stor man med ett gulaktigt skägg sade att judar inte intresserade honom.

Bara en person, en ung man med mustasch som såg ut som en officer i civila kläder, sade vänligt att Wallenberg var en svensk diplomat som dödades 1947 på order av Stalin.

För sex år sedan var allt anorlunda. Jag skrev den första artikeln i sovjetisk press om Wallenberg. Det var i juni 1989 när jag arbetade på den sovjetiska dagstidningen Komso-molskaya Pravda som hade en daglig upplaga på 18 miljoner exemplar. Vi gjorde vår egen undersökning och vi fick hundratals brev från läsare som chockats av Stalin-regimens brott.

Duellen mellan den allmänna opinionen och KGB varade i två år. Folk ville veta sanningen. KGB hävdade att alla

dokument förstörts. Även om delar av arkiven blev tillgängliga under Gorbatjovs "perestrojka", behöll KGB kontrollen över 90 procent av materialet.

Duellanterna hade olika vapen. Vi hade ingen möjlighet att undersöka arkiven. KGB vann. Med undantag för flera mindre dokument, som bevisade att Wallenberg förts från Ljubljanka-fängelset till Lefortovo-fängelset och tillbaka till Ljubljanka, påträffades ingen seriös dokumentation över Wallenbergs "liv" i Sovjetunionen.

Varför Wallenberg arresterades och vad som hände honom fick vi inte reda på.

För ett år sedan öppnade USA sina hemliga arkiv om Raoul Wallenberg. Amerikanerna hade tolv stora dossier. Sovjetunionen, som arresterade Wallenberg i Budapest, förde honom till Moskva där man fängslade honom, förhöorde honom under mer än två år och sedan troligen dödade honom, borde ha betydligt mer information om Wallenberg än USA.

Genom att hävda att alla arkiv förstörts undvek KGB att förklara på vems order han fängslades och varför det var nödvändigt att bränna alla arkiv som rörde den svenske diplomaten.

Min uppfattning är att svaret på gåtan Wallenberg finns i KGB:s arkiv. Men ingen vet när arkiven öppnas. Ett färskt exempel visar att ryska underrättelsetjänsten ofta säger nej när den i själva verket sitter inne

med mycket information. I slutet av november förra året dödades, sårades eller tillfångatogs många ryska "frivilliga" när ryska styrkor försökte inta den tjetjenska huvudstaden Groznyj. Men ingen kunde räkna förlusterna, eftersom listan över frivilliga var hemligstämplad.

Men det blev snabbt känt att Federala underrättelsetjänsten, som rekryterade soldater och officerare att slåss mot tjetjenerna, hade skrivit under speciella kontrakt med soldaterna och officerarna. Nästan alla ryska krigsfångar som frigavs av tjetjenerna vittnade om att

sådana kontrakt skrivits.

Det ryska parlamentet, som ville veta hur många ryssar som stupat eller sårats i kriget, bad Federala underrättelsetjänsten om kopior på kontrakten.

- Vi har inte skrivit några kontrakt, alltså kan vi inte hjälpa

er, löd svaret från underrättelsetjänsten.


Det här hände för knappt två månader sedan. Många personer var inblandade och det finns gott om vittnen. Vad kan vi då vänta oss av underrättelsetjänsten när det gäller ett fall för 50 år sedan och där det inte finns några vittnen kvar i livet?

Ändå är jag optimistisk. Underrättelseorganisationer tycker inte om att bränna papper. Det ger oss hopp om att vi någon gång i framtiden kommer att få veta sanningen om Raoul Wallenberg, som räddade tusentals liv - men inte sitt eget.

Alexej Kartsev

**Duellen mellan
den allmänna
opinionen
och KGB
varade i två år.
KGB hävdade
att alla
dokument
förstörts.**

NICHOLAS BETHELL



SPIES AND OTHER SECRETS

MEMOIRS FROM THE SECOND COLD WAR

NICHOLAS BETHELL

conviction. Through its literature, Nicholas Bethell became interested in Russia as a young man, but in Russia, literature and politics cannot be separated. This is the story of an individual who stood by what he believed and so fulfilled his ambition of being a persistent thorn in the side of the Soviet authorities.

Although warned that 'East is East and West is West', Bethell has adventured undeterred. His involvement with Russia cost him his post in the Heath government. His great esteem for Solzhenitsyn and his part in the first publication of *Cancer Ward* led, ironically, to harsh words from his hero, who was involved in a larger and more dangerous political game. Bethell remained an opponent of the Soviet state throughout the Cold War period, and his account illustrates dramatically the ironies and difficulties of communication and understanding between East and West, from the aggression of the Brezhnev era to the thaw of Gorbachev's glasnost.

Concern for human rights, reflected in his books, journalism and in his career as an MEP, has been his guiding star, whether demanding reparation for historical wrongs – such as the Allied repatriation of Russians, or the Katyn massacre – or in his constant campaigning for dissidents, including the Sakharovs, Bukovsky, Shcharansky, Orlov and Ginsburg.

The book also deals with his experience of other countries: Poland, South Africa, Afghanistan, Albania, Iran and Romania. Throughout his life he has pursued his causes with an unwavering sense of justice that has won respect from people as diverse as Margaret Thatcher, Lech Wałęsa and Nelson Mandela. His story is that of a man prepared to challenge cruelty, aggression and complacency wherever he finds them.

*SECRET and OTHER SECRETS £18.00
NICHOLAS BETHELL MEMOIRS FROM THE SECOND COLD WAR*

NICHOLAS BETHELL

Nicholas Bethell was born in 1938 and educated at Harrow and Pembroke College, Cambridge. In 1975 he was nominated from the House of Lords to be a Conservative member of the European Parliament and he served as elected MEP for London North-West from 1979 to 1994. He has campaigned vigorously on many European issues, such as food prices and air-fares, both as an individual and by chairing and advising official bodies. He is also a freelance writer. Throughout his career Lord Bethell has had a specialist interest in human rights in the Soviet Union and the communist bloc as well as in South Africa. He has travelled widely, to meet many dissidents and freedom fighters in these and other countries including Afghanistan, and to seek to influence governments on their behalf.

His earlier publications include *Gomulka: his Poland and his Communism*, *The War Hitler Won*, *The Last Secret, Russia Besieged*, *The Palestine Triangle* and *The Great Betrayal*. He has also translated works by Russian writers, such as *Cancer Ward* and *The Love Girl and the Innocent* by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Elegy to John Donne* by Joseph Brodsky and *The Ascent of Mount Fuji* by Chingiz Aitmatov. His translations from the Polish include *Six Plays* by Slawomir Mrozek.

Praise for the author:

Gomulka: his Poland and his Communism

'A scholarly and unbiased account of the events that shaped Poland's political destiny'

— Gabriel Lortie, *New Statesman*

The War Hitler Won

'...the most authentic and standardised book on the so-called "phony war" of 1939...beautifully written, and superbly documented'

— Lord Boothby, *Books and Bookmen*

The Palestine Triangle

'A story that no Englishman can read without shame' — A. J. P. Taylor

The Last Secret: Foulle Repatriation to Russia 1944-1947

'Lord Bethell has told this shameful, horrifying story with great restraint and balance'

— David Floyd, *Daily Telegraph*

The Great Betrayal

'a heartbreaking story, very well told'

— John Le Carré



the KGB, even if it was only to the extent of 'honest' red wine and cold sausage rolls.

I would have been more generous if I had known the truth. In fact Gordievsky had since 1974, at great personal risk, been working for my own country's Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). He was 'of a KGB background'. His father had been responsible for training NKVD officers. 'He was a conscientious Party member and he forced himself to believe that the Party was always right,' says Gordievsky today. His brother had a more colourful career in Soviet intelligence. He graduated from KGB Academy in 1957 and became an 'illegal', an agent working secretly in a foreign country under an assumed name. But, after serving in this dramatic capacity in several countries, he became ill and died in May 1972. Gordievsky himself joined 'the committee' as a young man, recklessly and unwisely, as he later conceded, largely because of these family connections and his interest in foreign literature and travel. He became a specialist in Germany and Scandinavia.

Then came the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which shocked him greatly. 'I decided that something had to be done against the system,' he says. 'I had become a convinced dissident and I wanted to do something practical.' British intelligence spotted these signs, he says, and with the help of Danish colleagues they watched him during his service in Copenhagen in the late 1960s and again in 1972-3. His first contact with the British was in 1973. By the end of 1974 he was a fully-fledged double agent, committed to the British side.

Of course, I knew none of this. If I had, I would not have begrudged him our sausage rolls. In fact, in all justice, the Conservative Party should have been rewarding him not with scarcely drinkable *vin ordinaire*, but with the best champagne that Brighton could provide.

Ill-disposed towards him as I was during that first meeting, I reacted to his strange overtures by making a request that I knew he would be in no position to grant. On 20 October 1982 I wrote him a letter. East-West relations were at their present poor state, I wrote disingenuously, because of the two sides' failure to communicate on matters of 'an rights.' would therefore be grateful if he would arrange for me to visit the well-known dissidents Orlov and Shcharansky in the camps where they were being held.

12. My Friend Oleg

On 7 October 1982, during the Conservative Party's annual conference at Brighton, an apparently lonely and shy man in a shiny suit and with greyish hair came up to me at one of the many evening drinks parties being held in the Grand Hotel.

He introduced himself in poor English. He asked me, did I by any chance speak Danish, or Russian? The latter, it seemed, was our only common tongue. This was very strange. And it seemed even stranger when he told me that he was a member of the Soviet embassy, invited to Brighton that week as one of the Party's overseas guests. I remember how, at that time, with East-West relations at a very low ebb, I was shocked by the thought that such a blood-red cuckoo was being made welcome in our true blue nest.

He had just been transferred to the political section of the London embassy, he said, having served for some years in Copenhagen. It was now his job to build links with Britain's 'non-socialist parties', which meant in the Soviet embassy's judgement the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Social Democrats, with the Labour and Communist parties looked after by a colleague. He would like to invite me and some of my European Parliament friends to the embassy. He gave me his card and I saw that his name was Oleg Gordievsky.

His friendly tone surprised me, and an invitation to drinks at the embassy a month later surprised me even more. What did they want? My 'anti-Soviet activities on behalf of the British secret services' in Afghanistan and elsewhere were widely mentioned in the Soviet press and must be well known to him. What motive could he have for wanting to drink with an 'enemy of the people' like me?

I assumed, rightly, that Gordievsky was a KGB officer. Otherwise his superiors would never have allowed him to attend the Brighton conference. So I became more and more suspicious of him. What was his game? It more than annoyed me to think that the Conservative Party, always short of funds, should be spending money on hosting

It was an outrageous idea. Soviet officials were then unwilling even to discuss their penal system with foreigners. In their view, Orlov was an ideological terrorist and Shcharansky a traitor who had given information to the CIA. There were no 'dissidents' in the Soviet Union, only freaks and criminals. In my letter I told him that I was chairman of the European Parliament's human rights group and that I was writing a report on human rights in the Soviet Union, due to be debated in Strasbourg in a few months' time (May 1983). At present, I said, trying my hardest to seem serious, the draft report lacked the benefit of the Soviet government's point of view. It would, I suggested, be preferable to settle such problems by discussion with the Soviet authorities, or through the Helsinki Agreement procedure, now being reviewed in Madrid, rather than by the 'megaphone' tactic of throwing abuse at one another on public platforms and through the media.

I sent the Foreign Office a copy of the letter. There was a danger, at the height of East-West conflict, confronting any Westerner who maintained contact with any member of the KGB, on however trivial a basis. It was essential to be 'covered'. They were a cunning and ruthless adversary, quite capable of exploiting by blackmail or any other means even the most casual contact with a British MP or writer. Not only the reputations of Westerners, but also the liberty and lives of Soviet citizens might be at risk. So I told the Foreign Office all about it and they presumably passed the information on to MI6. I do nevertheless see an irony in the fact that Gordievsky, as a good British agent, must also have been keeping MI6 informed about his contacts with me. I can only hope that the two versions of events coincided.

He did not write back, but he telephoned me. I was amazed. It was more than ten years since I had been contacted by anyone from the Soviet embassy. What mysterious reason could there be for it? I need not have been so paranoid. The reason, he says today, was nothing more than inter-service rivalry. The London KGB's aim was to build up a circle of contacts in the Conservative Party and so to demonstrate a deeper knowledge of the British scene than that submitted to Moscow by the Ambassador and other non-KGB diplomats.

He informed his station chief, Arcadi Guk, I informed the Foreign Office and on 10 January 1983 he arrived on my doorstep with a bottle of vodka in a brown paper bag. He was polite, almost deferential, in a way that I found deeply suspicious. 'Our Soviet government's

attitude to dissidents is too harsh,' he said. 'Anyone wishing to leave should be allowed to do so.' I smiled back at him, as far as I can remember, very cynically. 'That's what you would say, wouldn't you?' I wanted to say to him.

His reaction was equally strange when I told him that for the past twelve years I had been denied a Soviet visa, on account of my 'anti-socialist' activities. 'Of course you are anti-socialist. You are a Conservative. They should understand that in Moscow. They ought to hear the point of view of people like you. I would like to try to help you to get a visa.' Soviet officials did not usually see things in such simple and reasonable terms.

It was all very bewildering. 'I only ask one thing,' he went on. 'Please do not refer to any of our conversations publicly. I could be in serious trouble for talking to you like this.' 'Hypocrite!' I thought to myself. Did he seriously expect me to believe that every word of our talk was not being taken down, ready to be used in evidence at KGB Moscow Centre? He was probably wired for sound that very minute, with each nuance of our conversation being relayed to the Lubyanka by way of his embassy in Kensington Palace Gardens, London W8.

I saw no reason why the Soviets should suddenly feel well disposed towards me, at the height of the new cold war and a few months after their press had denounced me for my involvement with the Afghan opposition. What did it mean? If I went to Moscow and visited the survivors of the dissident movement, as I would have to, would I be safe? More importantly, would my Russian friends be safe? Was it all some great plan to lure me into an indiscretion, which could then be used against Mrs Thatcher's tough policies, or to provoke further arrests of dissidents, with the suggestion that they were agents of the British secret service?

Might I even be in physical danger? The feelings of the Soviet government towards me could only have changed for the worse. If they refused me a visa in 1972, they were not likely to give me one amid the horrors of early 1983, with East-West relations at their worst since Stalin's aggressions of the late 1940s and with the Kremlin ready to believe that the West was preparing a pre-emptive strike against them. As Gordievsky describes in his book *KGB: The Inside Story*,¹ the Soviet leaders believed that Reagan was actively planning

for nuclear war against the Soviet bloc. And Gordievsky was one of the KGB team in London whose job it was to keep a special eye on activities in Whitehall and other corridors of British power, to inform the Kremlin when the strike was going to take place. This was Operation RYAN and, according to the then British Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, Soviet paranoia about it was at its height in 1983. Howe confirms that Gordievsky kept him secretly informed of the danger, especially during the 'Able Archer' military exercises that autumn, and Britain did what it could to allay Soviet fears. I am amazed that amid these crises Gordievsky had time to concern himself with such a small problem as my visa.

Still, I decided to follow the advice that Gordievsky was for some strange reason giving me and visit Russia for the first time in twelve years. I applied for a seven-day Thomson Tours holiday in Moscow. And at the end of February 1983, to my astonishment, he rang from the embassy to say that my visa was approved.

It was exciting, but I was conscious of the need to beware of the KGB, especially when they bear gifts. What weird game were the Soviets playing with me? Gordievsky told me that he had some 'friends' whom I might like to meet in Moscow. He says today, 'We were only anxious to show ourselves better informed than the ambassador was.' At the time, though, it was all very alarming. I thought of ending the meetings and cancelling the whole venture, but decided instead to sup with my longest spoon and to keep the Foreign Office in the picture at every stage.

I would have paid less attention to the Foreign Office's advice if I had known that they rather than the KGB were Gordievsky's true employers. They did not of course tell me that this was the case. They suggested caution, but not that I cancel the trip, so I collected all the addresses and pharmaceuticals needed for a Moscow week and agreed to see Gordievsky for coffee on 18 April, three days before scheduled departure.

On 10 March I set out with my two EP colleagues for the CSCE review in Madrid, where I met the notorious KGB colonel Sergei Kondryashov, whose job it was to defend Russia's treatment of dissidents (see p. 109). I came back and wrote about the Kremlin's 4-million-strong convict army, pointing out that the Soviet Union was the only country on earth that made a profit out of its penal system.

This was the bizarre background to what was going to be my first visit to Russia since 1971.

On 18 April, with thoughts such as these racing in my brain, I waited for Gordievsky's arrival. My bags were packed, the papers I needed were in my suitcase and my visa was in my passport. The telephone rang. It was an executive of Thomson Tours, very embarrassed. 'The Soviet embassy has cancelled your visa,' she said. 'They have told us that the aircraft will not be allowed to land in Moscow if you are on it. I have therefore cancelled your ticket. You will receive a refund.'

So much for Thomson Tours, I thought, and so much for Oleg Gordievsky. I did not expect him to appear that morning. If I had known how busy he was with Operation RYAN, monitoring Whitehall windows and the price of blood and Mrs Thatcher's visits to the Queen, I would have given him up for lost. He surely had enough problems. Still, he arrived on schedule, as polite as ever and very apologetic. 'You are right. This is not good diplomacy,' he said. I was in a bad mood and rather less polite. I invited him in, but did not offer him coffee.

There was confusion in Moscow because of a leadership struggle, he told me. We should keep in touch and soon I would get another visa. However, by this time I was fed up. I felt that he was playing cat and mouse with me, underestimating my intelligence by thinking he could fool me with another dose of hypocrisy. I told him that his government had behaved insultingly and that I would use the incident and the actual visa document, which I refused to surrender in spite of the Soviet Consul's and Thomson Tours's urgent plea, to embarrass the Soviet Union. Then I showed him the door. I never expected to see him again.

Where did this fit into the 'wilderness of mirrors' of the secret world? Had Mr Kondryashov taken offence at my rude article, which identified him as a KGB colonel, and asked his friends to take action against me? Or had they done it all just to tease, to test whether I might be 'bought' for a visa, a bottle of vodka and a little polite Soviet talk? Gordievsky was, as far as I was concerned, just another cog in this wicked machine, a devious Soviet apparatchik, a representative of the enemy with whom I had no wish ever again to set eyes on. He passed out of my life.

Over the next two years his career flourished in the KGB's London station. In 1983 he was deputy KGB chief, under Arcadi Guk, and then, after Guk was expelled in May 1984, under Leonid Nikitenko. In June 1984 he secretly briefed Geoffrey Howe before the latter's visit to Moscow, where Howe spent seventy minutes being spoken to incoherently by the dying Soviet leader, Konstantin Chernenko. In December 1984 he was responsible for briefing Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev during the latter's famous London visit, when Margaret Thatcher announced that here was a man with whom she could do business. In January 1985 he was recalled to KGB 'Centre' in Moscow to receive the good news that in May he would succeed Nikitenko as 'Resident', the top London job. The Resident's special codes were explained to him.

He returned to London to await this promotion to one of the KGB's most prestigious posts, living with his wife Leila and daughters Masha and Anyuta. Five-year-old Masha attended a Church of England school in Kensington. Leila worked as a typist, the same job that she had when Oleg first met her in Copenhagen. Soviet leader Chernenko died on 22 March 1985, and Mikhail Gorbachev, the Politburo's youngest member, succeeded him.

All seemed to be going smoothly for Gordievsky. In the early days of Gorbachev's rule the paranoia surrounding Operation RYAN came to an end, partly due to the advice Gordievsky had been supplying. No longer did the Soviets believe that the Americans were planning any pre-emptive nuclear attack on them. Then, quite suddenly, he was called back to Moscow for urgent talks with the top brass, including the then KGB chief Victor Chebrikov.

His sixth sense told him something was wrong. Sure enough, as soon as he arrived home, he found his senior colleagues ignoring him, or even treating him with hostility. His flat, he could tell, had been searched and books by Solzhenitsyn discovered under his bed. On 30 May he was told that his London mission was cancelled, that he was being assigned to home duties. 'We know that you have been deceiving us,' he was told. A bizarre evening took place, when he was drugged with Armenian brandy and questioned about alleged disloyalty.

The KGB, it seemed, had reason for suspicion but no proof. They did not know enough either to convict him or to be absolutely sure that their doubts were justified. This was his interpretation of the fact

that they now let him go free, as a cat releases a bird, keeping him under close watch and hoping that he would panic and incriminate himself, perhaps by contacting the British embassy. For instance, he thought of contacting Leila in London to warn her not to return to Moscow, but decided that it would be suicide to make any such attempt. 'No telephone calls to London!' he had been warned by Viktor Grushko, his interrogator.

There was, however, I am presuming, a British plan ready for this eventuality. And, in those early days of June 1985, he thought about little else as he worked out how to put the plan into effect, all the time knowing that he was under such close observation that the slightest sign of guilt or panic would be known to the other side. He says, 'The flat was bugged very professionally. Leila confirmed this later. They played her my conversations and the quality of the recording was good, even though the record player had been at high volume at the time.'

The plan could not be implemented immediately. By the time it was ready Leila and the girls had been brought back to Moscow. This complicated his already meagre choice of options. Either he could confess and be shot for treason, or he could carry on with the plan, in which case he would have to take a terrible decision. He would have to escape without them, leaving his wife and daughters behind in the Soviet Union and hoping to recover them later.

On 30 June he saw Masha and Anyuta for what he thought might well be the last time. A few days later he kissed Leila goodbye. Their parting was made more poignant by the fact that she still had no idea of its significance, of his double life or of the imminent danger that he, and maybe she too, faced. He was later accused by the KGB and others of 'abandoning' his family. His answer to this is that the only alternative to separation that summer in 1985 was 'a few more weeks of freedom followed by execution as a traitor and even greater heartbreak for his family'.²

He went ahead with the plan and, I presume, found some way of explaining his predicament to the British secret service. Margaret Thatcher was informed. A difficult political decision then had to be taken. Should MI6 help him to escape from the Soviet Union? MI6 put it to the Prime Minister that it was vital, if only from the point of view of morale among other British agents in various countries, to

rescue Gordievsky from the KGB's vengeance. It was important on moral grounds at least to attempt to save a man who had faced such dangers on Britain's behalf, and produced such good results. Also, a successful rescue operation would do wonders for MI6's credibility in the intelligence world and would leave Britain with a valuable 'property', a storehouse of priceless information which even the CIA would find useful. It would impress the Americans, and this is something that British intelligence always likes to do.

On the other hand, it was argued, it would be a 'James Bond' operation to take a Soviet citizen across his country's borders without proper documents, a violation of Soviet law and of the Vienna Convention on diplomatic behaviour, a most undiplomatic act and a most unusual way for Britain to behave in time of peace.

The Moscow ambassador, Bryan Cartledge, was aghast at the idea, as was the Foreign Office as a whole. But Margaret Thatcher was firm. Her robust approach to foreign policy and personal commitment to the aim of radical change in the Soviet Union overcame all objections. If Gordievsky was abandoned in Moscow, he would be arrested, interrogated, tortured and shot. He might be expected, under torture, to give away information that was vital to British security. At the very least, the great success of the 'Gordievsky operation' would be destroyed. She therefore decided that Gordievsky must be saved and gave orders to her secret services accordingly. This is what I presume.

Gordievsky gives me a partial account of his exploit: 'The second half of June 1985 I dedicated to planning, training and other preparations, like studying maps. The first days of July I devoted to specific acts of preparation, some of which turned out to be abortive. I made mistakes because I was so nervous. I also carried out certain manoeuvres designed to deceive the KGB and lead them along the wrong trail. They were listening to my telephone and I gave them false ideas about where to look for me after my disappearance. I began my journey at 3.30 p.m. on Friday, 19 July. I caught a train at 5.30 p.m. and the next morning I made my way to the border area, using a commuter train, buses and hitch-hiking. At about five o'clock that evening [July 20] I was on the other side of the border, very euphoric but also very sad. Some of my British friends were there.'

In a recent interview for a Russian magazine¹ he says, 'I got into a

train going West, travelled all night, then during the course of the next half day made my way through forested country, reaching the border on foot.'

Gordievsky does not indicate which border he crossed. Nor does he confirm that he crossed with the help of British agents. However, on the basis of information from other sources, I am assuming that on 19 July he set out from his apartment on foot, pretending to be jogging, which he did at this time every day, carrying a few belongings including some light clothes in a plastic bag, and that the KGB surveillance team momentarily let him out of their sight, hardly imagining that he would be able to escape to London wearing only a vest and a pair of shorts.

I assume that he jogged to the railway station, changed into the light pair of trousers from the bag, and then caught an overnight train to Leningrad. I assume that the next morning he took a commuter train from Leningrad to Vyborg, eighty miles north-west of the city, and buses for some of the thirty miles between Vyborg and the Finnish border. I imagine that at some point between Leningrad and the Finnish border he met British agents and was packed into a secret compartment in a British diplomatic vehicle. This vehicle, protected by diplomatic immunity, then took him across the frontier. This was the 'hitch-hiking' element in the journey. A day or two later he was in England, in hiding in a very safe MI6 house.

The KGB were beside themselves with fury. The British, they were later to claim, had 'packed him like jam in a jam jar into a car with diplomatic plates and like criminals drove him across the frontier'.⁴ They had three good reasons to be upset. First, they had suffered their most serious security leak in recent years, including the loss of agents in Britain, a total of thirty-one from the embassy and others less official. They had also, secondly, having at last uncovered the traitor, allowed him to slip through their fingers. Seldom in the KGB's history had there been such a series of humiliating lapses. Many heads in the Lubyanka, one must imagine, rolled as a result.

The third reason for the KGB's anger was that they had, in this particular case, the law on their side. If my presumption is correct, the escape involved violations of both international law and Soviet criminal law by British government agents. This at any rate is what the KGB believed. They accused Britain of flagrant illegalities and

threatened an all-out war between the secret services. Assuming that he knew the names and whereabouts of all their illegal operators in Britain, they were forced to withdraw all these 'illegals', so losing the benefit of long years of careful secret planning.

The Soviet embassy described the expulsion of the thirty-one as 'an unwarranted act'. 'Their men never did anything illegal, said the embassy spokesman.' 'They retaliated by expelling British diplomats from Moscow and a lengthy 'tit for tat' conflict ensued. It was a small price for Britain to pay.

On 14 November the KGB sentenced Gordievsky to death *in absentia* and in this case, unusually, there was every reason to believe that they would try to carry out the sentence on foreign territory, so intense was their anger. They confiscated his property and vowed to the British and anyone else who cared to listen that *never*, under any circumstances, would Leila be allowed to leave the Soviet Union.

The details of this remarkable escape cannot be confirmed, but there is no doubt that they were repeated in confidence to senior spies in Washington, so lifting Britain's prestige in the secret world. It is said that Gordievsky has promised Margaret Thatcher personally never to reveal, without her permission, the secret of how she saved his life. 'Others may have to leave the Soviet Union by the same route,' he writes.⁶ But the main reason is probably that he has been asked not to add to Britain's embarrassment by confirming that an organ of the British state did indeed act in violation of Soviet and international law.

My Astonishment

It was with total amazement that I opened my newspapers in London on 12 September 1985 to find that this apparently foolish fellow, whom I had met in Brighton nearly three years earlier and twice welcomed to my home, before dismissing him from my mind as a typical Soviet hypocrite, was in reality one of the greatest double agents in the history of world espionage and Britain's most valuable intelligence 'property'.

My first reaction, a selfish one, was 'annoyant' that I had never photographed him, either in Brighton or in London. The picture

would have been syndicated all over the world and made me a fortune. I did, however, write an article⁷ that was given the extravagant heading 'My Friend Oleg', about my regret at having nursed such dark thoughts on the man's character, at a time when he was risking his life on Britain's side in the battle against Soviet imperialism and against the paranoia that had given birth to the potentially cataclysmic Operation RYAN.

I had wasted nervous energy, I wrote, fencing with the spy who never was, with a presumed KGB man who was, in fact, exactly the opposite, and I looked forward to meeting him under different circumstances. Meanwhile I could only say how glad I was that he had neither been shot by the Soviet Union nor blown to pieces by the IRA bomb that exploded in that same Grand Hotel in 1984, exactly two years after our first meeting.

An even more bizarre question came to mind. Was it really the KGB who had cancelled my visa? Or could it have been the British? Maybe MI6 had sent their agent Gordievsky to see me to test my reaction to his ideas. Then maybe MI6 asked him to arrange for the visa's cancellation, to avoid the chance of yet another cold war incident through anything provocative that I might do, or to protect their man from falling under suspicion through helping such an incurable anti-Soviet propagandist as myself? It was all a fine illustration, I wrote, of the dangers that beset any mere individual so rash as to venture into this 'wilderness of mirrors', the 'great game' between East and West. The only guiding principle I could detect was a need never to believe anything that seemed obvious at first glance, indeed to believe the opposite.

The British secret services held Gordievsky under wraps for nearly five years. As a writer, I was sorry about this. I was understandably keen to renew our acquaintanceship. Also I wanted to apologize for my rudeness to him when he came to tell me about my visa on 18 April 1983. However, MI5 and MI6 were anxious to protect his security. It was assumed that he was living 'in a safe house somewhere in the South of England', but it was one of the Government's most closely guarded secrets where exactly the house was. I sent him a letter through the Foreign Office asking him to contact me whenever he felt inclined.

For the first two or three years he saw no one outside a narrow

circle of trusted officials. He went several times to the United States, where he talked to the CIA and helped British prestige by the amount of information that he gave. The quality of the material was 'pure gold' and, from Britain's point of view, it mended much of the damage inflicted on the special relationship by the treachery of Philby and others during the first cold war.

He, if anyone, was the one most qualified and entitled to tell his story and profit from it. He met Christopher Andrew, a Cambridge specialist, and they embarked on a book together, an academic history of the KGB and its predecessors, enriched by Gordievsky's own background knowledge and personal experience. But he was still tormented by the separation from his family, with whom he had no contact at all for more than two years. And all this time he was under advice from his British 'minders' to say and do nothing about it. He says, 'From 1985 to 1990 the people from the Foreign Office and the "friends" insisted that their secret diplomacy, designed to get my family to the West, demanded my discretion. I was not sure about this tactic and some of the "friends" [i.e. MI6] actually believed that publicity was the only way forward.' Leila was all this time under intense pressure, including the threat of being prosecuted herself, even though she had never known anything of her husband's double life.

She says, 'They made up their minds to take it out on me and our two little girls ... I was in a state of shock after the death sentence in November 1985. That is why I agreed to divorce him. They told me, "Leila, you're not an idiot. He's a young man. Do you think he's spent all these months without a woman?" Then they said he was having an affair with an English secretary. Then they said that he had married her. I know that men fall out of love with their wives. It happens. But whatever he thought about me, I know that he would never abandon the girls. He worships them. I knew that he would be in touch, if only for their sake ... There was one thing that they wanted out of me those first two years. They wanted me to write to Oleg, "I will not join you in England." Then, when the British asked them to release us, they could say, "She does not want to go." But they never got those words out of me.'

In December 1987 Margaret Thatcher raised the matter with Gorbachev personally at Brize Norton air force base, near Oxford, where he stopped briefly on his way to sign a defence treaty with

Reagan. She chose the best moment she could, just after Gorbachev had recited a Russian folk song beside the Christmas tree, to ask whether Gordievsky could now be reunited with his family: 'He pursed his lips and said nothing. The answer was all too clear.'

That month, however, Leila did receive a long letter from her husband, after which she could tell that their marriage had a possible future, and from that time she did everything possible to join him. Again, it was something that the KGB could turn to their advantage. 'They came up with this strange proposal. "We will cancel the death sentence. The Soviet Union will pardon him. He can come back and join you and the girls in Moscow." I laughed at them. It was absurd. The KGB does not forgive a man for what Oleg did.'

The KGB saw it differently. Their press department announced in 1990: 'This compromise did not suit Gordievsky. Whether under pressure from his protectors or out of love for the "sweet life" he lives abroad, he turned it down. This means that he also turned down any possibility of being reunited with his family. So that is his affair.'

They were now allowed to talk on the telephone. But their separation caused great distress. All Leila's friends deserted her. They could not bear being always questioned by the KGB after every meeting with her. Her mail was intercepted and she was unemployable. How could she work, accompanied as she had to be by a constant escort of KGB men? Her telephone was only left connected, in Oleg's view, because her conversations gave them useful intelligence.

Any relationship with another man was impossible, even if she had wanted it. 'If I so much as sneeze in the apartment, the whole KGB know about it immediately,' she said. She reverted to her maiden name, the common Turkic surname 'Aliyeva'. The name 'Gordievsky' would not have helped Masha and Anyuta at school. She lived a lonely life and told the girls that their father was 'working abroad'. But they were growing up and it would not be long before someone told them the truth, in which case they would be deeply upset and probably victimized.

On 26 February 1990, Gordievsky finally surfaced with a series of articles in *The Times* and an appearance on television in obvious disguise, a wig and false beard. 'The KGB has an appropriate service to deal with defectors ... It is not nice to think that one's own death is being planned,' he said later.¹⁰ Asked why he had changed sides so

dramatically, he told *The Times*, 'Developments in the Soviet Union were so sad. It was impossible to save Russia from communism. It was lost, the beautiful old Russia, the beautiful eccentrics, the churches and sects, the variety of political parties, the fantastic art at the beginning of the century. It was all lost for ever.'

The KGB said, 'He did it because he wanted to earn money.' They also hint that he was blackmailed in Copenhagen over a sexual indiscretion and brought under British MI6 control. He analyses his motives differently. He did it, he told *The Times*, out of ethical conviction and in the hope that he could help at least to save *Western* civilization. His version is confirmed by a former CIA station chief in London, who told me, 'Until Gordievsky, I would have told you that there was no such thing as an ideological Soviet defector.'

Four months later he at last made contact and we agreed that, under strict supervision, he would come to my home for coffee. He would be without his wig and beard, so I was not allowed to photograph him. And so on 15 August 1990 we faced each other across the same glass table as we had in tenser times more than seven years earlier. We had been adversaries then, or so I thought, but now we were in the midst of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, allies in the fight against the KGB's remaining excesses. I was touched by his bravery and by the obvious suffering he endured through separation from his family. He gave me some extracts from my KGB file. They had me listed as 'a fierce anti-Soviet and anti-communist activist'. It was a description with which I could not quarrel. And he solved at last the mystery of my cancelled visa. It seems that I was wrong to have suspected any deep East-West conspiracy of 'the visa that never was'. It was nothing more than Soviet bureaucratic inefficiency.

When I applied in February 1983, he told me, the poor-quality embassy computer had not picked out my name, as a result of which visas had been issued, without distinction and in my case by mistake, to all those who had booked on the Thomson Tour. It was only when the lists of forthcoming tourists were sent to Moscow Centre, where the computers are better, that the error was detected and an order sent to London for my visa to be cancelled. Gordievsky remembers how Yuri Ivanov, one of the embassy's counter-intelligence officers, then working under cover in the consular department, came to him in

April 1983 'hiding his feelings of triumph' to tell him that the visa was cancelled.

Several interviews with Gordievsky had by now appeared in print, but his main revelations, he told me, were being kept for the publication of his book later that year. There was, however, one matter on which I might be able to help him. He knew that I had some experience and skill in causing public embarrassment to the Soviet authorities. Every violation of human rights, Andrey Sakharov had said, should be turned into a political problem for the violating government. Was I now prepared to use this technique to persuade the KGB to release his family?

He had come round to the view that secret diplomacy was not going to accomplish the aim: 'I decided to make the struggle for my family a public one. In 1990, and even more now, I came to the view that the policy of keeping me under wraps had been a great mistake. I am now very annoyed about the FO's misjudgement.'

There and then we cooked up the idea of my visiting Leila and the girls in Moscow. It was not going to be a simple task. True, the cold war was nearly over, but the KGB was still operating, albeit more gently than before, and one matter on which they felt strongly was the case of Oleg Gordievsky. Ever since mid 1985, Leila had been guarded night and day by KGB officers, a team of sixteen young men working shifts and equipped with every technical aid. They lurked outside the entrance to her apartment block on Davydkovskaya Street, on the outskirts of town, and followed her wherever she went, by car or on foot, with specific orders to prevent her from entering the British embassy or making contact with anyone from it. The plan used to extricate Oleg from the Soviet Union was not going to be allowed to work a second time.

In March 1990 a member of the embassy staff, Roderic Lyne, called on Leila with a message, a parcel of clothes and some money from her husband. He promised her regular help in the future. She was, after all, the wife of a naturalized British citizen, a person in distress and entitled to consular support. The Soviet authorities reacted with a furious aggression that was in no way in the spirit of perestroika. Recalling the British embassy's 'illegal behaviour' in spiriting Oleg out of Russia in July 1985, they ordered Lyne out of

the country and decreed that no British representative should contact her ever again.

Rodric Braithwaite, the ambassador, then faced long arguments with the Soviet foreign ministry. But he spent far more energy in trying to overturn the expulsion of Lyne than in insisting on the embassy's right to help Leila. Meanwhile he acquiesced in the KGB's edict, and all other parcels sent by Gordievsky to his wife remained undelivered. In short, the embassy made little of the problems of the destitute and persecuted wife of a British citizen, someone who had been subjected to considerable torment on Britain's behalf and to whom we all owed a debt of gratitude. Neither Lyne nor anyone from the embassy was ever permitted to get in touch with Leila in any way from March 1990 until after the August 1991 *coup d'état*. And in spite of Gordievsky's repeated entreaties, the parcels were never delivered and in the end they were returned to him.

Again and again Mikhail Gorbachev was appealing to the West to provide him with financial aid, to help him in his democratic reforms. It seemed nevertheless that in matters that closely touched the KGB's interest or self-esteem, such as the Gordievsky case, he was still in thrall to them and ready at their request to behave insultingly towards the British embassy. And Braithwaite's complaints to Chernyayev and Gorbachev's other senior aides produced no result.

Gorbachev was trying to survive by pleasing the West as well as the KGB. But, whenever it came to a conflict, he sided with the latter. He believed that he needed the support of the KGB head, Vladimir Kryuchkov, and that he could secure this support by doing the KGB favours. Richard Schifter, the US State Department's human rights chief, advised me that there was no hope of resolving the Gordievsky matter until the relationship between the President and the KGB fundamentally changed. Leila received no embassy support meanwhile and had nothing to live on but hand-outs from her father's pension.

My visit to her, it was hoped, would help turn the case from an espionage issue into a human rights issue, the clearest of all possible cases, a separation of a wife from a husband. And so I flew to Moscow on 29 September. Oleg had warned her by telephone to expect someone to call the following day, a Sunday, and I duly called her that morning from the Kosmos Hotel. So as not to give the KGB any pretext for suggesting that I was acting clandestinely, I at once told

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her my name and that I was a member of the European Parliament's human rights sub-committee. We agreed that I would come to her flat an hour later.

I assumed that the KGB would overhear our talk. They would then face a dilemma. Should they prevent us from meeting? Should they stop me entering the building? If they did, how were they to explain it to me? What should they do if I protested, or persisted? Should they be prepared, if necessary, to take me into custody? It was logical that they should, but they must have known that they would then face an ugly incident that would be made public and sound badly out of tune with Gorbachev's siren song of democratic reform.

Leila's 'boys', as she called them, the ones who hung about the entrance to her apartment block, were under orders to prevent any contact between her and any British official. Did this ban extend to MEPs and peers? The KGB had probably not taken the point into consideration and my Sunday morning call gave them little time in which to decide which was more important to the Soviet government, the appearance of glasnost at a time of economic difficulty or the need to keep Leila isolated from British contacts.

Glasnost prevailed. As I walked towards the front door, the 'boys' turned their backs and by the time I reached them they had lifted their car bonnet and dug their heads deep into its engine. I wished them good morning. They did not reply. 'They are frightened that I am going to photograph them,' I thought. I walked up the stairs, rang the bell, and the wife of 'the spy of the century' opened the door to me.

I handed her a letter from Oleg to prove my *bona fides*. She then gave me a spirited interview, which I had printed a week later in the form of an open letter to President Gorbachev: 'As far as I am concerned, Mr Gorbachev's reforms do not exist. I have done nothing against the Soviet Union. I have broken no law. But because of what my husband did in 1985, going over to the British side, I have for five years been treated like a criminal and am separated from the man I love.'

She talked about her round-the-clock surveillance. 'It must cost the Soviet government a fortune. So I protest. Not about the violation of my freedom, but as a taxpayer.' As for the KGB's offer to pardon her husband, her views were clear: 'Even if it's true, even if Gorbachev

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signs the pardon himself, what happens if Gorbachev dies and the head of the KGB takes his place? They would shoot him then and I would be the one who had lured him back here to be shot. I won't take such a sin upon my conscience.'

I finished my tea and we looked out of her living-room window. The 'boys' were no longer to be seen, although she assured me that they were still there, hiding in the trees. I left and my bewildered taxi driver took me back to the hotel. Two days later I called on her again and photographed her with the two girls, giving them each a polaroid as a souvenir. Masha hid hers, claiming that it did not make her look pretty.

After that first Sunday meeting, which the KGB had decided not to abort, I felt able to discuss the problem more openly with Russian friends and contacts. I told them that, whatever they might think about Gordievsky, who had undoubtedly committed a most serious crime under Soviet law, it was not in the spirit of the new East-West relationship for them to punish Leila and her daughters for what he had done. I pointed out that Britain had suffered more than enough through her secret agents defecting to the Soviet side. It was a catalogue of intelligence disasters - Philby, Burgess, Maclean, Blake, Blunt, Cairncross, Vassall, Prime and Bettaney. Each one had betrayed the most secret information and the first four had then succeeded in escaping to a privileged life in Moscow. Britain had been made to look amateurish and decadent. Our relations with the United States were seriously damaged.

I did not try to justify Gordievsky's decision to change sides. If I had, my Soviet colleagues' patriotic sentiment might have triumphed over their sense of common justice. I pointed out, though, that he had done what he did during the period of Brezhnev's 'stagnation', in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, at a time when dissidents were being arrested in Russia for non-violent political protest. He accepted that he had betrayed the Soviet system, but not that he had betrayed his country.

The British traitors, on the other hand, had rejected a democratic structure in favour of a false utopia, communism, which was supposed to be achieved by means of the brutal Stalinist system. Blake had betrayed agents in Germany. Philby had betrayed British agents sent into Latvia and Albania. The agents they betrayed had been executed

The KGB embassy officials betrayed by Gordievsky had merely been expelled from Britain. Gordievsky had given away the British KGB agent Michael Bettaney, who was sentenced to twenty-three years' imprisonment in 1984. He gave away a Norwegian KGB agent, Arne Treholt, who was sentenced to eighteen years in 1982. He gave away a Swedish KGB agent. That is all. Unlike Blake and Philby, he does not have blood on his hands.

But the main argument, I told Russian contacts, was that Britain had never punished the wives or families of these unmasked traitors. Blake's mother had visited Moscow many times, in spite of his boast of having denounced 600 British agents to the KGB, most of whom were executed. Burgess had had Christmas hampers mailed to him from Fortnum and Mason's London store - and a new Old Etonian tie every year. Maclean's wife Melinda had left Britain to join her husband in Moscow. Philby's son had visited his father in Moscow and sold photographs of him to the British press. Under English law, there was no way of preventing these people from going anywhere they wished to meet members of their families.

I put these arguments to Konstantin Lubchenko, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's legal committee. It was a sign of how far Gorbachev's reform programme had gone that he reacted to my request not with anger but with interest. He was prepared to look at the problem as a lawyer rather than as a Soviet apparatchik. And he accepted our petition, translated into Russian by Oleg, as a source of information and a guide to our side of the case.

I showed the same paper to the editor of Moscow's *New Times* and he printed it in his next issue, together with one of my polaroid pictures of Leila taken the previous day. Moscow's *Niezavisimaya (Independent)* newspaper also promised to help.

The evening before I left Moscow, a long letter from Leila to her husband burning a hole in my pocket, I was mysteriously telephoned in my hotel room by Oleg Kalugin, the former KGB officer who had 'defected internally', making a political career out of attacking his former bosses publicly. 'Meet me at the corner of Gorky Street and Revolution Square,' he said. 'Don't worry. I will recognize you.' He told me over coffee the Savoy Hotel, that the KGB would never let the family out. If they did, they would be giving up a most

would be seen as a sign of KGB weakness and would send these agents exactly the wrong type of signal. Gorbachev might be a reformer, but the KGB still had enough influence over him to protect what they saw as vital.

Gordievsky was likewise pessimistic after I came back to London and told him of the various meetings. He told the *Sunday Express*, '[The KGB's] members still represent the worst type of *homo sovieticus*, men with no compassion, no toleration. I can only see the KGB letting my family go as part of a package of agreements with Western intelligence.'

In spite of the glasnost of 1990, the Soviet embassy in London protested about my visit to the flat and Leila was summoned to the KGB office on Kuznetsky Most in Moscow for a 'chat' about it with her KGB case officer. 'They told me that Lord Bethell was a very bad man, a British spy, an enemy of our country, that I should never have received him, and they asked me if I realized what I was doing,' she says. 'My case officer was irritated at what he saw as my foolish and impertinent behaviour. I answered that it made no difference whether or not Lord Bethell was a spy, since I knew no secrets and so would not have been able to tell him anything.'

It was then reported¹¹ that all foreign contact with Leila had been forbidden. On 26 November, her last day as Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher wrote me a supportive letter, confirming that there was 'no justification' for the Soviet behaviour. It was one issue on which she and her 'nice Mr Gorbachev' seemed unable to agree. But still nothing was being achieved. All Britain seemed to be in love with Gorbachev and his government, but he still would not release Leila and her two little girls.

At the end of 1990 the British embassy in Moscow did not even send Leila a Christmas card. But at least the issue was now public and being highlighted as a British human rights issue. On 26 December *The Times* published my letter suggesting that it was 'pure Stalinism' to punish two small girls for a crime committed by their father. The Soviet government should not be allowed to get away with such behaviour, when 'their representatives come to London and ask for gifts of food, to be paid for by British taxpayers'.

More importantly, a debate on the issue had begun inside the

Soviet Union. On 31 January 1991, *Niezarivsimaya* wrote to the KGB's new 'public relations department' to ask for their comment. On 28 February they printed my article about the case beside Lubchenko's opinion, written as a reaction to the paper I had handed him the previous autumn. The Soviet tradition of holding hostage or punishing a traitor's family arose through the post-revolutionary fervour of the KGB's predecessor, the CHEKA, he wrote: 'This may be understandable from the moral point of view. The mark of shame, it is said, remains even to the third generation. But it has absolutely nothing in common with the rule of law.'

On 14 March *Niezarivsimaya* printed the KGB's reply. 'Crocodile tears have already been shed on this same subject by Nicholas Bethell, a staff member of British intelligence and now a Lord, born in 1938 in London,' they began. It was the same form of words that they had used in their article about me and Igor Rykov in *Izvestiya* in the worst cold war days of December 1984. They claimed that Oleg had 'abandoned' his family by turning for help to his English protectors, so great was his terror. He had joined the British side in the early 1970s, they pointed out. So where was his sense of responsibility towards his wife and the daughters he was about to have? He must have known that matters would come to a head eventually. He had, in effect, condemned his daughters in advance to being without their father. And what could one now say about the motives of those (like me) who were pushing these children into the embrace of their traitor-father? How would they react, when they grew up, to the idea of having a father who had done such a thing? 'Traitors should consider such issues before they do what they do.'

We were making no progress. It was very sad, I wrote,¹² to see the Soviet authorities reduced to using harsh and old-fashioned language at a time when relations with Britain were otherwise good. On 21 March Congressman Bob McEwen raised the case in the US House of Representatives, at my request, reading the *Sunday Express* article into the record and urging colleagues to contact Gorbachev about it. Many of them did, but nothing came of it.

On 18 July, during a brief visit by Gorbachev to London, Prime Minister John Major again raised the case, again without result, the Soviet lead merely emphasizing how difficult it was, since Leila and

Oleg were divorced.¹³ The whole story, I wrote that day (in the *Daily Telegraph*), was a throw-back to the bad old times when British students were not allowed to marry their Russian fiancées and Jewish refuseniks had to be bought out of the country with western money and technology. Oleg was 'the man perestroika forgot'.

On 19 August John Major wrote to me, 'We are not being timid in our handling of this case.' He would continue to 'take action of a specific kind', since the case was 'an indicator of the Soviet Union's willingness to turn away from past practices'.

That same day Gorbachev was deposed, leaving government in the hands of communist hard-liners. Whereas it was a serious situation for the entire world, it was now a hopeless one for Gordievsky and his family. His arch-enemy Vladimir Kryuchkov was the strong man of the *coup d'état*. Clearly he was poised ready to rebuild the KGB's power and to inflict it on the Soviet people, Leila and her daughters foremost among them.

And then it happened, their first piece of luck. Two days later the coup was overthrown. Kryuchkov was arrested and hard-line Minister of Interior Boris Pugo committed suicide. The liberal Vadim Bakatin became KGB chairman and one of his first acts in office, in response to an approach by the British ambassador, was to lift the travel ban on Leila and the girls. One moment the 'boys' were there outside her flat, as usual, as they had been for years. The next they had melted away, never to return, without even saying goodbye. It is thought that Ambassador Braithwaite cleverly judged his moment. Whatever he may have done or not done in the past, he played his cards very well in August 1991 and achieved the objective.

The whole atmosphere changed. Leila was now invited to the embassy, even to tea with John Major, who visited Moscow briefly to give President Yeltsin his support. She took a few days to collect her belongings and then suddenly, on 6 September, my heart lighter than usual, I was sitting in the Spelthorne suite at Heathrow Airport's Terminal 4, sipping champagne and waiting for Leila, Masha and Anyuta to arrive by British Airways.

A junior minister, Lord Caithness, and other officials shook her hand. My wife Bryony gave her flowers. I was the first to embrace her. 'Where are we?' Anyuta kept asking. I gave her flowers and we all drank champagne. Leila gave a short state...ent to the press, thanking

me and others who had helped her. And then she was driven away, with her two girls, to meet the husband she had not seen since his extraordinary disappearance from Moscow in July 1985.

Förre rikspolischefen Carl Persson:

TORSTEN NILSSON FUTTAR

Av DAVID LAGERCRANTZ

Slaben på UD sopade bort varje spår av beslutet.

Dåvarande utrikesministern Torsten Nilsson förnekar att beslutet över huvud taget togs.

Men han talar inte sanning.

För regeringen avböjde verkligen en utväxling mellan Raoul Wallenberg och spionen Stig Wennerström.

Nya bevis avslöjar utväxlingsaffären

Expressen har tagit del av bevis som styrker detta.

Det var klockan 10 den 15 mars 1966.

Där i gamla kanslihuset i Stockholm fanns Tage Erlander och utrikesminister Torsten Nilsson. Där fanns statsrådet

sammanträdde aldrig ägde rum.

En utväxling Wennerström — Wallenberg?

Nej, det hade ju varit sensationellt, säger Torsten Nilsson till Expressen.

Om vi utväxlar honom, skulle jag ha kommit

Otto Danielsson beskrev hur Sovjet tidigare arbetat för att få spioner utväxlade.

Mönstret, framhöll han, var nu detsamma.

Klassisk


utväxling

Liksom vid den klassiska utväxlingen mellan U2-piloten Gary Powers och KGB-översten Rudolf Abel i februari 1962, hade den verkliga uppdragsgåvaren inte trätt fram.

Liksom då, hade ryssarna nu inlett förhandlingarna med en politiskt obunden person i Östberlin.

Otto beskrev hur viktigt det var för ryssarna att få ut Wennerström. Stälv påminde jag om att Raoul Wallenberg för att Raoul Wallenberg hade berättat Carl Per-

DE SKULLE UTVÄXLAS



Svenska tackade nej till KGBs erbjudande



Expressen skrev den 6 februari om utväxlingen av Stig Wennerström mot Raoul Wallenberg.

Jonasson, kamradssekreterare Leif Belfrage och chefen för UD:s politiska avdelning Dick Hichens-Bergström.

Ingen av dem skrev, vad man vet, ned ett enda ord om mötet. Sanningen om det var tänkt att begravas med dem.

Skrev i hemlighet

Men runt bordet i kanslihuset den där vintern dagen satt också generalkonsuln Sven Backlund och Säpos spionchef Otto Danielsson.

Otto Danielsson skrev efteråt, i hemlighet, ned vad som sagts.

Backlund skrev ett par brev.

Deessa papper har i dag före detta rikspolischef Carl Persson tillgång till.

— Det är unika handlingar, säger han till Expressen.

— Det finns helt enkelt ingen annan dokumentation om mötet.

Martin Hallqvist, kansliråd på UD, har sökt igenom UD:s arkiv. Inte ett ord har han funnit om sammanträdet.

Torsten Nilsson, som i dag är enda överlevande statsråd från mötet, säger sig vara säker på att

"Oerförsiktigt"

Carl-Gustaf Svingel är Berlin-svensken som under namnet "källa K" avslöjat sitt möte 1965 med KGB om utväxlingen.

Carl Persson säger till Expressen att han inte begriper hur Torsten Nilsson vågar.

— Att ljuga så där, fortsätter han, måste vara oerhörd oförsiktligt.

Tack vare Otto Danielssons anteckningar vet vi i dag till och med hur mötet i mars 1966 började.

Det var kabinettssekreterare Leif Belfrage som inledde.

Han berättade hur svensk-lysken Carl-Gustaf Svingel träffat två högt uppsatta KGB-agenter i Östberlin, som sagt sig vara villiga att lämna ut Raoul Wallenberg till priset av spionen Stig Wennerström.

Han beskrev hur Svingel kontaktat generalkonsuln Backlund och hur Backlund inför regeringen gått i god för Svingel.

— Sedan var det Ottos tur, berättar Carl Persson.

Sedan ska Tage Erlanson ha talat. Han ska ha gett justitieminister Herman Kling om de juridiska förutsättningarna för att lämna ut Stig Wennerström.

— Enda sättet, sa Kling, är att benåda honom.

Enligt Carl Persson såg ingen på mötet något orimligt eller osannolikt i Sovjets förslag om en utväxling.

— Nej säger han. Men Otto och jag hade en oäck känsla av att Erlander och Nilsson redan före sammankomsten bestämt sig för att inte nappa på Sovjets krok.

Inget skulle arkiveras

— För plötsligt bestod man bara att inget för närvarande skulle göras. Inget skulle heller arkiveras.

En mycket upptrödd Otto Danielsson skrev efter mötet:

"Ingen ansvarig myndighet kan underlåta att göra allt vad som står i mänsklig makt för att få ut en människa som hållits oskyldigt fängslad i 21 år. Hur svar än uppgiften är måste förhandlingar inledas."

KGB BUGGADE JELETSIN

MOSKVA (TT-Expressen). Elektrisk avlyssningsapparat som tillhör KGB, Sovjetunionens underrättelsetjänst, upptäcktes i onsdags i två av rummen ovanför Boris Jeltsins kontor i det ryska parlamentet.

De två stängda rummen låstes i onsdags upp av en grupp ledamöter i sällskap med parlamentets säker-

hetstjänst.

Ledamoten Boris Njentsov sade att KGB berättat att just den här sortens buggning används för att avlyssna samtal och att dem tillhör KGB:s åttonde departement.

KGB säger sig inte veta varför utrustningen placerats i rummen enligt Njentsov.



Före utrikesministern Torsten Nilsson talar inte sanning om sin roll i utväxlingsaffären. Wennerström — Wallenberg. Dokument som förre rikspolischefen Carl Persson (tv) har, och som Expressen tagit del av, visar att regeringen verkligen diskuterade frågan. KGB hade föreslagit svensken Carl-Gustaf Svingel i Berlin (th) utväxlingen.

Man hade berättat i Norge om den 4-5 om Svingel - men det var inte sanning.



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (5)

1999-10-25

Andra ambassadsekreterare
Eva Tojzner Glückman

Delgivning från

enl adressering/samt

UMK

BMK/ *cl*

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För EC: (Lundvik)

Kopia: Amb Magnusson, Riga

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
<i>P</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>EUI</i>

● EC/Amb J Lundvik

991105

Delges

Lage Olson, ESEK

Guy von Dardel

● l Persson

Krister Wahlbäck, IAG

BRÅDSKANDE

Svar från RossArchiv avseende det sk Troféarkivet

(2 bil.)

Härmed översändes svaret från den ryska sidan på ambassadör Magnussons brev av den 16 juli 1999 avseende möjligheten för arbetsgruppen ~~att~~ ta del av innehållet i det sk Troféarkivet. Detta utgörs av material som under andra världskriget togs som krigsbyte från Tyskland och några av dess allierade av de sovjetiska trupperna och nu förvaras i ryska arkiv.

I sitt svar redogör RossArchiv för det material i RGVA:s och GARF:s samlingar, som man finner vara av intresse för arbetsgruppen, samt förklarar sig villigt att ställa detta till arbetsgruppens förfogande.

HIRDMAN

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MD

Относительно письма Сопредседателя Российско-Шведской
рабочей группы по делу Р.Валленберга Х.Магнуссона в МИД России

от 16 апреля 1999 года

Итого

В связи с поставленными в вышеуказанном письме вопросами Федеральной архивной службой России проведена работа, в ходе которой выяснилось следующее.

В фондах Российского государственного военного архива (РГВА) французского происхождения (в составе документов бывшего Особого архива) имеются документы, касающиеся деятельности и контактов Американского объединенного распорядительного комитета в Венгрии, а также о деятельности Центрального бюро Исполкома Всемирного еврейского конгресса, Постоянного представительства Палестинского еврейского агентства во Франции и Венгерского Комитета помощи евреям-беженцам.

В составе документов Германского оккупационного режима в Венгрии имеются донесения агентов СД о внутривнутриполитическом положении Венгрии, ежедневные обзоры событий, составленные VI Управлением РСХА, списки высших чинов СС и полиции в Венгрии (за 1944 г.), списки сотрудников германских представительств в Венгрии, донесения французского военного атташе в Венгрии о деятельности немецкой агентуры и гестапо.

Из списка лиц, указанного в запросе, в именном каталоге архива имеются сведения на Генриха Мюллера, Вальтера Шелленберга, Курта Андреаса Бехера, Манфреда Вайса, Адольфа Айхмана, Эриха Сики, Хуго Грелля, Фрица Гешке, Вайрауха, Герхарда Файне, Эрнста Кинаста, Карла Веркмайстера, Ноэля Филда, Ивера Ольсена, Иру Хиршман. Отсутствие установочных данных у части запрашиваемых лиц в запросе (указаны только фамилии) снизило результативность поиска.

РГВА не располагает сведениями о венгерском Движении сопротивления по спасению еврейского населения, военнопленных и национальных меньшинств, вывозе венгерских евреев в Швецию, а также алфавитным указателем/каталогом на 200000 личных дел из архива СС.

В хранящихся в Государственном архиве Российской Федерации (ГА РФ) документах имеются следующие сведения о Р.Валленберге:

1. Письмо В.М.Молотова от 31 марта 1956 г. в ЦК КПСС о представлении переведенных материалов по вопросу о Р.Валленберге, переданных ему министром внутренних дел Швеции Хедлундом 30 марта 1956 г.

2. Из дневника В.М.Молотова о приеме министра внутренних дел Швеции Хедлунда 3 апреля 1956 г.

3. Справка начальника первого спецотдела МВД СССР А.Сиротина от 12 апреля 1956 г. о проверке материалов на Р.Валленберга.

В результате тщательного изучения документов Тюремного отдела НКВД-МВД СССР, в том числе переписки по особо важным "нумерованным" заключенным, а также проверки учетных данных на эту категорию лиц сотрудниками Центрального архива МВД России в 1995 г. сведений о Р.Валленберге обнаружено не было.

Что касается указанного в запросе семейного архива Эстерхази, хранящегося в ГА РФ, то хронологические рамки этого фонда 1818-1893 гг.

Росархив России готов оказать содействие членам российско-шведской рабочей группы в ознакомлении с интересующими её документами и обеспечить необходимую консультативную помощь.

EMBASSY OF SWEDEN
Moscow

Non-official translation from Russian

Ruslan Kosynkin

October 21, 1999

981025

PROMEMORIA

Re: Letter of Mr. Hans Magnusson, Co-Chairman of the Swedish-Russian Working Group On the Fate of Raul Wallenberg, to MID of July 16, 1999

The Russian Federal Archive Service has studied the requests as to the above-named letter and made the following findings:

A number of documents, related to the activities and contacts of the US Joint Distribution Committee in Hungary, activities of the Central Bureau of the Executive Committee of the World Jewish Congress, activities of the Permanent Representative Office of the Palestinian Jewish Agency in France as well as the activities of the Hungarian Committee for Jewish Refugees have been found in the Russian State War Archive (RGVA) funds, originally taken from France (previously kept in the funds of the former Special Archive).

The documents of the German occupation regime in Hungary include reports of Abwehr agents on the internal situation in Hungary, daily reviews of the current events written by VI Department of RSHA, lists of the SS chief command and police in Hungary (1944), lists of the German official staff in Hungary, reports of the French Military Attaché in Hungary on the activities of the German intelligence and Gestapo.

The catalogue of the Archive contains information on the following persons of those listed in the letter:

Heinrich Muller, Walter Schellenberg, Kurt Andreas Becher, Manfred Weiss, Adolf Eichmann, Erich Sziki, Hugo Grell, Fritz Geschke, Wehrauch, Gerhard Feine, Ernst Krenast, Karl Werkmeister, Noel Field, Iver Olsen, Ira Hirschmann. As a portion of the required search data was missing (a number of persons were called only by their last names), the results of the search proved to be less complete than they could have been.

Neither data on the activities of the Hungarian Resistance Movement to rescue Jewish population, prisoners of war and national minorities; on transport of Hungarian Jews to Sweden nor any alphabet indexes/catalogues of the 200 000 personnel files from the SS Archive could be found in RGVA.

The State Archive of Russian Federation (GARF) contains the following documents related to R. Wallenberg:

1. V. M. Molotov's letter to CPSU Central Committee of March 31, 1956, presenting translated materials on Wallenberg's case, sent to Molotov by Swedish Minister of Interior Mr. Hedlund on March 30, 1956.

2. Information, found in Molotov's diary, on a reception of Swedish Minister of Interior Mr. Hedlund on April 3, 1956.

3. A written report by First Deputy Director of MVD's Special Department A. Sirotin of April 12, 1956, confirming that he had checked the materials related to R. Wallenberg.

The 1995 detailed search made by the staff of the MVD's Central Archive through the documents of NKVD-MVD Prison Department, including correspondence related to especially important numbered prisoners, as well as a search through registers, concerning this kind of prisoners, gave no results. No information related to R. Wallenberg was found.

As to the Family Archive of Eszterhasi, the documents, kept in GARF, date to 1818-1893.

The State Archive of Russian Federation is ready to present the actual documents to the members of the Swedish-Russian Working Group and give them any necessary consultations.

Uppsala, den
22 oktober 1998,

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
DNR 295610		
1998 -10- 26		
Avd. P	Gr 2	Wid Eu!

Käre Lage,

a. o. / L
(Härmed sänds
nytt PM med utskick
v. r. remiss) / L

Äntligen har jag lyckats färdigställa
min rapport från lunchen med Per Anger
den 14 augusti.

Jag hoppas att Du kan läsa igenom den
och kontrollera såväl det språkliga som
det innehållsmässiga, hejst före den
29 d.s., som är en torsdag.

Den 2 november flyttar Pressarkivet
till ny adress på Gamla Torget. Datorerna
och mycket annat skall flyttas.

Därför måste ev. sändes avfärdas
före den 29 oktober. Datorerna flyttas

Report from a luncheon with Per Anger in Stockholm.

At the occasion of Mrs. Vera Parnes' visit to Sweden in August 1998, the Foreign Office organized a luncheon on August 14 at the Modern Museum's restaurant. To this luncheon counsellor of embassy Lage Olson had also invited Vera Parnes' host and friend Mrs. Ebba Grönroos, former ambassador Per Anger, the ambassador of Canada William L. Clarke and the author of this report Torsten Hérnod.

Per Anger, who will be 85 on December 7, astonished us with his vitality and spiritual vigour. "It is important to keep fit, both physically and intellectually", he told me.

Ambassador Clarke asked Per Anger how the Swedish government acted immediately after the war in order to get Raoul Wallenberg back. "The Swedish attitude towards the Soviet Union was too benevolent up to the coup of Prague in February 1948", answered Per Anger. To Vera Parnes he said that several measures might have been taken to emphasize disapproval with the Soviet stance regarding Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, for instance to recall home the ambassador in Moscow and to break both diplomatic and commercial relations with the USSR. Also the credit of one billion Swedish crowns to Soviet industry in 1946 could have been annulled or postponed. This generous credit, intended to help both Soviet and Swedish industry, was much questioned and debated in the press. Finally the USSR only made use of 555 million Swedish crowns for buying Swedish goods. (Hägglöf, Ingemar, 1984).

Ambassador Clarke then asked if there were any possibilities of negotiating the release of Raoul Wallenberg at that time. With verve Per Anger told us about the exchange deal of 1946 in Switzerland. He said that the Swiss held a communist who had betrayed the USSR.

At the end of the war the Soviets captured (seized) many foreigners, among others diplomats, in order to use them in exchange for something. In his book "With Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest - memories of the war years in Hungary", Per Anger writes that the Swiss government traded with the Soviets the release of their chargé d'affaires in Budapest Harald Feller, and four other Swiss diplomats, against the extradition of six Russians held captive in Switzerland. Ambassador Anger assumes that the Swiss government would probably not have exchanged the Soviet citizens

Kotchetov and Novikov if circumstances were otherwise, but this was a case of buying "life for life".

Bernt Schiller writes that this bargain was the prize paid for establishing diplomatic relations between Switzerland and the USSR. He indicates that Max Meier of the Swiss legation in Budapest was released together with Feller. Fighterpilot Kotchetov and engineer Valimir Novikov were refused asylum by the Swiss Federal Assembly in January 1946. Novikov never saw his family again but was allowed to start a new life after eleven years in Siberia. The young pilot was probably executed. (Schiller, Bernt, 1991 and Anger, Per, 1981, 1995). A Dane, Hakon Dahl, imprisoned six years in the USSR, had been exchanged for a Soviet communist caught in Denmark. (Anger, Per, 1981, 1995).

In Sweden several cases of espionage were revealed involving personnel of the Soviet embassy. Vladimir Petrov and his wife Evdokia were stationed in Stockholm from 1943 to 1946. They were both employed by the Soviet intelligence service NKVD. In 1954 they defected to the West and chose to stay in Australia. Two chapters in their book "Empire of fear" are about their espionage activity in Sweden. (Petrov, Vladimir and Evdokia, 1956).

When Per Anger accompanied the minister of Foreign Affairs Östen Undén, as his secretary, to a meeting in Oslo at the end of 1950, he was asked about his opinion on the Wallenberg case. Per Anger considered that Sweden ought to speak a tougher language with the Soviets. Instead of expulsion why not detain a Soviet spy while awaiting an exchange for Raoul Wallenberg? Östen Undén's face became sombre when he heard this suggestion and he retorted "the Swedish government will not apply such a procedure." Influenced by his ambassador in Moscow Rolf Sohlman, foreign minister Undén was rather indulgent towards the Soviets. (Rydbeck, Olof, 1990 and Petri, Lennart, 1996). He did not suspect that his counterpart Andrei Vyshinski was lying when he stated in August 1947, that "we are certain that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union and his name is not familiar to us". (Marton, Kati, 1982). Per Anger was in charge of the Raoul Wallenberg dossier during 1948-1950 but was relieved of that responsibility upon his own request, and sent to Cairo in Egypt.

Ambassador Clarke then brought up the issue of when the West learned about the Holocaust. He spoke favourably of the Jewish Museum in Stockholm and of Aron Neuman, its founder and director.

The nazis confirmed at the Wannsee meeting in Berlin, January 20, 1942, their determination to exterminate all the Jews in Europe. Per Anger said that Sweden pursued a restrictive immigration policy in 1938 as it feared an influx of Jewish refugees. Sweden therefore accepted the German proposal to mark the passports of Jewish people with a big red "J". The Germans introduced this restriction in October 1938. Some historians claim that Sweden was directly responsible for its initiation through pressure on Germany. Other mean that Sweden passively made use of the German passport regulation and that Switzerland rather than Sweden was urging it. (Tydén, Mattias in Grynberg, Anne, 1997). I asked Per Anger about this on the telephone, October 10, 1998, and he answered that probably both Switzerland and Sweden wanted a system whereby they could discern a Jew from other Germans or refugees, arriving from nazioccupied territories. This is confirmed by historian Hans Lindberg in a dissertation; "owners of such passports who intended to travel to Sweden, should be asked to visit a Swedish consulate before departure and apply for a special permit, a so called border recommendation. If such was granted, the traveller must show it for Swedish passport officers. Owners of J-marked passports, who had no such border recommendations, would risk to be refused entry by the border control. That system would not hinder regular travellers and tourists but placed Jews who wanted to go to Sweden for a short stay or wanted to reside permanently in the country under supervision." (Lindberg, Hans, 1973).

Per Anger lauded a dissertation in history by Paul A. Levine published in Uppsala, Sweden in 1996. Levine, who has learned Swedish well, asserts that the Swedish commitment to help Jews became obvious (clear) when the deportations in Norway began in November 1942. In a rescue operation in October, 1943, 80.000 Danish Jews found refuge in Sweden. "Employing a method of obstruction conceptualized as 'bureaucratic resistance' Swedish diplomats in Stockholm, Oslo, Vichy, Berlin, Copenhagen and Budapest, often but not always, succeeded in saving Jewish lives", Paul Levine explains. (Levine, Paul A., 1996).

Per Anger also mentioned Steven Koblik's book "The stones cry out", which stresses the importance of the Auschwitz Protocols. These comprise the account of Rudolph Vrba (Walter Rosenberg) and Alfred Wetzler (Josef Lanik). The underground movement in Auschwitz helped them to escape in April 1944. Their duty was to inform the Western democracies about the slaughtering of the Jews in Auschwitz-Birkenau and warn them against the impending threat to Hungarian Jewry. (Levai,

Jenö (Eugene), 1989 and Lester, Elenore, 1982). Copies of this report were sent at the end of April to Geneva and Istanbul among other places. (Lester, Elenore, 1982).

The Swedish legation in Budapest forwarded the Auschwitz Protocols to Stockholm. Its horrifying contents reached king Gustav V in June 1944. The king of Sweden also received information about the Holocaust through Arvid Fredborg, the young correspondent of Svenska Dagbladet in Berlin, who published in September 1943 a best-seller entitled "Behind the steel wall". Arvid Fredborg was a keen observer and historian. He reported the execution of two million Jews and one million Poles by the hands of the nazis. (Koblik, Steven, 1988).

On June 30, 1944 king Gustav V sent a personal telegram to Miklos Horthy in which he pleaded with the regent for an end to "the harsh methods applied against the Jewish population of Hungary." In the name of humanity king Gustav V entreated Horthy to "take measures to save those who still remain to be saved of the unfortunate people." (Wallenberg, Raoul, 1995).

Protests from the king of Sweden, christian churches, the international Red Cross, the United States and Great Britain determined Horthy to halt the deportations on July 18. (Thulstrup, Åke, 1949). Ambassador Per Anger said that Raoul Wallenberg considered his mission as fulfilled when the deportations ended. He arrived to Budapest on the ninth of July, 1944 and prepared himself to return home at the end of August. At that time the regent Horthy discharged Döme Sztójay as the prime minister imposed on him by the nazis in March and replaced him with general Geza Lakatos. Simultaneously Rumania capitulated to the Red Army and declared war to Germany. Admiral Horthy hoped to be able to stop the Soviets till the western allies could occupy Hungary. (Anger, Per, 1981 & 1995).

Everything changed for the worse when the Arrow Cross seized power on October 15. The regent Horthy was forced to resign and elect the Arrow Cross leader Ferenc Szálasi as new premier. Horthy and his family were interned in a Bavarian castle. His son Miklos Jr. was deported to Mauthausen and later to Dachau, where he was liberated at the end of the war by American troops. (Lester, Elenore, 1982). A wave of terror and persecution began.

If we return to the Auschwitz Protocols they form an essential part of the dispatches from Hungary by Per Anger and ambassador Ivan Danielsson, gathered in a book

published in 1997, "Räddningen. - De svenska hjälpinsatserna i Budapest 1944. Rapportur ur UD:s arkiv." (The rescue. - Swedish relief actions in Budapest 1944. Reports from the archives of the Foreign Office.)

The Auschwitz Protocols were handed over by the Jewish Council in Budapest to Valdemar Langlet, representative of the Swedish Red Cross. He in turn gave these protocols to the Swedish legation who sent them to Stockholm. They contain :

1) A report on the arrest and deportation of the Hungarian Jews written by the Jewish Council in Budapest. 2) A detailed account by two Slovak Jews, Rudolph Vrba and Alfred Wetzler of their two-year experience in Auschwitz-Birkenau. 3) A summary of the protocols by the Jewish Council. 4) A narrative of a woman who escaped from Auschwitz on May 20, 1944.

The Auschwitz Protocols opened the eyes of many. George Mandel-Mantello, consul of El Salvador in Bern, Switzerland wrote a condensation of it to the press. (Kranzler, David, 1989). The consul Mandel-Mantello cooperated with Raoul Wallenberg and asked him to issue protective passports from El Salvador which were eventually authorized by the consulate in Bern. (Derogy, Jacques, 1980 and Lester, Elenore 1982).

As a further answer to ambassador Clarke's second question Per Anger referred to a book published in 1997 by Ingvar Svanberg and Mattias Tydén about Sweden and the Holocaust. (Svanberg, Ingvar 1997). One of their findings is that the largest daily newspapers and also local press in Sweden gave accurate accounts, from September 1942 and onwards, about the deportations and massmurders. (Sennevall, Sven, 1997-09-22). The readers' attention were caught by fat headlines in the newspaper and on the placards. The British press provided the material and often cited was the well-informed Manchester Guardian. In the United States these awesome reports frequently ended up at the bottom or in the middle of the foreign news pages. (Lipstadt, Deborah E., 1986). On the other hand Swedish press was sometimes censored by the government in compliance with German demands.

Per Anger also remembered the five hour long conversation between Swedish diplomat Göran von Otter and the SS-officer Kurt Gerstein on the Warsaw-Berlin train. Kurt Gerstein had witnessed the atrocities at the Belzec camp, near Lublin and was very repentant. Göran von Otter had been in Poland to interview Swedish industrialists who acted as messengers between the Polish underground movement and the Polish embassy in Stockholm. Upon his arrival in Berlin on August 23, 1942

baron von Otter verbally transmitted, at the request of Gerstein, the essential of their conversation to Erik von Post who was acting as deputy to ambassador Arvid Richert at the Berlin legation. (Koblik, Steven, 1988).

William L. Clarke said that Per Anger ought to write his memoirs. "I am trying to do that", answered Per Anger, who was Swedish consul general in San Francisco 1961-66, ambassador to Australia in Canberra 1970-1975 and to Canada in Ottawa 1976-1979.

Ambassador Anger then explained to Vera Parnes that without the Swedish legation behind him, Raoul Wallenberg would not have been so successful. He cited from his foreword in "Räddningen" (Swedish relief actions in Budapest 1944. Dispatches...); "the merit of having saved such a great number of Jews - the figure 100.000 is often mentioned - is above all Raoul Wallenberg's ... But he would not have achieved this result without the help from of the Swedish legation who provided the base for the entire operation and in which other Swedes participated as well."

I asked Per Anger about the formal role of attaché Lars G:son Berg, head of the B-section. Ambassador Anger said that Sweden had an assignment as protective power for some countries in Hungary, for instance the USSR, and the B-section handled affairs concerning relations to other powers. According to a memorandum by Raoul Wallenberg, written in Budapest on August 15, a special subsection within the B-section was organized for securing the release of detained persons. Wallenberg wrote that "the B-section was also organized more practically in other respects regarding the protective and the provisional passports." (Wallenberg, Raoul, 1995).

Per Anger said that Wallenberg had a section of his own. It was called the C-section (Sjöquist, Eric, 1974). So did the Swedish Red Cross headed by Valdemar Langlet, a seventy-year old historian who knew both Russia and Hungary from travels in his youth on horseback. Valdemar Langlet and his Russian-born wife Nina issued a great number of protective passports already in May 1944. Their passports were similar to the refugee passports of Fritiof Nansen. The Langlet couple each wrote a book about their wartime experience in Budapest. (Langlet, Valdemar, 1946 & Langlet, Nina, 1982). The different activities of the Swedes were co-ordinated by Per Anger. (Koblik, Steven, 1988). Per Anger, who was then secretary of legation, and his superior Ivan Danielsson had the difficult task of negotiating with successive Hungarian governments. Per Anger said that ambassador Danielsson's plea for more

personnel coincided with the U.S. wish to send a man from a neutral country to Budapest. Raoul Wallenberg was chosen for that important assignment.

Referring to the tragic fate of the Jews in Hungary and elsewhere in Europe, Per Anger said that "too little was done too late. The United States could have acted earlier". I objected, that the American Jews reacted quite early. In a book by professor Henry L. Feingold we are informed that "public agitation culminated in a massive rally in Madison Square Garden (New York) on March 1, 1943, under the exhortation 'Stop Hitler Now!'" The rally was sponsored by important groups and was the largest of its kind in the United States. It produced a 12-point resolution and suggested different steps of action. Two of the points referred to neutral nations who were expected to negotiate with Germany and her satellites (point 1) and to organize the freeing of the victims (point 10). By declaring that "an appropriate 'intergovernmental agency' should be established with sufficient authority to implement the rescue program" (point 9), the creation of the War Refugee Board (WRB) in January 1944, was anticipated. (Feingold, Henry L., 1970). Its agent in Stockholm Iver Olsen, approached Raoul Wallenberg in June 1944 (Derogy, Jacques, 1980).

Henry Morgenthau Jr., secretary of the Treasury, influenced president Franklin D. Roosevelt to give priority to the severe plight of European Jewry. The president's executive order, whereby the WRB was established, set a new tone to rescue pronouncements. (Feingold, Henry L., 1970). The State Department had hitherto delayed and sometimes even suppressed information about the Holocaust and different rescue attempts. (Morse, Arthur D., 1967-68 & Feingold, Henry, 1970 & Wyman, David, 1984 & Koblik, Steven, 1988).

"Especially at the end of the war", Per Anger said, "the Germans were for different reasons, anxious not to disturb diplomatic relations with neutral Sweden. They were indulgent to the rescue activities of the Swedes." In this context ambassador Anger mentioned the negotiations of Adolf Eichmann with Joel Brand, representative of Vaada, the Jewish rescue committee in Budapest. Eichmann offered him a deal; the exchange of one million Jews for 10,000 trucks to be used on the Eastern front. Brand was sent to Turkey but the British arrested him in Syria. He was then taken to Cairo. The German offer was considered as "monstrous" by the Times of July 20, 1944. (Weissberg, Alexander Cybulski, 1958).

Swedish historian Bernt Schiller affirms that the offer to Joel Brand was only a pretext for the German ambition to get in touch with the allies. The head of the SS Heinrich Himmler tried desperately to obtain a separate peace with the allied powers in order to make an all-out attempt on the Eastern front. (Schiller, Bernt, 1991).

Ambassador Clarke then skimmed through the book "Räddningen" (Swedish relief actions in Budapest 1944. Dispatches...). His attention was caught by an image illustrating the Swedish legation. "The building is situated above the Gellert hotel", said ambassador Anger. In 1988 he inaugurated an embossed plaque there of Ivan Danielsson, Raoul Wallenberg and himself. The present Swedish embassy is located near a huge park on the Pest-side of the Hungarian capital.

Before ambassador Clarke had to leave Per Anger expressed his grateful thanks to Vera Parnes for all she has done for Raoul Wallenberg, in Moscow and in Montreal.

In April 1948 a statue to the memory of Raoul Wallenberg was supposed to be unveiled in Budapest's St. Stephen park. The sculptor Pal Pátzay had depicted St. George slaying the dragon as a symbol of Wallenberg's struggle against the fascist beast. The statue which bore Wallenberg's profile on its base was removed overnight by Soviet soldiers. Some years later it turned up, without the inscription of gratitude to Raoul Wallenberg, in front of a pharmaceutical factory in Debrecen. Per Anger said that the plant considers the statue as a symbol of man's fight against diseases and will not return it to the city of Budapest. (Marton, Kati, 1982 & Lester, Elenore, 1982. These books have an illustration of Pal Pátzay's monument.). An imposing statue of Raoul Wallenberg by sculptor Imre Varga was unveiled in Budapest in May 1987. (Thor, Clas, 1992).

The man who organized the luncheon at Skeppsholmen, where the Modern museum is, was Lage Olson, counsellor of embassy at the Swedish Foreign Office. He conversed with Mrs Ebba Grönroos, who is committed to the Wallenberg case since many years. They talked about the forthcoming white book being prepared by the Foreign Office and also about the publication on CD-Rom of the remaining documents on Raoul Wallenberg, from 1970 until today.

They discussed about the diaries of Madame Kollontay who was Soviet ambassador to Sweden 1930-1945. Alexandra Kollontay asked her friend and doctor Ada Nilsson to take care of her private papers "in case she would be victim of an accident." (Lindahl, Ingemar, 1987). Ada Nilsson lived in Göteborg and passed away

in 1966. She published her memoirs in 1963. Ada Nilsson's intention was to write a biography of Alexandra Kollontay, who therefore entrusted her with personal letters, notes and diaries up till 1947. Madame Kollontay expressed a wish that all this material should be delivered to the Marx-Engels Institut in Moscow, ten years after her death. If the USSR found it appropriate the material could be published, Madame Kollontay wrote from Stockholm to her doctor Ada Nilsson on 4th of July, 1937. (Nilsson, Ada, 1963).

In February 1945 Madame Kollontay invited for tea Mrs. Ingrid Günther, wife of the Swedish Foreign Minister. She told Mrs. Günther not to worry since "Raoul Wallenberg was in Russian hands, safe and sound." Two weeks later she gave the same reassuring message to Raoul Wallenberg's mother Maj von Dardel. (Marton, Kati, 1982 & Derogy, Jacques, 1980). Speaking frankly to Ada Nilsson, Madame Kollontay said that she wanted to imbue Mrs. Maj von Dardel with some hope concerning her son, out of compassion for her; "and on the whole Moscow cannot even locate its own troops in the chaos of Budapest." (Nilsson, Ada, 1963). Elenore Lester claims that Madame Kollontay also said to Ingrid Günther that it would be best not to make a disturbance about the matter. Wallenberg was being held because he had done some "dumb" things in Budapest. (Lester, Elenore, 1982.).

In the spring of 1945 Madame Kollontay was called back to Moscow. She never recovered from a severe illness in 1942 and resigned from her duties as ambassador to Sweden. During the eight remaining years of her life Madame Kollontay drafted her personal reminiscences and wrote many letters to her friends. Ada Nilsson received 230 messages - letters, postal cards or telegrams - from Alexandra Kollontay 1945-1953. (Nilsson, Ada, 1963).

Lage Olsson asserts that Raoul Wallenberg left Budapest in November 1944 for Berlin and then Stockholm. There are indications that he met with Marcus Wallenberg, his father's cousin and with Madame Kollontay in Stockholm at that time. Marcus Wallenberg maintained this in a speech in January 1981, at the Raoul Wallenberg Hearing in Stockholm. (Sjöquist, Eric, 1981 & Sjöquist, Eric, 1996-05-11). Mrs Ebba Grönroos will try to find out if there is any correspondence between Alexandra Kollontay and Ada Nilsson deposited somewhere in Göteborg.

The white book of the Foreign Office will probably not be published until a report by the Swedish-Russian commission is available. This commission has examined one hundred personal files (dossiers). 10.000 prisoner cards have been investigated in the

Vladimir prison. These cards have been computerized and its valuable information scanned. Patient's cards at mental hospitals were scrutinized. Professor Marvin Makinen and Susanne Berger were helpful with the patient's register.

I further learned from Lage Olson on August 19, 1998 that the German so-called Roff-archive, which the USSR got as war booty, contains among other things documents on the Berlin-Budapest relations during the Second world war. Historian Susan Mesinai has devoted herself to this task. She takes an active part in the Arc project whereby forgotten American citizens, held in custody for more than 40 years, have been located and eventually freed. Guy von Dardel, Raoul Wallenberg's half-brother heard about Susan Mesinai's successful work and employed her. Personal files are examined. A full report to the commission is expected to be completed in January 1999. The Swedish-Russian commission began its job in 1991.

Vera Parnes gave an envelope to the participants at the luncheon containing several issues of the Wallenberg Bulletin, from its start in 1992. Per Anger expressed his gratitude for this. He recognized Mrs. Agnes Adachi on a picture. (Fall number of 1996). She worked at the Swedish legation in Budapest in 1944 and is the author of "Child of the winds". (Adachi, Agnes, 1989).

For those who wish to read about Per Anger's life, Mrs. Elizabeth R. Skoglund has written a biography of him, "A quiet courage : Per Anger - Wallenberg's co-liberator of Hungarian Jews". (Skoglund, Elizabeth R., 1997). Mrs. Skoglund listened to a lecture by Per Anger at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles and was deeply affected by it. She decided to write his biography. Her earlier writings have been about religion.

Per Anger said to Vera Parnes that John W. Pehle's letter of appreciation to Wallenberg, dated December 6, 1944, never reached him. John Pehle was the first executive director of the War Refugee Board. He thanked Raoul Wallenberg on behalf of the WRB for his splendid co-operation "and for the vigor and ingenuity which you brought to our common humanitarian undertaking".

Ebba Grönroos had brought with her a copy of Reader's Digest in which Per Anger contributed with an article about his friend Raoul Wallenberg. Its author said that he was amazed about the great number of languages into which his article was translated, even Chinese. The article appeared in *Det Båsta*, in March 1981.

Some pictures were taken outside the Modern museum. We then strolled by the ship "Af Chapman", which has been turned into a youth hostel, and over a narrow bridge to the National museum and Grand Hotel. The Royal Castle was partly hidden by tents pertaining to the ongoing and much frequented Water festival. A little train on wheels was carrying tourists for a sight-seeing of Stockholm. We bade farewell to Per Anger and Lage Olson.

Shortly afterwards Vera Parnes, Ebba Grönroos and I had a glass of orange juice at an outdoor cafeteria in Kungsträdgården. I evoked Nanna Svartz' meeting with professor Aleksandr Myasnikov at a conference in Moscow, in January 1961. Vera Parnes assumed that Nikita Chruschev rebuked him for having talked about Raoul Wallenberg with professor Svartz. From a long-standing colleague to professor Myasnikov Vera Parnes learned that the professor never mentioned anything about Raoul Wallenberg to him. Mrs. Parnes finds it strange that such a vigorous and rather healthy person as professor Myasnikov died so unexpectedly, four months after his last encounter with Nanna Svartz in July 1965. (Derogy, Jacques, 1980).

In a recent book by Kenne Fant, professor Nanna Svartz is quoted as saying; "he (Myasnikov) must have been some 60 years old and never appeared to me as being in poor health. I must confess, that I have wondered if his death was a natural one." Ambassador Gunnar Jarring reported to Prime minister Tage Erlander that "the tribute to Myasnikov is exceptional. The Moscow list of those who have signed his obituary is impressive." (Fant, Kenne, 1997).

I told Mrs. Vera Parnes about a study circle in Uppsala concerning Raoul Wallenberg. It lasted for ten years, 1984-1993, and functioned much as a debating society. The five-ten participants studied material - books, articles and documents - on Raoul Wallenberg and on special occasions listened to an invited speaker. It was a very rewarding activity. I made the acquaintance of a man born in Italy, but of Hungarian extraction, Francesco Wittorio Kovacs, who lives in Uppsala with his family. As he took part in a debate after a lecture in 1984, he evoked emotionally his painful nine years of imprisonment in the Soviet Gulag. He was captured when he was sixteen and worked for the Hungarian resistance. Still in 1984 he felt uneasy about disclosing his experiences in the Soviet camps. Francesco Kovacs was a valuable and appreciated participant in the study circle. Today he visits schools in different parts of Sweden and lectures on his unique experiences in the USSR and on the dangers of nazism and communism.

Mrs. Vera Parnes acknowledged that also she was afraid during the years of terror, that the Soviet police might knock on her door in Moscow. Thanks to Francesco Kovacs the study circle wrote a letter in Russian to the rabbi of Moscow Adolf Schayevic, in November 1992. We asked for help to get in contact with Dmitri Kopylanski who, according to Nicholas Bethell, had interrogated Raoul Wallenberg on July 16, 1946 in the Lefortovo prison in Moscow. (Bethell, Nicholas, 1992). The rabbi never sent us a reply. Vera Parnes explained why; rabbi Schayevic was probably a member of the KGB.

During the long years of terror the synagogues in the USSR were not considered as safe havens. It occurred that people who revealed too much during confessions were later denounced by the Jewish priesthood. Hence Jews were careful not to confess in the synagogues.

Vera Parnes said that Andrei Sacharov was a very brave man. She knows his wife Jelena Bonner. Sacharov took risks while collecting signatures for the benefit of unjustly imprisoned persons.

I told Vera Parnes and Ebba Grönroos that dissidents Aleksandr Ginzburg, Jurij Belov and Chronid Lubarsky visited Uppsala in the 1980's. Mrs. Parnes knew about the late mr. Lubarsky, who for a number of years edited a pamphlet from Munich called *USSR News in Brief*. It rendered into English the actual situation of dissidents in the Soviet Union.

I thanked Ebba Grönroos and Vera Parnes and followed them to the Central Station where they took a commuter train to Södertälje.

A monument created by the Hungarian-born artist Gustav Kreitz in honor of Raoul Wallenberg will be unveiled at the United Nations in New York this autumn, in the presence of its secretary-general Kofi Annan and his wife. It will be situated at the Raoul Wallenberg Walk, near 47th street and First Avenue. Another monument to the memory of Raoul Wallenberg will be erected in Buenos Aires in November 1998. It is said to be a replica of the British sculpture made by Philip Jackson.

In Sweden two sculptures memorializing Raoul Wallenberg will be erected. Lidingö, adjacent to Stockholm, will likely be the site of Willy Gordon's statue, since Raoul Wallenberg was born there. Two Raoul Wallenberg associations in Chicago have shown interest in Willy Gordon's piece of art. Four sculptors from abroad and two

from Sweden will compete for the honor of making a tribute to Raoul Wallenberg, which in due course will be placed at Nybroplan, within walking distance of the synagogue in Stockholm.

Uppsala, Sweden
in October 1998.

/ Torsten H è r n o d.
Author of an annotated
bibliography on Raoul
Wallenberg..

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Datum
1998-10-23

Diariennr
61-3324-98

Byrån för enskilda arkiv
L Ånimmer

Utrikesdepartementet
EI/ESEK
Lage Olson
103 39 STOCKHOLM

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DN	296/003
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Delges:

Magnusson, Riga

Olsson (Washington) p.t. Stockholm

Olsson, EI-ESEK

Ambr. Florsheim

Olsson, A-ARK

1998-10-28

Ang. en delegat för Svenska Röda Korset vid namn Wallberg eller Wollberg

Vi har sökt i Svenska Röda Korsets arkiv efter en person med namnet Wallberg eller Wollberg, som skall ha stått i Röda Korsets tjänst någonstans i östra Europa kring år 1945, men dessvärre utan resultat. I korrespondensen mellan Röda Korsets Överstyrelse i Stockholm och personalen ute på fältet påträffas många namn som t.ex. Sven Hellqvist, Ulf Nordwall, Sven Frykman (Polen), Bertil Ekeröth, Curt Hullström m.fl. (Tjeckoslovakien), samt i Ungern de säkert välbekanta namnen Valdemar Langlet och Asta Nilsson, men inget som ens tillnärmelsevis påminner om Wallberg eller Wollberg.

Att ur arkivet utläsa vilka svenskar som varit internationella Röda Kors-delegater visade sig vara svårt. Eventuellt kan dessa uppgifter lättare finnas att tillgå i huvudorganisationens arkiv i Genève. Adress:

Comité international de la Croix-Rouge

Division des archives

Georges Willemin

19, avenue de la Paix

CH-1202 Genève

fax: (022) 733 20 57

e-post: archives.gva@icrc.org

I undersökningen har följande arkivvolym ingått: Svenska Röda Korset I, Överstyrelsen, C I a: 27-28, C II a: 27-28, F I a: 171, 180, 183, 218-219, 252-253.

Med vänlig hälsning,

Lena Ånimmer

Lena Ånimmer

1998-10-27

300/011

P2 En1

EI-ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08-405 3280

Delges:

Ulrika Haggård, P-P

Gun Nilsson, PLAN-BUD

Hans Magnusson, Riga

Exp. 98-10-28 / K

Preliminär budget för arbetsgruppen i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet år 1999

1. Möte med den svenska delen av arbetsgruppen i Stockholm 60 000 kr
den 8 januari 1999 (5 - 6 tjänsteresor).
2. Arvode till experten Susan Mesinai i högst sex månader 144 000 kr
(6 x 3 000 USD = ca 6 x 24 000 kr = 144 000 kr).
3. Beräknat arvode till experten Susanne Berger i högst två 48 000 kr
månader (2 x 3 000 USD = ca 2 x 24 000 kr = 48 000 kr).
4. Möte i RW-arbetsgruppen (5 - 6 tjänsteresor) i Moskva. 75 000 kr
5. Tryckning av vitbok på svenska (2 000 ex.), engelska 125 000 kr
(2 000 ex.) och ryska (1 000 ex.).
6. Fem - sex tjänsteresor till Moskva för experter. 80 000 kr
7. Avslutande möte i RW-arbetsgruppen i Stockholm (åtta - 110 000 kr
tio tjänsteresor).
8. Vissa lokala kostnader, i första hand i Moskva, jämte 83 000 kr
reserv.
- SUMMA 725 000 kr

300/004
1998-10-28

P 2 Eu'

October 27, 1998

FACSIMILE TO: Lage Olson, Foreign Ministry of Sweden 011-468-723-1176

FROM: Susan Mesinai in New York 1-212-645-7495

Dear Lage:

I spoke to Anders Wallberg on Monday. He had heard from the Russian side regarding my report, essentially it seemed querying how serious the Government of Sweden was in regard to my requests, and when I was coming — i.e., how much time they had to prepare. I answered that I will come in any case and continue with my other reports on the list, but will be available to answer any questions they might have regarding my numerous requests — including the Medical. My essential request was that they take this very seriously so that we can finish the work and close it down. I mentioned also that while there can be other questions, those addressed in this report are the most critical and therefore we could cut through a lot of effort if answers to those in the 30 pages were forthcoming.

I have also heard from Guy who spent about ten days studying the version of the Report which I sent him since it had been too long to keep him in the dark. I cannot give an exact word to describe the impression I got from him — it was beyond pleased, and beyond impressed. Or rather it was more solid and serious than that. His essential concern was to know that I would be continuing along these lines until the end and I assured him that we — the Government of Sweden and I, as we all discussed in my visit to Stockholm — had every intention and that I would be going full strength until June 30th. I told Anders this also, should it prove valuable in communications with the Russian side. Certainly for Guy to feel that everything that could be done has been done will be of great value to the final effort.

I have booked my flight back to Moscow through British Air, planning to depart here on the 5th of November and to arrive in Moscow on the 11th. (The interim days will be spent in the PRO indexing declassification requests to be submitted by your office to the British Government.) I will remain in Moscow until the 20th of December with a possible short flight to and from Stockholm with Johann Oberg on the 10th of December.

The day before yesterday I faxed to Lotte, bookkeeper at the Embassy in Moscow, my remaining receipts covering my basic expenses for the Washington trip, which was quite fruitful, and a long fax to Guy which was in essence the next to the last version of the Preliminary Report. Unfortunately the latter was doubly expensive because the computer center charged for the time as well as the number of pages. I also faxed to Hans Magnusson a report on my findings in Washington.

In all, I left Lotte with about \$1,100 in receipts (possibly more) out of the \$1,500 she advanced me for the month of September when I left Moscow on September 13th. I also gave her receipts for the money advanced for my air fare London-Stockholm for our meeting at the Foreign Ministry and to meet with Ambassador Ostrom. I sent her in the first week or so of October

Fax file

GK New York

98-10-28

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more receipts, \$924 USD plus about \$300 in UK Sterling and around 1400 in Swedish kronor. And now I sent your receipts for around \$1200

I mention all this because it would be of great help to me if I could be re-advanced the \$2,000 for my air ticket, visa and travel insurance through the Swedish Consulate in New York prior to my departure -- cash which was applied to hotels in Stockholm, interim transportation expenses, the Washington trip and in between communications. Between the monies above, the taxes removed and the need to buy the ticket I will otherwise be right on the line upon departure and as we all know it is very difficult to get monies from Moscow into my account. On the positive side, I should only be due half a month's expense money upon arriving in Moscow. Also, I continue to pay my researcher in Washington to work in the National Archives, somewhere between \$600 and \$1,000 a month, not at the expense of the Government of Sweden. Given my recent findings, this should be most helpful to our mutual efforts.

I also have asked Hans Magnusson and am asking you if it would be possible to advance Susanne Berger \$500 for her to obtain an affidavit from a very important witness -- not the one we discussed in Stockholm. This testimony is extremely important to the next report on Camps and Disappearance, as to the whole death/disappearance issue. She could pick up this money in Stockholm and use it to take care of the matter once she returns to Hanover. This refers to a prisoner on my list, for which to date there is NO TESTIMONY in the Swedish files or in the press. You could take it out of my research budget if need be as it is very critical.

Please would you let me know if the above two requests, for myself and for Susanne, are agreeable to you -- and how I should proceed -- in case an alternative method is recommended or more time needed. (That is, I could transmit the money from London if need be, but would prefer New York because they know me and the procedures are not strange to them..

Thank you very much. Looking forward to hearing from you.

Best,

Susan
Susan



SVERIGES GENERALKONSULAT
NEW YORK
Informationsavdelningen (SIS)

TELEFAX

1998-10-28

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Antal sidor: 2 (inkl denna)

TILL: Svenska massmedierepresentanter
FAXNR:
FRÅN: Sveriges generalkonsulat i New York
RE: Invigning av Raoul Wallenberg-monument

PRESS RELEASE

Wallenberg-monumentet invigs 9 november

Raoul Wallenbergs insats för att rädda tusentals judar undan nazisterna kommer inom kort att hedras med en av New Yorks största skulpturer på en hedersplats på Raoul Wallenberg Walk utanför FN-högkvarteret. Den svenske konstnären Gustav Kraitz har just inlett arbetet för att med hjälp av lyftkranar få upp skulpturen "Hope" som bl.a. består av fem stenpelare på tillsammans närmare 180 ton inför invigningen den 9 november.

Invigningen sker i närvaro av kronprinsessan Victoria, som för närvarande studerar i USA, samt representanter för Wallenbergs familj; halvsystemen Nina Lagergren, halvbrodern Guy von Dardel samt systerdottern Nane Annan, maka till FN:s generalsekreterare Kofi Annan. En av talarna vid invigningsceremonin blir FN:s fredspristagare, författaren Elie Wiesel.

Skulpturen är en donation av svensken Marcus Storch och hans syskon i fadern Hillel Storchs namn -- fadern kunde liksom Wallenberg rädda förföljda judar undan nazisternas koncentrationsläger.

Skulpturen är byggd på ett fundament av gatstenar från Budapests forna ghetto och är en gåva från staden Budapest. Ett blått keramikklot på toppen

o, a- / Ho

Delges:

von Dardel

Carl Persson

Magnusson, Riga

Olson, El-ESEN

Amb Moskva

Amb Budapest

RW-Foreningen

19-98-10-28

Ho

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av den högsta stenpelaren på ca 7 meter symboliserar hoppet och har gett skulpturen dess namn. En portfölj i brons på marken representerar Wallenbergs oavslutade uppdrag. På stenpelarnas blankpolerade sidor finns texter ingraverade som anknyter till Raoul Wallenbergs gärning.

Den ungerskfödde konstnären Gustav Kraitz greps själv i Budapest samtidigt som Wallenberg och levde flera år i sovjetisk fångenskap för att sedan komma till Sverige 1956.

Raoul Wallenberg är amerikansk hedersmedborgare sedan 1981 och korsningen 47:e gatan och Första Avenyn, utanför FN, heter Raoul Wallenberg Walk och utgör början på Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza.

Till representanter för svenska massmedier:

Invigningen sker 9 november kl. 11:00 och är öppen för allmänheten. Ingen pressackreditering krävs. För ytterligare information angående programmet och monumentets konstruktion dessförinnan -- kontakta Kjersti Board eller Claes Jernaeus, Sveriges generalkonsulat i New York tfn: (212) 583-2550.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

TELEFAX

Sid. 1 (1)

1998-10-28

P 2 Eu¹

Utrikesdepartementet

P-P

Ulrika Haggård

Generalkonsulatet

NEW YORK Dnr 111 ✓

Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

Generalkonsulatet bemyndigas utbetala 2000 US dollar till forskaren Susan Mesinai, utomstående expert i Raoul Wallenberg-utredningen. Beloppet utgör förskott för flygbiljett Moskva samt kostnader för visa och reseförsäkring för senare redovisning mot kvitton.

Redovisning skall ske med avräkningsbesked (kostnadsställe 4215, finansiering 105, verksamhetskod 25112).

Cabinet

Exp. 98-10-28/uh.